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Abstract 
 
 
Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting 
evidence (APA, 2013) and are a symptom most often associated with schizophrenia. 
Evidence suggests that psychotic symptoms, such as delusions, exist on a continuum 
from the healthy population to clinical disorder (van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, 
Delespaul & Krabbendam, 2009; van Os & Reininghaus, 2016). Research 
demonstrating that biases in reasoning contribute to the formation of such 
delusional beliefs has gathered momentum and has been shown in both clinical and 
healthy, non-clinical populations (e.g. Warman, Lysaker, Martin, Davis, & 
Haudenschield, 2007). Liberal acceptance has only been demonstrated previously in 
patients with schizophrenia therefore the current thesis aimed to examine whether a 
liberal acceptance reasoning style would be evident in a subclinical sample 
consistent with a continuum model and to examine factors that may underpin this 
acceptance.  
 
In Chapters 3-5 and Chapter 8, it was found that there was a tendency for those 
high in delusional ideation to rate stimuli with both delusional and neutral content as 
more likely to be true compared to those low in delusional ideation indicating a 
lowered threshold for plausibility, consistent with a liberal reasoning style. It was a 
fairly consistent finding that stimuli with delusional themes were rated as more 
exciting than stimuli with neutral themes by participants high in delusional ideation, 
highlighting a potential mechanism for why narratives with delusional and neutral 
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content are more likely to be accepted (Chapter 2, 5 & 8). Sensation seeking 
however did not provide an explanation for finding excitement in delusional stimuli 
and creativity was only implicated when this was in regards to emotional creativity in 
Chapter 3. Furthermore, perceptual and non-perceptual apophenia (the tendency to 
see patterns where none exist or make causal connections between random events) 
appears to play a central role in why participants high in delusional ideation liberally 
accept. Embedded objects were reported in visual ‘noise’ where no object had been 
embedded by participants high in delusional ideation in Chapter 4. Consistent with 
this, participants high in delusional ideation also tended to report experiencing more 
coincidences than those low in delusional ideation in Chapters 5 and 8. This is 
important for the liberal acceptance account since the ability to see patterns where 
none exist and make causal connections between random events may be a factor in 
why delusion-prone individuals see plausibility where others do not.  
 
Liberal acceptance was also investigated in light of findings from studies with clinical 
patients in Chapters 6 and 7. In Chapter 6, participants assigned plausibility ratings 
to interpretations of ambiguous pictures to see if those high in delusional ideation 
see plausibility in interpretations that others would reject or rate lowly. Similar 
trends were found in a subclinical sample, to that found in Moritz and Woodward’s 
(2004) original study and participants high in delusional ideation rated more of the 
interpretations as possible, good or excellent compared to participants low in 
delusional ideation, who rated more of the interpretations as poor; these effects 
however did not achieve significance. When probability estimates and decision and 
rejection thresholds were examined using the ‘Who Wants to be a Millionaire?’ 
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paradigm (see Moritz, Woodward & Hausmann, 2006), differences between 
participants high and low in delusional ideation did not emerge in Chapter 7. 
 
The series of experiments reported in this thesis have been successful in highlighting 
under what conditions participants high in delusional ideation liberally accept and in 
identifying potential factors that underpin this acceptance. Limitations of this 
research, theoretical implications and directions for future research are considered in 
the General Discussion in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
Definition of delusions 
Delusions are present in a number of psychiatric diagnoses but are most often 
thought of as a symptom of schizophrenia (Mujica-Parodi, Greenberg, Bilder, & 
Malaspina, 2001; Tandon & Maj, 2008), with schizophrenia affecting around 1% of 
the population (Johns & van Os, 2001). Eighty percent of those with schizophrenia 
will suffer persecutory delusions (Freeman, 2007) and between 20-50% will report 
grandiose delusions (Knowles, McCarthy-Jones & Rowse, 2011).  
 
The concept of delusions has a long history (Berrios, 1991), however the attempts 
most recently to define delusions have mainly concentrated on the ideas first 
introduced by Karl Jaspers (1913). Jaspers defined three main areas concerned with 
psychiatric patients’ beliefs; these included the conviction with which the belief is 
held, the tendency for the belief/s to be unreceptive to evidence or 
counterarguments and often the tendency to have bizarre content. However, Jaspers 
also made the distinction that for a belief to be delusional rather than a delusion-like 
idea, it must also be non-understandable. As some have noted, (Bentall, Corcoran, 
Howard, Blackwood, & Kinderman, 2001) it is difficult to operationalize the criteria of 
non-understandability and thus definitions of delusions have mainly concentrated on 
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these three criteria highlighted by Jaspers (1913). Until most recently delusions have 
been defined as: 
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. 
The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s 
culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of religious faith) (DSM-IV, 2000; 
p. 765.). 
However, this definition has received criticism. For example, non-bizarre delusions 
could essentially occur in real-life situations such as believing you are being 
followed, poisoned or deceived by someone (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2003). In other 
words, the belief does not necessarily have to be false and it is left to clinicians to 
make a judgement about whether this is indeed, a false belief.  
 
Researchers have also questioned the ‘falsity’ criterion (Spitzer, 1990) and 
additionally what constitutes ‘incontrovertible falsity’- it is left unclear what level of 
evidence would be required for a belief to be ‘incontrovertibly false’ (Bell et al., 
2003).  
 
Furthermore, delusions need not be about ‘external reality’. Indeed, delusions of 
control or passivity delusions usually refer to a person’s own mental state such as 
experiencing one’s thoughts and actions as not being their own. Some researchers 
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have also questioned whether the delusional belief is firmly sustained. A study 
conducted by Myin-Germeys, Nicolson and Delespaul, (2001) found that patients’ 
conviction of the truthfulness of a belief can vary over short periods of time, even 
over the course of a day, while Garety et al. (2005) found that approximately half of 
patients with delusions will accept the possibility that they may be mistaken about 
their beliefs. This suggests that delusional beliefs are not always firmly sustained. 
 
With the publication of the fifth Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM; APA, 2013), the definition of delusions has undergone some revisions. The 
new DSM has aimed to address some of the issues associated with defining 
delusions. According to DSM V, (Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic 
Disorders; 2013); 
Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of 
conflicting evidence. Their content may include a variety of themes (e.g. 
persecutory, referential, somatic, religious, grandiose). […]The distinction 
between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make 
and depends in part on the degree of conviction with which the belief is held 
despite clear or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its veracity (APA, 
2013; p. 87). 
The changes have implications for the current understanding of delusions. For 
example, what is most noticeable is the change of a false belief now being a fixed 
belief. In addition, delusions no longer need to be based on ‘incorrect inference’ 
about ‘external reality’ but can be about one’s self or one’s life experiences, for 
 21 
 
example. It must also be considered that proof is not always available that the belief 
is false and therefore, ‘despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or 
evidence to the contrary’ has now been changed to ‘despite clear or reasonable 
contradictory evidence regarding its veracity’ in the new definition, reflecting more 
flexibility regarding the truthfulness of a belief than was afforded by the old 
definition. 
 
Classification 
Despite problems operationalising the definition of delusions, the concept of 
delusions as a central symptom of psychosis is widely accepted (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 
2006). Any theme can be present in a delusional belief, though some delusional 
beliefs appear to be more common than others. Table 1.1 presents some common 
themes in delusional beliefs. 
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Table 1.1  
Common delusional themes and examples. Adapted from Bell et al. (2006).                                          
Theme Example 
Persecutory “I am being followed by the police” 
Grandiose “I am special, ‘chosen’” 
Bizarre “People can read my mind and insert thoughts” 
Somatic “I am infested by parasites” 
Cotard “I am dead/ decaying” 
Capgras  “My wife has been replaced by an impostor” 
Reference “The lyrics of that song are especially meant for 
me”  
 
Delusions: Dichotomous or Continuous? Measuring subclinical delusional 
ideation 
Despite psychosis generally being defined dichotomously for clinical purposes (van 
Os, Hanssen, Bijl, & Ravelli, 2000) a growing body of evidence suggests that 
psychosis exists on a continuum (Claridge, 1988; Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley 
& Slater, 2010; van Os, et al, 2009; van Os & Reininghaus, 2016) and that those in 
the general population experience delusional ideation more often than previously 
thought. By this reasoning, there are people in the general population whose 
experiences, cognitions and behaviours are comparable to patients with 
schizophrenia, yet would not warrant a clinical diagnosis of psychosis. Some authors 
have noted that general population samples who engage in delusional thinking may 
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be distinguished from clinical populations on their level of distress and preoccupation 
with a belief (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999). 
 
The idea of dimensionality between normality and psychosis is by no means a new 
one (Bleuler, 1911; Rado, 1953; Meehl, 1962). Personality and individual differences 
were thought to be implicated in psychosis proneness some decades ago. This is 
emphasised in the schizophrenia literature, the idea of continuity in the disorder and 
that certain features of schizophrenia could be observed without the associated 
clinical signs of illness (Claridge, 1994). 
 
Lawrie (2016) however raises issues surrounding the use of a continuum approach 
in clinical practice and argues that the current system does reasonably well without 
the need to differentiate between categorical and continuous approaches. Esterberg 
and Compton (2009) make a comparison between categorical and dimensional 
approaches to psychosis and conclude that while a categorical approach leads to 
greater reliability, a dimensional approach enhances validity. Although Lawrie (2016) 
supports the view that adding continuous scores that are related to symptom 
severity to categorical diagnoses could enhance aspects of clinical practice, more 
evidence would be required before a revolutionary change in clinical practice is 
justified. This evidence is being accrued and provides a strong justification for using 
this approach. Van Os and Reininghaus (2016) have suggested an ‘extended 
psychosis phenotype’ that is continuous with clinical psychotic disorder and shares 
features such as demographic, environmental, familial and psychopathological 
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features with clinical psychotic disorder. Positive psychotic symptoms such as 
hallucinations and delusions can occur independently of disorder as in the subclinical 
population or can persist over time and eventually result in psychotic disorder (Van 
Os & Reininghaus, 2016). Consistent with this, earlier findings of Linscott and van Os 
(2013) demonstrated that the probability of persistent psychotic experiences is 
strongly correlated with baseline measures of psychotic experience. Of those 
exhibiting psychotic experiences at baseline, 7.4% went on to develop a psychotic 
disorder. This provides support for the continuum model of psychosis and this is 
important since, if the argument for a continuum is to be supported, research must 
demonstrate that there are changes over short and long periods of time between 
subclinical and clinical cases (van Os et al., 2009).  
 
That psychosis exists on a continuum has been supported by studies such as that 
conducted by Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad and Zinser (1994), Poulton, 
Caspi, Moffitt, Cannon, Murray & Harrington (2000) and Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, 
Vollebergh & van Os (2005) who followed participants reporting psychotic 
experiences over longitudinal periods and then examined incidences of psychotic 
disorder. For instance, Chapman et al. (1994) identified participants who were 
psychosis prone (n = 534) and then re-interviewed the same participants after a 10-
15 year period (n = 508). They found that particularly high scores on the Magical 
Ideation Scale and Perceptual Aberration Scale (or both) were strong indicators of 
psychosis proneness but that psychotic-like experiences at initial interview were also 
predictive of later psychosis proneness. Poulton et al. (2000) examined children at 
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11 years old and followed the same participants up to when they were 26 years old 
to determine if there was continuity in psychotic symptoms from childhood to 
adulthood. They found that as symptoms increased in the 11 year olds, so did the 
positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia in 26 year olds. The group 
members with strong symptoms at age 11 were significantly more likely than the 
weak or control group to have an adult diagnosis of schizophreniform. Children with 
weak symptoms were also at risk of deleterious outcomes as an adult. Poulton et al. 
(2000) however acknowledges that this does not necessarily mean that a prodromal 
phase of schizophrenia can be spotted earlier but rather that covert behaviours 
(such as concealed unusual beliefs and experiences) may precede the more overt 
prodromal signs.  
 
Hansenn et al. (2005) conducted a large scale study (n = 7076) examining the 
stability of subclinical psychotic experiences over a two year period. The incidence of 
psychotic experiences was also examined. They found that the most likely outcome 
of these experiences is that they cease to continue – only 8% of people who had a 
subclinical psychotic experience the first time they were examined had a subclinical 
outcome and a further 8% showed evidence of a clinical outcome. The number of 
reported psychotic experiences at time one and the emotional context had a strong 
influence on clinical outcomes but not on subclinical outcomes. The incidence of 
subclinical psychotic experience was also found to be much higher (100 times 
greater) than estimated incidences of psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. 
These studies suggest some predictive value of whether psychotic experiences will 
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eventually lead to psychotic disorder and while some will result in psychotic disorder, 
most will remain in the subclinical range. 
 
In light of the above literature and support for the existence of a psychosis 
continuum it has subsequently been proposed that it would be more beneficial to 
study individuals in this subclinical category of psychosis proneness (e.g. DeRosse & 
Karlsgodt, 2015; Linney, Peters & Ayton, 1998; Mark & Toulopoulou, 2016). As some 
have noted, this avoids methodological difficulties such as medication effects, 
motivational issues, variation over time of severity of symptoms and general 
cognitive decline as a consequence of mental illness (Claridge, 1988). Thus, research 
on subclinical delusions allows researchers to make inferences regarding the clinical 
population (DeRosse & Karlsgodt, 2015; van Os & Linscott, 2012).  
 
In psychology, research into subclinical symptoms has led to the development of a 
number of questionnaires that aim to measure liability to psychosis. These range 
from the Magical Ideation Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) measuring unusual 
experiences, the Schizotypal Personality Scale (Jackson & Claridge, 1991) modelled 
on DSM-III criteria for schizotypal and borderline personality disorders and the 
Psychoticism Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; 1976) measuring personality traits, 
through to the more recent Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences 
(O-LIFE; Mason, Claridge & Jackson, 1995; Mason, Linney & Claridge, 2005) 
measuring ‘Unusual Experiences’, ‘Cognitive Disorganisation’, ‘Introvertive 
Anhedonia’ and ‘Impulsive Nonconformity’.  
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From these and other measures that have been developed, it can be argued that 
there has been a limitation on the number of questionnaires available that 
exclusively measure delusional thinking, especially in non-clinical populations 
(Peters, et al., 1999). One such scale, the Foulds Delusions-Symptoms-State 
Inventory (Foulds & Bedford 1975), was designed to measure four main types of 
delusion (delusions of grandeur, disintegration, persecution, and contrition); 
however, this was designed for clinical use and would be considered inappropriate 
for use in non-clinical populations since the items contain florid symptoms and would 
be unlikely to be consistent with delusional ideation in non-clinical populations 
(Peters et al., 1999). Thus, the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters, Day & 
Garety, 1996) was constructed to specifically measure delusional ideation in general 
population samples. This measure emphasises the importance of the distress 
associated with a belief, how preoccupied a person is by a belief and the conviction 
with which the belief is held. In doing this, it also emphasises the importance of 
continuity in delusional thinking and the potential for this to develop into psychotic 
illness, given that these factors of distress, preoccupation and conviction can interact 
and fluctuate over time, consistent with a continuum approach (Peters et al., 1999). 
For example, a person may believe with absolute conviction that things in magazines 
or on TV are written especially for them but they may not be particularly distressed 
or preoccupied with this. Conversely, they may be particularly preoccupied with the 
idea that people might communicate telepathically but not be distressed about it or 
really believe that it is true. Therefore, delusions can no longer be defined as ‘all or 
nothing’ phenomena, but as beliefs that lie on a continuum with normality. 
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Another similar measure that has been developed is the 42-item Community 
Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE; Stefanis et al., 2002). This is based on 
three dimensions of positive, negative and depressive symptoms and measures 
frequency and distress associated with lifetime psychotic-like feelings, experiences 
and thoughts. The CAPE has been used in clinical settings to detect first episode 
psychosis successfully (Boonstra, Wunderink, Sytema & Wiersma, 2009; Mossaheb 
et al., 2012) and more recently, the 15 item CAPE (CAPE-P15) measuring positive 
symptoms such as grandiosity, paranoia and bizarre experiences has shown to be a 
valid and reliable measure of current psychotic like experiences in a non-clinical 
sample (Capri, Kavanagh, Hides & Scott, 2015). 
 
Theories of Delusion Formation 
Anomalous perceptual experiences, two-factor theories and the prediction 
error theory of delusions 
Maher (1974; 2005) argued that delusions are a result of anomalous perceptual 
experiences through normal reasoning processes. This implies that a delusional 
belief is not held contrary to evidence but is strengthened by the evidence available 
(i.e. the anomalous experience). In an attempt to explain the significant, anomalous 
perceptual experience, normal cognitive activity (i.e. reasoning) is applied. The 
content of the explanation therefore represents the delusion (Maher, 1974).  
A number of studies provide evidence to support this theory. For example, delusions 
are not limited to one type of disorder but rather can occur in a number of 
psychological and medical conditions (Maher & Ross, 1984). In non-clinical 
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populations, hearing loss has been found to be linked to paranoia (Zimbardo, 
Andersen & Kabat, 1981). Ellis, Young, Quayle and de Pauw (1997) found that when 
Capgras patients and controls were shown pictures of familiar and unfamiliar faces, 
Capgras patients failed to discriminate between these faces on a measure of skin-
conductance response compared to the control participants. However, Maher’s 
theory does not account for all delusions (Garety & Freeman, 1999). Some delusions 
occur in the absence of an anomalous perceptual experience (Chapman & Chapman, 
1988). Additionally, some people have perceptual anomalies but do not develop 
delusions (e.g. Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1995; Vuilleumier, Mohr, Valenza, 
Wetzel, & Landis, 2003). Peters and Garety (2006) point out that perception is not 
independent of interpretations, therefore delusions may sometimes influence 
abnormal perceptual experiences (Slade & Bentall, 1988).  
 
A more recent study examined anomalous perceptual experiences in a large, general 
population sample and how these relate to beliefs (Pechey & Halligan, 2012). They 
found that almost half of the sample reported an anomalous perceptual experience 
and that anomalous experiences moderately and significantly correlated with 
anomalous beliefs but not with cultural or societal beliefs. Given that a causal effect 
has been implied between anomalous perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs 
a disassociation effect between these was also found. Of the 253 participants 
sampled, 89% moderately or strongly endorsed at least one delusional/ paranormal 
belief but did not report an anomalous perceptual experience. Conversely, 56% of 
participants that did not claim to have any anomalous beliefs reported having at 
least one anomalous experience (Pechey & Halligan, 2012). These findings are of 
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importance since they demonstrate that while a large majority of people report 
anomalous beliefs alongside anomalous perceptual experiences, not all of them do, 
suggesting that anomalous perceptual experiences are not necessary for the 
formation of all types of aberrant beliefs. Indeed, Maher (1999) later acknowledged 
a potential reasoning impairment in addition to anomalous perceptual experiences to 
explain delusion formation. 
 
Extending the work of Maher, Coltheart, Menzies and Sutton (2010) put forward a 
persuasive argument in support of a two-factor theory of delusion formation 
incorporating anomalous perceptual experiences or what they prefer to term as 
‘abnormal data’ (Factor 1)  and a cognitive aspect: namely defective belief 
evaluation (Factor 2). The two-factor theory of delusion formation has been 
developed over the last decade and a half (Coltheart, 2007; Coltheart, Langdon & 
McKay, 2007; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000) and tends to relate solely to 
monothematic delusions; most commonly the Capgras delusion (see Table 1.1 for 
example). There are however limitations to this approach. Firstly, it is unclear how 
this theory relates to polythematic delusions. Some delusions that are frequently 
seen in clinical patients have not been considered in the two-factor theory 
(Coltheart, 2013). Additionally it is unclear how a two-factor theory relates to other 
types of delusional beliefs such as persecutory or grandiose delusions, for example 
(Miyazono, Bortolotti & Broome, 2015). Coltheart, et al. (2011) have however aimed 
to address some of these issues associated with applying a two-factor theory to 
polythematic delusions. For example, there may be many ‘first-factors’ (anomalous 
perceptual experiences) that cause polythematic delusions. Polythematic delusions 
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may also form when the first factor is ambiguous and therefore may lend itself to 
different types of explanations (Miyazono et al. 2015). There is a general consensus 
that a second factor exists and some state that this is an abnormality in the 
evaluation of beliefs (Miyazono et al. 2015). What specific kind of abnormality this is, 
requires further clarification and there seems to be little consensus in the literature 
regarding the features of this second factor. There is nonetheless consensus that the 
two distinct factors of the theory have a causal role to play in the formation and 
maintenance of delusions, with the first factor explaining the content of the delusion 
and the second factor accounting for the adoption and maintenance of the 
(delusional) belief. 
 
Corlett et al. (2007), Corlett, Krystal, Taylor and Fletcher (2009) and Corlett, Taylor, 
Wang, Fletcher and Krystal (2010) posit that delusions are adopted due to aberrant 
prediction-error signals and that this leads to inappropriate attribution of salience. In 
this context, prediction-error relates to a mismatch between predictions and 
experiences. It is theorised that prediction-error signals become excessive in people 
with delusions. Inappropriate attribution of salience in this context then, relates to 
giving salience and attention to events that are not at all interesting or merely 
coincidental but somehow seem to have sudden special meaning to the person 
(Miyazono et al. 2015) potentially due to the influence of prediction error signals and 
dopamine dysregulation (Corlett et al., 2009; Kapur, 2003). In this way, delusions 
may form to explain these odd but meaningful experiences.  
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There is empirical evidence to support the aberrant prediction-error theory. Corlett 
et al. (2007) asked participants to learn the association between certain foods and 
allergic reactions while being monitored by fMRI. Participants were made up of 
either people with delusions or a control group of non-delusional participants. The 
activity in the right prefrontal cortex (thought to be a marker of prediction error 
processing) did not differ with the expectations about allergic reactions in the group 
of people with delusions despite the expectations differing to either confirm or 
violate these expectations. There was also evidence that the more severe the 
delusion, the worse the aberrant prediction error was (Corlett et al., 2007).  
 
There are however limitations to the prediction-error hypothesis. It could be that 
people experience aberrant prediction error signals but do not develop delusions. It 
is a core assumption of proponents of the prediction error theory that prediction 
errors lead to delusions but this may not be the case. As with the two factor 
theories, people with perceptual anomalies have the same abnormal experience as 
Capgras patients but still, do not develop a delusion to explain this experience (e.g. 
Tranel, et al., 1995; Vuilleumier et al., 2003). This theory also needs to explain in 
more detail how delusions are maintained over time - memory reconsolidation has 
been proposed as a potential mechanism for this (Corlett et al., 2009). 
 
Schemas, affect and attributional biases 
The threat anticipation model (Freeman, 2007; Freeman & Freeman, 2008; 
Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002) also has perceptual 
anomalies as a central tenet implicated in the formation of delusional belief (see 
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Figure 1). Within this model, paranoid (persecutory) delusions are the focus, with 
several factors of importance including: anomalous experiences, affective processes, 
reasoning biases and social factors (Freeman et al., 2010). Research has 
demonstrated, consistent with Maher’s account of anomalous perceptions, that 
internal anomalous experiences are likely to be given a delusional explanation 
because delusional patients have no alternative explanation for their experience 
(Freeman et al., 2004). Two out of three studies also found that internal experiences 
are often cited as evidence to support beliefs in those that are delusional (Buchanan 
et al., 1993; Freeman et al., 2004; Garety & Hemsley, 1994).  
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Figure 1. Factors involved in the development of persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 
2010; Pg. 84.) 
 
 
Emotion 
Anxiety, Worry, Interpersonal 
sensitivity (negative beliefs about 
self and others) 
Trigger 
Major life-events, on-going stress, 
sleep disturbance, trauma, illicit drugs 
 
Search for Meaning 
Search for understanding/ meaning. 
Not wanting to talk to others/ having 
nobody to provide feedback on ideas 
Internal and External Events 
Internal: arousal, anomalous 
experiences, core cognitive 
dysfunction 
External: Discrepant, negative, 
socially significant, or ambiguous 
events 
 
THE PERSECUTORY 
(THREAT) BELIEF 
Reasoning 
Jumping to conclusions, 
confirmation bias, failure to 
consider alternatives 
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Cognitive-affective processes are also central to this model. Negative cognitions 
about the self are prevalent in those with paranoid delusions (Collett, Pugh, Waite & 
Freeman, 2016). The induction of negative self-cognitions led to increased paranoia 
in those displaying paranoid ideation (Atherton et al., 2016; Freeman et al., 2014) 
Indeed, paranoia is strongly related to negative-other schemas (e.g. other people 
are hostile, unforgiving, devious) and negative self-schemas (e.g. I am weak, 
worthless, vulnerable) (Fowler et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2006). Combined with 
anxiety (Fowler et al., 2006) these potentially have devastating consequences when 
considering the effects in a social context and in part, underpin the threat 
anticipation model proposed by Freeman (2007). Appraising others as hostile and 
devious and appraising oneself as weak and vulnerable can be a dangerous position 
leading to the feeling of persistent threat from others (Fowler et al., 2006). 
  
Anxiety and depression are strongly associated with paranoia in both clinical and 
non-clinical populations (Fowler et al., 2006; Freeman et al., 2005; Johns et al., 
2004) and predict the occurrence of paranoid thinking in the general population 
(Freeman, Pugh & Garety, 2008; Galbraith et al., 2014). Additionally, inducing 
anxiety had led to the likelihood of paranoid thoughts increasing (Lincoln, Lange, 
Burau, Exner & Moritz, 2012). With the combination of negative self and negative 
other schemas and anxiety it seems inevitable that hypervigilance to threat occurs. 
This is consistent with the findings of Freeman et al. (2013) that patients show 
greater anticipation of threatening events and that danger is always in mind. 
Hypervigilance and an attentional bias then, lead to individuals becoming more 
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sensitive to potential threats making false alarms more common. Furthermore, 
beliefs may be further exacerbated and subsequently consolidated by reasoning 
biases such as a self-reference bias (Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris, 2008) or a 
jumping to conclusions reasoning style (Fine, Gardner, Craigie & Gold, 2007; 
McLean, Mattiske & Blazan, 2017).  
 
Bentall and colleagues (Bentall, & Kaney, 1996; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; 
Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997; Moritz, Bentall, Kolbeck & 
Roesch-Ely, 2017) suggest that those with persecutory delusions display attributional 
biases – an ‘externalising’ bias whereby self-blame is avoided when negative events 
occur and a ‘personalizing’ bias whereby negative events are attributed to others. 
These biases come into play because of attempts to avoid negative views of the self 
(self-blame) which may be particularly highlighted when negative events occur. This 
ensures that fragile self-esteem is protected by essentially projecting negative self-
representations onto others. However, maintaining self-esteem in this way comes at 
the cost of living with negative representations of others as being hostile or devious, 
for example.  
 
A number of studies have examined the association between persecutory delusions 
and attributional style with mixed results (Langdon, Still, Connors, Ward & Catts, 
2013). An externalising bias has been found for negative events in those with 
paranoid delusions in comparison to nonclinical controls (Fear, Sharp & Healy, 1996; 
Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994) however, there have been studies that have failed to 
 37 
 
replicate these findings (e.g. Martin & Penn, 2002; McKay Langdon & Coltheart, 
2005).  
 
Freeman (2007) postulates that an externalising attributional style does not 
necessarily reflect a defensive account because self-esteem tends to be skewed 
towards a negative relationship with paranoia. For example, in non-clinical 
populations, paranoia has been found to correlate with lower self-esteem and higher 
depression (Ellett, Lopes, & Chadwick, 2003; Freeman et al., 2005a; Fowler et al., 
2006; Johns et al., 2004; Martin & Penn, 2001; McKay, et al., 2005) while Smith et 
al. (2006) found that those with persecutory delusions had lower self-esteem, higher 
depression and more negative beliefs. This would not be the case if delusions served 
as a defence mechanism for self-esteem. It seems that the most parsimonious 
explanation is that paranoia is directly related to lowered self-esteem and increased 
depression (Freeman, 2007) although causal effects may be hard to determine since 
the argument is likely to be circular in nature. Low self-esteem and depression are 
factors related to the formation of paranoid ideas; this in turn may then cause even 
lower self-esteem and increased depression. 
 
Reasoning 
Maher (1974) argued against a cognitive impairment maintaining that there was a 
lack of evidence for reasoning biases in deluded individuals. However, a large body 
of evidence has since emerged that challenges this position and suggests that 
reasoning biases are indeed implicated in delusion formation and maintenance (e.g. 
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Garety & Freeman, 1999). A number of studies have shown that people with 
delusions tend to show a ‘jump-to-conclusions’ (JTC) reasoning style (see Garety & 
Freeman, 1999; Fine et al., 2007; Garety & Freeman, 2013; McLean et al., 2017; 
Warman et al., 2007). The JTC bias is based on the notion that decisions are made 
(or hypotheses are accepted as correct) on the basis of less information compared to 
controls.  
 
This was first demonstrated by Huq, Garety and Hemsley (1988) using a probabilistic 
reasoning task developed by Phillips and Edwards (1966) known as the ‘beads task’. 
In this classic experiment of probabilistic reasoning, participants are shown two jars 
of beads, labelled A and B. The jars contain two different coloured beads in the ratio 
of 85:15 and 15:85. Participants are made aware of the ratios of beads and the jars 
are hidden from view. Although participants are told the beads are being drawn 
randomly, they are drawn in a fixed sequence and replaced after each draw after 
which participants must decide which jar the experimenter is drawing from. Two 
versions of this task have typically been employed; ‘draws to decision’ and 
‘probability estimates’. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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One More 
 
                                                       
                                                                 
Jar A  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the ‘draws to decision procedure’ and the ‘probability 
estimates procedure’ variation of the beads task. Adapted from Munz (2012). 
 
 
 
 
Draws to decision, example: 
                                                (Trial is terminated) 
 
Probability estimates, example: 
 
 
A series of beads is drawn 
from one container.  
(Here, it is Jar A.) 
 
One More 
 
One More Stop. It is A! 
70% A 80% A 85% A 90% A 60% A 70% A 80% A 85% A 85% A 90% A 
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Draws to decision allows participants to request as many beads as they wish and the 
task is only terminated once a decision of which jar is being drawn from is made. 
Probability estimates involves assigning probabilities at each stage of the sequence 
for which jar is being drawn from and this has a fixed number of trials. Huq et al. 
(1988) found, when using the draws to decision paradigm that deluded individuals 
requested fewer beads before reaching a decision than controls (normal and 
psychiatric) and displayed greater confidence in their decisions. A number of studies 
have replicated these findings (Fear & Healy, 1997; Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 
1991; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Mortimer et al., 1996; Peters, Day & Garety, 1997; 
see also Ross, McKay Coltheart & Langdon, 2013) with few exceptions (Young & 
Bentall, 1997). Interestingly, Maher (1992) has argued that the findings of Huq et al. 
(1988) do not indicate that people with delusions make faulty inferences. Rather, 
Maher (1992) argues that people with delusions represent better Bayesian reasoning 
than control groups, with the mean number of draws being 2.2 to reach a decision.  
After two beads have been drawn that are the same colour, Bayesian probability of 
the beads coming from the jar with mostly that colour is 97% (Garety & Freeman, 
1999; Ross, McKay, Coltheart & Langdon, 2015). Maher (1992) argued that this 
would be a reasonable point to make a decision and that consequently, the findings 
fail to demonstrate any faulty inference. However, nearly half in the sample of 
people with delusions made a decision on the basis of one bead (85% Bayesian 
probability) which is thought to be very rare in controls (Garety & Freeman, 1999). 
In contrast, the controls were overcautious in their estimate, which has also been 
shown previously (Edwards, 1982). In addition, it has been demonstrated that 
humans are not always strong Bayesian reasoners (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
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Nevertheless, the deluded group still consistently based their decisions on less 
information that controls.  
 
Dudley, John, Young and Over, (1997a) replicated Huq et al’s (1988) findings using 
the draws to decision paradigm but found that deluded participants performed 
similar to controls on probability estimates. In this study, participants were shown 
results from a coin-spinning task, where participants estimated the probability of 
whether the coin was biased to land on heads. No differences were found between 
groups on this task (Dudley et al., 1997a).  
 
The JTC bias has been shown to be unrelated to impulsiveness, since the deluded 
group adjusted the amount of evidence required when the ratio of beads was more 
difficult (60:40) or to a memory deficit, since a memory aid did not change the 
results (Dudley et al., 1997a). Therefore, the authors concluded that it appears not 
to be a general reasoning deficit but specific to a data gathering bias (Dudley et al., 
1997a). Importantly, this does not demonstrate that those with delusions cannot 
reason but that there may be specific differences in reasoning that contribute to the 
formation and maintenance of delusional beliefs (Dudley, Cavanagh, Daley & Smith, 
2015). 
Using neutral reasoning tasks such as the beads task is thought to be useful because 
if delusional patients were to reason about delusional materials, this may lead to 
tautological arguments (why can’t they reason, because they are delusional and vice 
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versa; Dudley & Over, 2003). However, when people make decisions in social 
situations, these decisions have different consequences in comparison to reasoning 
about beads in a jar. Thus, the beads task has been criticised as lacking ecological 
validity (Lincoln, Salzmann, Ziegler & Westermann, 2011).   
 
To make reasoning tasks more realistic and relevant to everyday decision making, 
one study presented participants with neutral and emotionally salient material in the 
form of surveys about someone very much like the participant (Dudley, John, Young 
& Over, 1997b). The emotionally salient material appeared to exaggerate the JTC 
bias and also led to more errors in reasoning for the deluded group, although more 
errors were made generally with emotionally salient material in all groups (Dudley, 
et al., 1997b). There is evidence to suggest that the data gathering bias is increased 
when such methods are employed (Lincoln et al., 2011; Young & Bentall, 1997). 
Hence, the relevance of this data gathering bias is that the amount of information a 
person gathers to support an explanation is limited, leading to an early and 
sometimes inaccurate decision (Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod, & Roesch-Ely, 
2010) that could potentially contribute towards the formation of a poorly supported, 
potentially delusional belief. This also means that there are limited attempts to 
gather other (possibly disconfirmatory) evidence, leading to belief maintenance 
(Freeman, 2007).  
 
Moritz and Woodward (2004) have argued for a liberal acceptance (LA) account. 
According to this, those with delusions have a lower threshold of acceptance, 
 43 
 
suggesting that rather than simply being hasty, deluded patients reach the threshold 
of what is acceptable evidence for a decision to be made sooner than controls. This, 
in turn, leads delusional patients to accept implausible ideas more easily. They found 
that when patients with schizophrenia were shown pictures from the Thematic 
Apperception Test (Murray, 1943), and asked to rate the plausibility of various 
interpretations, patients gave relatively high plausibility ratings for those that were 
rated as poor or unlikely by controls, yet on plausibility ratings that were rated as 
good or excellent by controls patients were comparable (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). 
Interestingly, Moritz and Woodward’s (2004) findings indicated that liberal 
acceptance was more pronounced for scenarios that were absurd or less likely and 
that are usually discounted either through ‘common sense’ or prior knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, ambiguous situations (rather than situations with only one strong 
alternative; e.g. the ‘beads task’) led to increased ambivalence and could delay a 
decision because of a lower threshold of acceptance (Moritz, Woodward & Lambert, 
2007). For example, when the number of jars in the beads task is increased to three 
rather than two, hasty decision making disappears in delusion-prone participants 
(Bensi, Giusberti, Nori & Gambetti, 2010). The increased number of alternative jars 
leads to greater ambiguity, since multiple alternatives cross this lowered threshold of 
acceptance (however see Broome et al., 2007). The findings of White and Mansell 
(2009) appear contradictory, with the JTC bias being evident for the two, three and 
four jar paradigms. They argue that inconsistent findings may be due to differing 
methodologies – Moritz and colleagues utilise probability or plausibility estimates 
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whereas White and Mansell (2009) argue that it is the decision that is of importance, 
not how alternatives are evaluated. Liberal acceptance has been demonstrated 
consistently in further and recent studies (Moritz et al., 2008; Moritz et al., 2009; 
Moritz et al., 2016). 
 
In a recent study, Moritz and colleagues (Moritz et al., 2016) again tested the liberal 
acceptance account but replaced jars of beads with herds of sheep. Consistent with 
previous studies that have demonstrated liberal acceptance (Moritz et al., 2006; 
Moritz et al., 2007), they found that patients with present or previous delusions had 
much lower decision thresholds in comparison to the control group (82% vs 93% 
respectively). This strengthens the liberal acceptance account and means that 
patients with schizophrenia employ lax criteria for assessing hypotheses which in 
turn may lead to the acceptance of explanations that are weakly supported. In 
support of this, few decisions were revised after an initial decision had been 
endorsed (Moritz et al., 2016).  
 
The studies reviewed have shown that deluded individuals display certain reasoning 
biases when making decisions. Reasoning biases similar to those found in individuals 
with delusions have been increasingly detected in the sub-clinical population (e.g., 
Colbert & Peters, 2002; Galbraith et al., 2008; Galbraith, Manktelow & Morris, 2010; 
LaRocco & Warman, 2009) supporting a continuum model of psychosis (Ross et al., 
2013). 
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Colbert and Peters (2002) found a JTC bias in a healthy sample of participants who 
scored highly on a measure of delusional ideation. Freeman, Pugh and Garety (2008) 
found that the JTC bias was evident in 40 (out of 200) non-clinical participants and 
that this bias was associated with delusional conviction. Furthermore, Cafferkey, 
Murphy and Shevlin (2014) found an association between delusional ideation and a 
JTC bias on the harder version of the beads task (60:40 ratio) but not on the easier 
version (85:15 ratio). Keefe and Warman (2011) found that stress induction resulted 
in JTC in delusion-prone participants while in another study, subclinical paranoia led 
to high prevalence of JTC (Moritz, Quaquebeke & Lincoln, 2012). There are 
nonetheless studies that have failed to find an association between delusional 
ideation and a JTC bias (e.g. Ziegler, Rief, Werner & Lincoln, 2008). 
 
Warman et al. (2007) investigated the JTC bias across the continuum of delusional 
ideation by using deluded individuals as well as delusion prone and non-delusion 
prone individuals. The tasks used in this study involved a neutral task (the beads 
task) and a highly self-referent task adapted from Dudley et al’s (1997b) survey 
task. The JTC bias was present for the deluded group on the neutral task but not the 
delusion prone or non-delusion prone groups. However, they found that the 
delusional and delusion prone group displayed significantly more confidence in their 
judgements when the task was emotionally salient than when the task was neutral. 
This would suggest that confidence in judgements might be critical to understanding 
the way delusion-prone individuals process information that is self-referent (Warman 
et al., 2007). This is consistent with the phenomenology literature where 
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schizophrenia is theorized to be underpinned by a disorder of the self, most 
prominent in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. This is characterized by 
hyperreflexivity whereby self-consciousness becomes exaggerated to the point that 
cognitions and actions become observed, as if detached from the self; with the 
potential that one’s actions become objectified and attributed to external sources 
(Sass & Parnas, 2003). The findings of Warman et al. (2007) suggest that patients 
with delusions and delusion-prone individuals exhibit a heightened sense of self-
focus in their thinking.  
 
Disorders of the self have further been explored using cognitive approaches. 
Galbraith et al. (2008) found that individuals high in delusional ideation displayed a 
self-reference bias in response to everyday arguments, while those low in delusional 
ideation displayed the opposite effect. Warman and Martin (2006) found that high 
delusion prone individuals displayed the JTC bias only when the task was 
emotionally salient and self-referent but not when the task was neutral. The authors 
contended the judgements that people with delusions make are likely to be 
emotionally salient in nature, not neutral, therefore these findings are particularly 
relevant to understanding how those with delusions actually reason about their own 
delusions (Warman & Martin, 2006). 
 
Aims of the Present Thesis 
This thesis aims to make two new contributions to the literature. The first is to test 
whether liberal acceptance can be demonstrated in non-clinical, delusion-prone 
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participants as opposed to patients. Secondly, this thesis will explore hitherto 
untested questions as to why people with delusional ideas exhibit a liberal reasoning 
style. This will be done by studying new dimensions on which information is 
accepted/rejected (e.g. bizarreness and excitement), dimensions that have not 
previously been tested in relation to the liberal acceptance account.  
 
In Chapters 2-5, narratives containing delusional and neutral content were utilised to 
examine reasoning and liberal acceptance. This extended the work of LaRocco and 
Warman (2009) who used narratives with delusional and neutral content and asked 
participants to rate how likely they thought the narratives were true. If narratives 
were rated as more likely to be true in the present thesis, this would indicate that 
they were deemed as more plausible to participants and therefore more likely to be 
accepted. In the present thesis, this was considered an effective measure of 
reasoning. Additional variables such as creativity and personality were also examined 
to determine why those high in delusional ideation liberally accept.  
 
In Chapter 2, the effect of bizarreness and excitement as well as self reference and 
how disturbing narratives were thought to be was examined. Chapter 3 took an 
exploratory approach, utilising delusional and neutral narratives as a measure of 
reasoning but also examining creativity and personality - factors that may account 
for why a liberal acceptance bias is displayed in those high in delusional ideation. 
Additionally in Chapter 3, acquiescence bias was examined since it was important to 
rule out the possibility that liberal acceptance was simply agreement with statements 
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regardless of content. Chapter 4 and 5 examined creativity and apophenia as factors 
for why people high in delusional ideation liberally accept compared to people low in 
delusional ideation. Apophenia is the tendency to perceive meaningful patterns or 
make causal connections where none exist (e.g. coincidental experiences; Fyfe, 
Williams, Mason & Pickup, 2008). Chapter 6 and 7 utilised materials for examining 
liberal acceptance that had been used in the published literature (See Moritz & 
Woodward, 2004; Moritz et al., 2006) with the aim to demonstrate liberal 
acceptance in a clinical sample. In Chapter 8, a direct comparison between the new 
materials constructed by the author (Chapter 2-5) and materials used previously in 
the literature (Chapter 6 and 7) were made. Each experiment will now be reported 
within this thesis. 
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Chapter II 
Subclinical delusional ideation and likelihood ratings of 
delusional and neutral narratives 
 
Introduction 
LaRocco and Warman (2009) investigated reasoning biases in those high and low in 
delusional ideation by asking participants to assign ratings to emotionally neutral and 
delusional narratives. They found that those high in delusional ideation rated 
delusional narratives as more likely to be true than those low in delusional ideation, 
yet both groups assigned equivalent ratings for emotionally neutral narratives 
(LaRocco & Warman, 2009). In other words, those high in delusional ideation were 
biased to rate unusual scenarios as more likely to be true (see also McGuire, 
Junginger, Adams, Burright & Donovick, 2001). To put it another way, unusual 
scenarios surpassed a lower threshold of acceptance, consistent with a LA account 
(Moritz & Woodward, 2004). It may be that while healthy participants discount 
stimuli either through common sense or prior knowledge, evidence now suggests 
that patients with schizophrenia and those that are delusion-prone share common 
ground in that they demonstrate a more liberal approach to accepting implausible 
stimuli (Moritz & Woodward, 2004; LaRocco & Warman, 2009). 
 
Liberal acceptance has been demonstrated consistently in patients with 
schizophrenia (Moritz & Woodward, 2004; Moritz, Woodward & Hausmann, 2006; 
Moritz, Woodward, Jelinek & Klinge, 2008; Moritz, Woodward & Lambert, 2007) but 
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has not previously been explored in a non-clinical population. Additionally, 
underpinning factors of why people liberally accept information that others would 
reject or rate lowly have not been identified. 
 
The first variable examined, in line with LaRocco and Warman (2009), was to 
explore how likely participants rated narratives containing delusional and neutral 
themes to be true. In addition, the author is not aware of any studies that have 
addressed the importance of participants’ perceptions of bizarreness of delusional 
narratives. This question is important for the liberal acceptance account as it could 
be that delusional scenarios are thought to be less bizarre by delusion prone 
individuals thus leading to higher ratings of likelihood and greater acceptance of 
them. As many individuals find their delusional ideas disturbing (e.g. Stanton & 
David, 2000), participants were asked to rate how disturbing the narratives were. 
Some authors have theorized that holding divergent beliefs may associate with 
sensation-seeking and that these beliefs may offer greater excitement than a more 
rational view of the world (Kumar, Pekala, & Cummings, 1993; Zuckerman, 1979). 
Hence participants were also asked to rate how exciting the narratives were. Taken 
together, these questions may offer new insight into the variables underpinning why 
those with sub-clinical delusional ideation exhibit liberal acceptance. The Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1996) was used to place participants into 
high and low delusion-prone groups. Five delusional and four neutral narratives were 
presented and participants were asked to assign ratings of how likely each narrative 
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is true (in accordance with LaRocco & Warman, 2009) but also how bizarre, 
disturbing and exciting they found each narrative to be.  
 
In light of previous research (LaRocco & Warman, 2009) and the liberal acceptance 
account (Moritz & Woodward, 2004), it was expected that the high PDI group would 
rate the delusional (but not neutral) narratives as more likely to be true and less 
bizarre, compared to the low PDI group. In addition to adding bizarreness, 
disturbing and excitement ratings, the current study also extended LaRocco and 
Warman’s study by examining the effect of self and other perspectives. Drawing 
from the work of Galbraith et al., (2008) and Warman et al., (2007) it was predicted 
that although both groups would show a self-reference bias – higher rating for self-
referent perspectives compared to other referent perspectives - it was expected that 
this bias would be more pronounced in the high PDI group. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate psychology students recruited from a large urban 
UK university. One-hundred-one participants took part, (83 females; 5 had missing 
sex data) with a mean age of 21 years 9 months (S.D. = 5 years 1 month). Five 
participants did not include age data. Participation formed part of their course 
requirements. 
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Materials  
Participants received an information sheet (Appendix 1), a consent form (Appendix 
2) and a demographic form asking for age and sex (Appendix 3). 
 
Delusional Ideation. The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1996; 
Appendix 4) is a measure of delusional ideation in the general population. The 
participant responds to 21 questions with a Yes/No answer. If 'yes' is chosen the 
participants also indicate on a five-point scale their distress, preoccupation and 
conviction associated with that belief. For example one question reads - Do you ever 
feel as if people are reading your mind? Scores range from 0 to 336, with higher 
scores being associated with greater delusional ideation. The PDI has been shown to 
have good reliability and validity (Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004). 
 
Narratives. These included five delusional narratives (Appendix 5) based on five 
types of delusion, namely grandiose, persecutory, reference, bizarre and 
Schneiderian delusions (e.g. control, thought broadcasting, insertion and 
withdrawal). The delusional narratives were developed from first person accounts in 
special issues of Schizophrenia Bulletin (Chapman, 2002; Herrig, 1995; Payne, 1992; 
Weiner, 2003; Zelt, 1981). For example, the grandiose narrative read: 
While working, I began to feel that I had such enormous insight into subject 
areas I hadn't previously studied. I felt as if I possessed a deep knowledge of 
how certain things in life worked or could work... I began to think of myself 
as being somewhat special and having a special mind to be thinking these 
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things...Because I believed much of my thought-life was entertaining and 
inventive, I thought I was ‘chosen’. I thought I was becoming one of the next 
sprouting great thinkers endowed with important knowledge... I was going to 
disregard college classes and jobs and assume my now very important, 
genius-like self, pursuing the development of new and inventive ideas that 
would make me highly successful. (Chapman, 2002; p. 546-547). 
 
Four neutral narratives (Appendix 6) were constructed for this study. An example of 
a neutral narrative was as follows: 
A colleague of mine had been looking for a used car. I suggested that she 
should go to have a look at a car auction because cars are usually quite 
inexpensive there. She said she would really like a black car. The site where 
the auction was held was only able to hold 200 cars. On arrival, we noticed 
the majority of the cars were black. In fact, the auctioneer informed us that 
150 of the cars were black and the rest were silver. I said I knew the first car 
to be shown would be black. 
 
Consideration was given to the length and structure of each narrative to try to 
maintain consistency. These were ordered with a delusional narrative followed by a 
neutral narrative and this sequence was fixed. Participants were asked to assign a 
rating on a five-point scale of how likely the narrative is true, how bizarre they find 
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it, how likely it is that this could happen to them and finally how likely it is that it 
could happen to most other people. 
 
Participants also completed the Lie Scale from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976) to assess participant’s truthfulness when completing 
questionnaires (Appendix 7).  
Design 
This study employed a mixed design with PDI group (high/ low) being the between 
groups factor and Narrative (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other) being 
the within groups factors. There were five dependent variables: likelihood of being 
true, bizarreness, likelihood of happening, exciting and disturbing.  
 
Firstly a 2x2 mixed design ANOVA incorporated PDI group (high/ low) as the 
between groups factor and narratives (delusional/ neutral) as the within-groups 
factor. The dependent variable was ‘likelihood of being true’. A further series of four 
2x2x2 mixed ANOVAs incorporated the same two factors as above in addition to 
perspective as an additional within groups factor (to self/to most other people). 
‘Bizarreness’, ‘likelihood of happening’, ‘how disturbing’ and ‘how exciting’ were the 
dependent variables. 
Procedure 
After informed consent was complete, participants were given a demographics form 
requiring sex and age and completed the Eysenck Lie Scale. This was followed by 
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the PDI and the delusional and neutral narratives. Delusional narratives were in the 
order of grandiose, persecutory, reference, Schneiderian and bizarre delusions. 
These were ordered by presenting a delusional narrative followed by a neutral 
narrative and this sequence was fixed for all nine narratives. Participants were asked 
to read each narrative and to circle their answer accordingly. Once the study was 
complete, participants were verbally debriefed. 
Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 57 
made the low PDI group (n = 51), while those scoring over the median made the 
high PDI group (n = 50).  
 
Independent t-tests revealed no significant PDI group differences in age (t (94) = -
1.90; p = 0.06). In addition, no significant difference was found between males and 
females and PDI score (t (94) = -0.51; p = 0.62). Nor did the PDI groups differ 
significantly on the Lie Scale (t (99) = 0.68; p = 0.50). (See Table 2.1 for summary 
statistics). 
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Table 2.1  
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Group (n) Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean 
(S.D.) 
Female 41 42 59.87 (37.16) 
Male 6 7 54.54 (19.02) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 21.97 (5.61) 23.92 (7.41) - 
PDI Score 86 (27.85) 34.12 (17.16) - 
Lie scale 6.32 (3.87) 6.78 (2.97)  
 
A two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted to analyse the likelihood of how true 
the narratives were rated to be with PDI Group as the between groups factor and 
Narratives as the within-groups factor. The likelihood ratings (DV) approximated a 
normal distribution (p = .2; see Appendix 36) and a Levene’s test found that the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was met for delusional (p = .07) and neutral 
(p = .07) narratives.  
 
Results revealed a main effect of narrative (F (1, 99) = 463.71; p < 0.01; p² = 
0.82) with the neutral narratives rated higher than the delusional narratives. No 
significant main effect of PDI group was found (F (1, 99) = 1.15; p = 0.29; p² = 
0.01) nor any significant interaction (F (1, 99) = 1.30; p = 0.26; p² = 0.01). As can 
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be seen from Table 2.2, the high and low PDI group rated similarly on delusional 
and neutral narratives.  
 
Table 2.2  
Mean values (standard deviation in parenthesis) for how likely the delusional and 
neutral narratives were true between high and low PDI groups  
 Delusional narrative Neutral narrative Overall 
High PDI group 2.08 (0.72) 3.73 (0.70) 2.91 (0.71) 
Low PDI group 1.89 (0.50) 3.72 (0.47) 2.81 (0.49) 
Overall 1.99 (0.61) 3.73 (0.59) 2.86 (0.60) 
 
Four 3-way mixed design ANOVAs were also conducted with PDI Group (high/ low) 
as the between groups factor and Content (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective 
(self/ other-referent) as the within groups factors. The four dependent variables 
were ratings of how bizarre, how likely to happen, how disturbing and how exciting 
the narratives were. 
 
How bizarre? 
The first three-way ANOVA examined average ratings of bizarreness of the 
narratives. A Levene’s test found that the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was met for both delusional and neutral narratives and self and other ratings (p > 
.05).  
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Results revealed a main effect of Content (F (1, 99) = 1002.71; p < 0.01; p² = 
0.91) with the delusional narratives being rated as more bizarre than the neutral 
narratives (See Table 2.3). No other main effects or interactions were significant for 
this analysis (p ≥ 0.24).  
 
Table 2.3  
Mean scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how bizarre the narratives were 
rated to be to them or most other people between high and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-
Referent 
   3.95 (0.70) 4.01 (0.71) 3.98 (0.71) 
Delusional/ Other-
Referent 
4.01 (0.61) 3.96 (0.72) 3.99 (0.67) 
Neutral/ Self- 
Referent 
1.38 (0.55) 1.57 (0.53) 1.48 (0.54) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 1.37 (0.52) 1.55 (0.65) 1.46 (0.59) 
Overall 2.68 (0.60) 2.77 (0.65) 2.73 (0.63) 
 
How Likely to Happen? 
The second three-way ANOVA assessed how likely it was that the narratives could 
happen. Homogeneity of variance between the high and low PDI groups was not 
met for delusional narratives when participants were asked how likely it was that 
narratives could happen to oneself (p = .02) or for neutral narratives when asked 
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how likely it was that narratives could happen to others (p < .01). Findings related 
to these should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
 
There was a main effect of PDI group (F (1, 99) = 4.94; p = 0.03; p² = 0.05): as 
shown in Table 2.4 the high PDI group gave higher ratings than the low PDI group. 
There was also a main effect of Perspective (F (1, 99) = 70.86; p < 0.01; p² = 
0.42) with the narratives being rated as more likely to happen to most other people 
than to the self, and a main effect of Content (F (1, 99) = 477.25; p < 0.01; p² = 
0.83), where neutral narratives were rated higher than delusional narratives. There 
was also a significant interaction between Content and Perspective (F (1, 99) = 
4.64; p = 0.03; p² = 0.05). As Table 2.4 shows, other-referent scenarios were 
judged as more likely than self-referent scenarios, but particularly if they had 
delusional content. No further interactions achieved significance (p ≥ 0.48).  
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Table 2.4  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) of how likely delusional and neutral 
narratives could happen to them or most other people between high and low PDI 
groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-Referent 
 
1.36 (0.46) 1.20 (0.30) 1.28 (0.38) 
Delusional/ Other-Referent 
 
1.62 (0.52) 1.42 (0.38) 1.52 (0.45) 
Neutral/ Self-Referent 
 
3.23 (0.89) 3.02 (0.75) 3.13 (0.82) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 
 
3.38 (0.87) 3.14 (0.65) 3.26 (0.76) 
Overall 2.40 (0.69) 2.20 (0.52) 2.3 (0.61) 
 
To explore the significant interaction between Content and Perspective, follow up 
analyses (paired samples t-test) were conducted. In the first t-test, ‘self’ rating were 
examined. In the second t-test, ‘other’ ratings were examined.  
In the first t-test, the difference between delusional and neutral narratives was 
significant (t (100) = -21.94; p <.01); neutral narratives (M = 3.12; SD = .83) were 
rated as more likely to happen to the self than delusional narratives (M = 1.28; SD = 
.39).  
In the second t-test, there was significant difference between delusional and neutral 
narratives (t (100) = -20.02; p <.01) with neutral narratives being rated as more 
likely to happen to others (M = 3.26; SD = .46) than delusional narratives (M = 
1.52; SD = .77). 
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How disturbing? 
The third three-way ANOVA tested ratings of how disturbing the narratives were. A 
Levene’s test revealed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance had been 
met for all between group comparisons (p > .05) except for ratings of how 
disturbing the neutral narratives were to oneself (p <.05).  
 
Results revealed a main effect of Content (F (1, 99) = 589.80; p < 0.01; p² = 
0.86). As can be seen from Table 2.5, the delusional narratives were rated as more 
disturbing than the neutral narratives. There was also a main effect of Perspective (F 
(1, 99) = 35.26; p < 0.01; p² = 0.26). The narratives were rated as more 
disturbing to most other people. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant for this analysis (p≥ 0.15). 
Table 2.5  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how disturbing delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to them or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-Referent 
 
3.19 (0.96) 3.20 (0.88) 3.20 (0.92) 
Delusional/ Other-Referent 
 
3.52 (0.81) 3.40 (0.81) 3.46 (0.81) 
Neutral/ Self-Referent 
 
1.07 (0.18) 1.23 (0.43) 1.15 (0.31) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 
 
1.35 (0.57) 1.40 (0.47) 1.38 (0.52) 
Overall 2.28 (0.63) 2.31 (0.65) 2.30 (0.64) 
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How exciting? 
The final three-way ANOVA tested ratings of how exciting the narratives were (see 
means in Table 2.6). A Levene’s test found that the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was met for ratings of delusional narratives (exciting to self p = .07; 
exciting to others p = .56) but not for ratings of neutral narratives (exciting to self p 
= .02; exciting to others p <.05). The findings relating to comparisons between the 
groups on neutral narratives should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
  
Results revealed a main effect of PDI group (F (1, 99) = 5.67; p = 0.02; p² = 
0.05). As can be seen from Table 2.6, the high PDI group gave higher ratings than 
the low PDI group. There was also a main effect of Content (F (1, 99) = 92.01; p < 
0.01; p² = 0.48): the delusional narratives were rated as more exciting than the 
neutral narratives. There was a main effect of Perspective (F (1, 99) = 10.91; p < 
0.01; p² = 0.10): narratives were rated as more exciting to most other people than 
to oneself. In addition, a three - way interaction between the factors was found to 
be approaching significance (F (1, 99) = 3.63; p = 0.06; p² = 0.06). Although the 
low PDI group rated all narratives as more exciting to most other people, the high 
PDI group regarded delusional narratives (but not neutral) as equally exciting to 
themselves and most other people. 
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Table 2.6   
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how exciting delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to them or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-Referent 
 
2.85 (0.86) 2.48 (0.82) 2.67 (0.84) 
Delusional/ Other-Referent 
 
2.85 (0.73) 2.66 (0.77) 2.76 (0.75) 
Neutral/ Self-Referent 
 
1.78 (0.78) 1.63 (0.54) 1.71 (0.66) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 
 
2.04 (0.89) 1.78 (0.58) 1.91 (0.74) 
Overall 2.38 (0.82) 2.14 (0.68) 2.26 (0.75) 
 
Discussion 
The first prediction was that compared to the low PDI group, the high PDI group 
would rate delusional narratives as more likely to be true. Instead, the high PDI 
group rated both delusional and neutral scenarios as more likely to be true 
compared to the low PDI group, although this difference was too subtle to be 
significant. These findings appear partly inconsistent with LaRocco and Warman, 
(2009) who only found higher ratings of likelihood from delusion-prone participants 
on delusional narratives. In contrast to this, the data suggests that high PDI scorers 
have a general tendency to rate all scenarios as more likely/true. It is tentatively 
argued that this is in line with Moritz and Woodward’s (2004) notion of the liberal 
acceptance bias. In the high PDI group, both neutral and delusional narratives may 
have surpassed a lower threshold of acceptance, making them appear more 
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plausible and thus more likely or more true. This is a unique finding, since the liberal 
acceptance bias has previously only been observed on implausible material, but here 
it has also been observed it in relation to neutral material, suggesting – in subclinical 
delusions at least - that this lower threshold of plausibility extends beyond delusional 
material to neutral information. These findings should however be interpreted with 
caution given that statistical significance was not achieved. 
 
In line with LaRocco and Warman’s (2009) study, it was predicted that high PDI 
scorers may rate delusional narratives as less bizarre. However, this prediction was 
not upheld. Ratings of how bizarre or how disturbing did not differentiate the PDI 
groups. The high PDI group rated narratives as more exciting than the low PDI 
group, but in particular, the high PDI scorers found delusional narratives more 
exciting from a personal perspective compared to the low PDI scorers. This supports 
the theory that some find greater excitement in unusual beliefs as opposed to a 
more rational view of the world and that this may associate with sensation seeking 
(Kumar et al., 1993; Zuckerman, 1979) in those that are delusion-prone. This finding 
is also consistent with research highlighting arousal abnormalities in delusional 
patients (Mujica-Parodi, Corcoran, Greenberg, Sackeim & Malaspina, 2002) and 
delusion-prone participants (Kéri, Seres, Kelemen & Benedek, 2011). 
 
These findings provide tentative new evidence not only that a liberal acceptance bias 
is evident in delusion-prone individuals, but also that this bias potentially extends to 
neutral information and that inflated estimates of likelihood and feelings of 
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excitement may be reasons why such individuals have a more liberal threshold of 
acceptance. In Chapter 3, the aim was to replicate these findings but also to employ 
an exploratory approach and test a range of variables that may offer alternative 
explanations to the liberal acceptance account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
Chapter III 
Personality, creativity, sensation seeking, acquiescence 
and reasoning as underpinning factors of delusional 
ideation 
 
Introduction 
The present chapter aimed to replicate the findings of Chapter 2 but also to examine 
other variables that may offer alternative explanations for the findings besides liberal 
acceptance.  
 
The first aim was to investigate earlier findings that high PDI scorers find excitement 
in delusional stimuli. To explore this, the Sensation Seeking Scale Form V 
(Zuckerman, 1994) was employed to measure high and low PDI scorers’ interests 
and preferences. The second aim was to investigate the relationship between 
delusional ideation and creativity. Evidence suggests that schizotypal personality 
traits are associated with creativity (see Nettle, 2006 and Fink et al., 2014). 
Schuldberg (1988; 1990; 2000) has shown that self-report measures of creativity 
and scales to measure liability to psychiatric symptoms are correlated, particularly 
measures relating to the positive symptoms of psychotic illness (i.e. delusions and 
hallucinations). Furthermore, those who score highly on scales measuring positive 
psychotic symptoms have been found to make more semantic associations (Mohr, 
Graves, Gianotti, Pizzagalli, & Brugger, 2001). Both creativity and the psychosis 
continuum are related to cognition and thus creativity may be a factor in why 
delusion-prone individuals see plausibility where others do not. In the current study, 
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three measures of creativity were employed to investigate the relationship between 
those high in delusional ideation and creativity. Gough’s Creative Personality Scale 
(Gough, 1979) is a self-report measure of creativity. This measure has been shown 
to be a valid predictor of a ‘creative personality’ (e.g. Carson, Peterson & Higgins, 
2005). In addition, the Novelty sub-scale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory (ECI; 
Averill, 1999) was employed. When examining emotions and creativity, a link has 
been identified between creativity and affective disorders (Ivcevic, Brackett & Mayer, 
2007). This link may be due to the individual experiencing strong positive emotions 
or even mild mania which is thought to increase awareness and enhance flexibility in 
thinking (Ivcevic et al., 2007). Those who reported high scores of hypomania in a 
student sample described themselves as unique and creative and reported engaging 
in more fantasy activities (Shuldberg, 1990). Furthermore, the Emotional Creativity 
Inventory has been found to correlate negatively with alexithymia (difficulty in 
experiencing, expressing, and describing emotional responses) and positively with 
fantasy proneness (Fuchs, Kumar & Porter, 2007). Finally, the Remote Associate 
Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) was employed as a measure of convergent thinking, 
thought to be essential to creativity (Guilford, 1967). 
 
The third aim was to investigate the relationship between personality, subclinical 
delusional ideation and ratings of narratives. Previous studies have investigated 
personality in relation to the positive and negative symptoms of schizotypy. For 
example, Ross, Lutz and Bailey (2002) found that positive symptoms of schizotypy 
were predicted by Neuroticism, Openness and Agreeableness. Larøi, DeFruyt, van 
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Os, Aleman and Van der Linden (2005) investigated the association between 
personality and delusion-proneness in a young (18-30) and elderly (60-75) sample. 
They found that Openness to Experience, Neuroticism and Agreeableness 
significantly correlated with total PDI score in the young sample whereas, in the 
elderly sample, Openness to Experience alone significantly correlated with total PDI 
score. In the present study, the 20-Item Mini IPIP (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird & 
Lucas, 2006) was employed to test whether the five factors of personality were able 
to further explain higher ratings for the narratives employed. In particular, it may be 
that openness to experience (imaginative, unconventional and willing to embrace 
new ideas; e.g. Costa & McCrae, 1992) may explain a greater willingness to endorse 
narratives as more likely and exciting. 
 
It has been argued in this thesis that high PDI scorers’ higher ratings of scenarios 
could indicate a liberal acceptance bias and hence a vulnerability to endorse 
information that others would reject or rate lowly. However, these findings could be 
due to mere acquiescence bias (the tendency to agree with questionnaire 
statements regardless of content; Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982). Acquiescence 
bias was hence tested to examine if high PDI scorers are generally more inclined to 
agree or approve. A scale containing matched pairs of logically opposite items was 
used to measure acquiescence response bias. Acquiescence is indicated by 
endorsement of two opposing items. 
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Based on previous literature and findings from Chapter 2, it was expected that those 
high in delusional ideation would replicate previous results in terms of rating neutral 
and delusional narratives as more likely to be true and more likely to happen than 
the low PDI group. In addition, it was expected that the high PDI group would rate 
the delusional narratives as more exciting compared to the low PDI group. Finally, 
regression and mediation analyses will explore whether measures of creativity, 
personality, dis-inhibition, experience seeking, boredom susceptibility and response 
acquiescence could explain why high PDI scorers gave higher ratings for scenarios. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduate psychology students recruited from a large urban 
UK University. Sixty-five participants took part, (32 females; 29 participants had 
missing sex data). The mean age was 22 years 2 months (S. D. 7 years 8 months). 
Thirty participants did not include age data. Participants were recruited via an online 
system and took part voluntarily and gained course credits for their participation.  
Design 
ANOVAs. Chapter 3 employed a mixed design with PDI group (high/ low) being the 
between-groups factor and Narratives (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ 
other) as within-group factors. The dependent variables were: likelihood of being 
true, bizarreness, likelihood of happening, how exciting and how disturbing.  
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Multiple regression and mediation. A multiple linear regression was also employed to 
test whether a set of predictors (PDI group, dis-inhibition, experience seeking, 
boredom susceptibility, Creative Personality Scale, Remote Associates Test, 
Emotional Creativity Inventory, response acquiescence, openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability), could predict narrative ratings. 
Significant predictors were then tested as mediators of the relationship between PDI 
group and narrative ratings, in order to see whether these variables could explain 
why PDI group was related to narrative ratings. 
 
Materials 
After informed consent (Appendix 8 & 9), participants completed the Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1996; Appendix 4) and assessed five 
delusional (Chapman, 2002; Herrig, 1995; Payne, 1992; Weiner, 2003; Zelt, 1981; 
Appendix 5) and four neutral narratives (Appendix 6) as well as the lie scale from 
the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976; Appendix 7), 
identical to Chapter 2.  
Sensation Seeking. In addition, participants completed the Dis-inhibition, Experience 
Seeking and Boredom Susceptibility sub-scales of the Sensation Seeking Scale Form 
V (Zuckerman, 1994; Appendix 10). This contains ten items in each subscale and 
requires participants to choose between two options. For example, for Boredom 
Susceptibility, one item reads;  
A. There are some movies I enjoy seeing a second or even third time* 
B. I can’t stand watching a movie that I’ve seen before* 
Participants are required to choose one option from the two presented. 
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Creativity. Gough’s (1979) Creative Personality Scale (Appendix 11) is a check-list of 
items where participants indicate which adjectives best describe them. Eighteen 
items are indicative of a creative personality, while 12 are contraindicative. This 
includes adjectives such as: capable, cautious, confident and conservative. A higher 
score indicates higher creativity. 
 
The Novelty sub-scale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 1999; Appendix 
12) contains 14 items measuring novel emotional creativity. For example, one item 
measuring emotional novelty is: My emotional reactions are different and unique. 
Items are rated on a scale of 1 (If the statement is much less true of you than of the 
average person or if you strongly disagree with the statement) to 5 (If the statement 
is much more true of you than of the average person, or if you strongly agree with 
the statement).  
The Remote Associate Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962; Appendix 13) involves finding a 
solution to a triad of unrelated words. For example, if presented with the triad of 
words consisting of Broken, Clear and Eye the associated word would be Glass 
(Broken glass/ Clear glass/ Glass eye). Higher scores indicate higher creativity. 
 
Acquiescence Bias. To measure response acquiescence twelve matched pairs of 
logically opposite items were presented to participants in a random order. This was 
proposed by Winkler, Kanouse and Ware (1982) and is a method to detect 
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acquiescence response bias, i.e. the tendency to agree with questionnaire 
statements regardless of content. Examples of pairs of logically opposed items are;  
1. Prescription drugs frequently do more harm than good. 
           Prescription drugs are almost always helpful. 
2. Good health is largely a matter of luck. 
           When it comes to health there is no such thing as bad luck. 
 
These were presented in a random order and are then scored from the frequency 
with which participants agree with pairs of items that are logically opposite 
(Appendix 14). 
 
Personality. The 20-item mini-IPIP consists of twenty items measuring extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism and openness to experience 
(Donnellan, et al., 2006; Appendix 15). For example, for extraversion, one statement 
reads; Am the life of the party.  Participants rate on a 5-point scale how well each 
statement describes them from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate). 
 
Procedure 
Once informed consent was complete participants were presented with a 
questionnaire pack. Questionnaires were presented in a fixed order. Participants 
firstly assigned ratings to the delusional and neutral narratives as in Chapter 2. 
Participants then completed the Eysenck Lie Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976) 
followed by the Dis-inhibition, Experience Seeking and Boredom Susceptibility sub-
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scales of the Sensation Seeking Scale Form V (Zuckerman, 1994). This was followed 
by Gough’s Creative Personality Scale, the Remote Associate Test (Mednick, 1962) 
was presented next to act as an interval between rating scales. Participants then 
went on to complete the Novelty subscale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory 
(Averill, 1999), a questionnaire measuring response acquiescence (Winkler et al., 
1983), the 20-Item Mini IPIP (Donnellan, et al., 2006) and the PDI (Peters et al., 
1996).  
Once the questionnaire pack was complete, participants were given a verbal debrief 
of the study.  
 
Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 48 
comprised the low PDI group (n = 33) while those scoring above the median 
comprised the high PDI group (n = 32). Independent t-tests revealed no significant 
PDI group differences in age (t (33) = 1.70; p = 0.10). In addition, no significant 
difference was found between males and females and PDI score (t (34) = 0.05; p = 
0.30). There was also no significant difference between PDI scorers on the lie scale 
(t (63) = -1.20; p = 0.24) (See Table 3.1).  
 
 
 74 
 
Table 3.1  
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups  
 High PDI Group (n) Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean 
(S.D.) 
Female 15 17 52.31 (42.44) 
Male 3 1 71.5 (26.86) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 20.22 (1.40) 24.18 (9.78) - 
PDI Score 88.03 (34.71) 24.88 (14.13) - 
Lie scale 7.31 (5.25) 5.97 (3.7)  
Note: Fourteen responses in the high PDI group and fifteen responses in the low PDI group were 
missing for sex of participants. Fourteen responses in the high PDI group and sixteen responses in 
the low PDI group were missing for age. 
 
A two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted to analyse the likelihood of how true 
the narratives were. The likelihood ratings (DV) approximated a normal distribution 
(p = .2; see Appendix 36). A Levene’s test found that the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was met for neutral narratives (p = .83) however this was 
not met for the comparison on delusional narratives (p = .04) - caution should 
therefore be employed in any interpretation. 
 
Results revealed a main effect of PDI group (F (1, 63) = 4.04; p = 0.05; p² = 
0.06) with the high PDI group giving higher ratings than the low PDI group. There 
was a main effect of narrative (F (1, 63) = 161.17; p < 0.01; p² = 0.72). As can be 
seen from Table 3.2, the neutral narratives were rated as more likely to be true than 
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the delusional narratives. The interaction was not significant (F (1, 63) = 0.25; p = 
0.62; p² = 0.004).  
 
Table 3.2  
Mean values (standard deviation in parenthesis) for how likely the delusional and 
neutral narratives were true between high and low PDI groups  
 Delusional narrative Neutral narrative Overall 
High PDI group 2.03 (0.72) 3.47 (0.74) 2.75 (0.73) 
Low PDI group 1.71 (0.56) 3.27 (0.80) 2.49 (0.68) 
Overall 1.87 (0.64) 3.37 (0.77) 2.62 (0.71) 
 
Four 3-way mixed design ANOVAs were also conducted with PDI Group (high/ low) 
as the between-groups factor and Content (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective 
(self/ other referent) as the within-groups factors. The dependent variables for each 
of the four 3-way ANOVAs were ratings of how bizarre, how likely to happen, how 
disturbing and how exciting.  
How bizarre? 
The first three-way ANOVA examined average ratings of bizarreness of the 
narratives. Homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05). There 
was no main effect of PDI group (F (1, 63) = 3.189; p = 0.08; p² = 0.05). There 
was a main effect of Content (F (1, 63) = 315.190; p < 0.01; p² =0.833) with the 
delusional narratives rated higher than the neutral narratives. There was a main 
effect of Perspective (F (1, 63) = 5.467; p = 0.02; p² = 0.08). Narratives were 
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rated as more bizarre to the self than to most other people (See Table 3.3). There 
were no other significant findings for this analysis (p ≥ 0.11). 
 
Table 3.3  
Mean scores (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how bizarre the narratives were 
rated to be to them or most other people between high and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-Referent 3.78 (0.69) 4.12 (0.89) 3.95 (0.79) 
Delusional/ Other-Referent 3.53 (0.83) 4.01 (0.75) 3.77 (0.79) 
Neutral/ Self-Referent 1.74 (0.72) 1.77 (0.81) 1.76 (0.77) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 1.65 (0.68) 1.64 (0.69) 1.65 (0.69) 
Overall 2.68 (0.73) 2.89 (0.79) 2.79 (0.76) 
 
 
How likely to happen? 
The second three-way ANOVA assessed how likely it was that the narratives could 
happen. Homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05). Results 
revealed no main effect of PDI group (F (1, 63) = 1.064; p = 0.31; p² = 0.02). 
There was a main effect of Content (F (1, 63) = 200.042; p < 0.01; p² = 0.760) 
with the neutral narratives being rated higher than the delusional narratives. There 
was a main effect of Perspective (F (1, 63) = 17.340; p < 0.01; p² = 0.216). The 
narratives were rated as more likely to happen to most other people than to 
themselves. The interaction was also significant between Content and Perspective (F 
(1, 63) = 12.128; p < 0.01; p² = 0.161). Neutral narratives were rated as more 
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likely to happen to most other people (See Table 3.4). No other interactions were 
significant for this analysis (p ≥ 0.56). 
 
Table 3.4  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) of how likely delusional and neutral 
narratives could happen to them or most other people between high and low PDI 
groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-Referent 1.38 (0.37) 1.30 (0.37) 1.34 (0.37) 
Delusional/ Other-Referent 1.66 (0.55) 1.54 (0.52) 1.60 (0.54) 
Neutral/ Self-Referent 3.12 (0.85) 2.99 (0.92) 3.05 (0.88) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 3.19 (0.82) 3.02 (0.92) 3.11 (0.87) 
Overall 2.34 (0.65) 2.21 (0.68) 2.27 (0.66) 
 
To explore the significant interaction between Content and Perspective, follow up 
analyses (paired samples t-test) were conducted. In the first t-test, ‘self’ rating were 
examined. In the second t-test, ‘other’ ratings were examined.  
In the first t-test, the difference between delusional and neutral narratives was 
significant (t (64) = -15.18; p <.01); neutral narratives (M = 3.05; SD = .88) were 
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rated as more likely to happen to the self than delusional narratives (M = 1.34; SD = 
.37).  
 
In the second t-test, there was significant difference between delusional and neutral 
narratives (t (64) = -12.46; p <.01) with neutral narratives being rated as more 
likely to happen to others (M = 3.10; SD = .87) than delusional narratives (M = 1.6; 
SD = .53). 
How disturbing? 
The third three-way ANOVA tested ratings of how disturbing the narratives were. 
Homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05). There was no main 
effect of PDI group (F (1, 63) = 1.688; p = 0.20; p² = 0.026). There was a main 
effect of Content (F (1, 63) = 215.046; p < 0.01; p² = 0.773). As can be seen from 
Table 3.5, the delusional narratives were rated higher than the neutral narratives. 
There was a main effect of Perspective (F (1, 63) = 4.541; p = 0.04; p² = 0.067) 
with the narratives being rated as more disturbing to most other people. There was 
a significant interaction between Content and Perspective (F (1, 63) = 4.716; p = 
0.03; p² = 0.070). Delusional narratives were rated as more disturbing to most 
other people. No other findings were significant for this analysis (p ≥ 0.14).  
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Table 3.5   
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how disturbing delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to them or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-Referent 2.93 (0.96) 3.28 (0.98) 3.11 (0.97) 
Delusional/ Other-Referent 3.26 (0.81) 3.58 (0.93) 3.42 (0.87) 
Neutral/ Self-Referent 1.30 (0.48) 1.59 (1.43) 1.45 (0.96) 
Neutral/ Other-Referent 1.54 (0.70) 1.39 (0.46) 1.47 (0.58) 
Overall 2.26 (0.74) 2.46 (0.95) 2.36 (0.85) 
 
Follow up analyses (paired samples t-test) were conducted to explore the significant 
interaction between Content and Perspective. In the first t-test, ‘self’ rating were 
examined. In the second t-test, ‘other’ ratings were examined.  
 
In the first t-test, the difference between delusional and neutral narratives was 
significant (t (64) = -10.6; p <.01); delusional narratives (M = 3.11; SD = .98) were 
rated as more disturbing to the self than neutral narratives (M = 1.45; SD = 1.08).  
In the second t-test, there was significant difference between delusional and neutral 
narratives (t (64) = 15.77; p <.01) with delusional narratives being rated as more 
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disturbing to others (M = 3.42; SD = .88) than neutral narratives (M = 1.46; SD = 
.59). 
 
How exciting? 
The final three-way ANOVA tested ratings of how exciting the narratives were. 
Homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05) except for ratings of 
excitement to self for neutral narratives (p = .03). Results revealed that the main 
effect of PDI group was approaching significance (F (1, 63) = 3.55; p = 0.06; p² = 
0.05). The high PDI group were giving higher ratings than the low PDI group. There 
was a main effect of Content (F (1, 63) = 12.45; p < 0.01; p² = 0.165). As can be 
seen from Table 3.6, delusional narratives were rated as more exciting than neutral 
narratives. There was a main effect of Perspective (F (1, 63) = 19.49; p < 0.01; p² 
= 0.236) with the narratives being rated as more exciting to most other people than 
to the self. None of the interactions were significant for this analysis (p ≥ 0.20).  
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Table 3.6   
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how exciting delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to them or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ Self-
Referent 
2.31(0.85)  2.14 (0.77) 2.23 (0.81) 
Delusional/ Other-
Referent 
2.59 (0.79) 2.38 (0.79) 2.49 (0.79) 
Neutral/ Self-
Referent 
1.97 (0.90) 1.67 (0.63) 1.82 (0.77) 
Neutral/ Other-
Referent 
2.14 (0.87) 1.82 (0.71) 1.98 (0.79) 
Overall 2.25 (0.85) 2.00 (0.73) 2.13 (0.79) 
 
A multiple linear regression incorporated predictors in two blocks. Block 1: PDI 
group; block 2: dis-inhibition, experience seeking, boredom susceptibility, Creative 
Personality Scale, Remote Associates Test, Emotional Creativity Inventory, response 
acquiescence, openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and 
emotional stability. The dependent variable was overall ratings of how likely to be 
true. Only being in the high PDI group and having high agreeableness predicted high 
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ratings of how likely to be true (F (2, 62) = 5.16, p=.008; R2 = .143). A subsequent 
bootstrapped mediation analysis revealed that agreeableness did not mediate the 
relation between PDI group and ratings of likely to be true (b = .002; SE = .04; 
95% CI, -.08 to .11).  
 
A second multiple regression incorporated the same predictors but this time with 
overall ratings of how exciting as the dependent variable. Being in the high PDI 
group and having lower RAT scores predicted ratings of how exciting the narratives 
were (F (2, 62) = 5.14, p=.009; R2 = .142). In a subsequent bootstrapped 
mediation analysis, there was a fully mediated indirect effect, showing that the 
relation between PDI group and ratings of how exciting were fully mediated by RAT 
scores (b = .12; SE = .06; 95% CI, .03 to .27). Thus lower RAT scores explain why 
high PDI scorers rated the scenarios as more exciting. Figure 3 displays the 
relationships from this significant mediation analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The direct and indirect pathways showing PDI group as a predictor of 
‘how exciting’, mediated by RAT scores, with unstandardised b weights. 
 
RAT 
 
 
PDI group How exciting? 
Direct effect: b = .13 
b = -.08 b = -1.48 
Indirect effect: b = 0.12 
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Discussion 
High PDI scorers gave higher ratings of ‘how likely to be true’ narratives were. Both 
groups rated neutral narratives as more likely/ true but high PDI scorers still gave 
higher ratings to both scenarios than low PDI scorers. This supports the findings 
from Chapter 2 but only partially supports LaRocco and Warman (2009) in that high 
PDI scorers demonstrate a liberal acceptance bias for scenarios containing both 
delusional and neutral content as opposed to delusional scenarios alone. This implies 
a lowered threshold of acceptance for scenarios generally consistent with a liberal 
acceptance account (Moritz & Woodward, 2004; Moritz et al., 2006; Moritz et al., 
2008; Moritz et al., 2007). 
 
The prediction that the high PDI group would rate narratives as more likely to 
happen was not supported. Instead, both groups rated neutral narratives as more 
likely to happen to most other people. The high PDI group did show a subtle self-
reference effect compared to the low PDI group, consistent with previous research 
(Galbraith et al., 2008; Warman et al., 2007) but this difference was too slight to be 
significant.  
 
Consistent with Chapter 2, high PDI scorers rated delusional narratives as more 
exciting, but this did not achieve significance. This may suggest that holding unusual 
beliefs offers greater excitement (Kumar et al., 1993; Zuckerman, 1979) however 
the data does not indicate that high ratings of the scenarios’ excitement was due to 
sensation seeking since no such association was found. This implies that there is 
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something specific about delusional stimuli that affect high PDI scorers’ excitement 
and not a general tendency to seek excitement in all areas of life.  
 
Although rating how true or exciting the scenarios were, did not associate with two 
of the creativity measures, (Creative Personality Scale, Emotional Creativity 
Inventory), the RAT did predict exciting ratings. This was a negative relationship, 
suggesting that high PDI scorers were rating scenarios as exciting perhaps because 
of low RAT scores (NB low RAT scores indicate high cognitive looseness). Some 
authors have argued that those low in delusional ideation have greater cognitive 
inhibition and thus perform better on convergent thinking tasks such as the RAT 
because it requires a narrow and focused type of thinking (Davidson-Jenkins, 2003) 
and the findings support this position. Hence, low scores on the RAT would suggest 
‘cognitive looseness’ in high PDI scorers and conversely cognitive inhibition in low 
PDI scorers. No significant associations were found between PDI group and any of 
the five factors of personality. It has been argued in this thesis that high PDI scorers 
rate scenarios more highly because of liberal acceptance; no relationship between 
scenario ratings and response acquiescence was found, which eliminates this as an 
alternative explanation for high PDI scorers’ ratings. 
 
Thus Chapter 3 confirms earlier findings that likelihood and potentially excitement 
might be two important indices which may contribute to liberal acceptance of 
information by delusion prone individuals. Besides the role of low RAT scores in 
explaining the relation between delusional ideation and ‘exciting’ ratings, attempts to 
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explore further variables which may explain that relation proved largely 
unsuccessful. 
 
Nonetheless, these experiments offer new insight into the judgements that delusion-
prone individuals may use when liberally accepting information: how likely it is of 
being true or of happening and how exciting it may be to them – these are 
important dimensions by which delusion-prone people judge plausibility and offer 
new reasons why they liberally accept. 
 
In Chapter 4, liberal acceptance, creativity and ‘cognitive looseness’ were 
investigated to address the previous finding that those high in delusional ideation 
may exhibit a ‘loose’ or disinhibited cognitive style and to investigate additional 
variables that may explain a lowered threshold of acceptance in subclinical 
delusional ideation. 
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Chapter IV 
Delusional thinking and reasoning: The effect of 
creativity and apophenia 
 
Introduction 
It has been argued in this thesis that ‘likelihood of being true’ and ‘excitement’ 
appear to be important factors for understanding why those that are high in 
delusional ideation liberally accept. In Chapter 4, again reasoning was examined in 
order to replicate previous findings that those high in delusional ideation rate 
narratives with delusional and neutral content as more likely to be true and exciting 
compared to those low in delusional ideation. From the findings of Chapter 3, it also 
seems that those high in delusional ideation employ a ‘looser’ cognitive style and this 
may provide a mechanism by which information may surpass a lowered threshold for 
plausibility. Indeed, it appears that in those high in delusional ideation, several 
competing options may surpass this lowered threshold of acceptance (Moritz et al., 
2007), resulting in scenarios being rated as more likely to be true and thus accepted. 
This also means that performance on tasks such as the RAT is not as adept in those 
high in delusional ideation as those low in delusional ideation. Those low in 
delusional ideation appear to display a degree of cognitive inhibition (as opposed to 
cognitive ‘looseness’) and thus perform better on convergent thinking tasks. 
Furthermore, this is consistent with literature demonstrating that those high in 
delusional ideation are resistant to focus down to a final hypothesis (Young & 
Bentall, 1995). 
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Creativity may play an important part in the acceptance of implausible information. 
For example, one study has demonstrated that positive schizotypy and creativity can 
partly account for why some scientists hold religious beliefs and still have a high 
commitment to empiricism (MacPherson & Kelly, 2011), while other authors maintain 
that holding religious beliefs directly conflict with a scientific stance (e.g. Dawkins, 
2006).  
 
In the present study, two measures of creativity were employed to investigate the 
relationship between those high in delusional ideation and creativity. The Novelty 
sub-scale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 1999) was again employed, 
since novelty is an often associated criterion for creativity. For the purpose of the 
Emotional Creativity Inventory, an emotionally creative response can be novel in 
comparison to an individual’s usual behaviour or novel in comparison to the typical 
behaviour in a society (Averill, 1999; Humphreys, Jiao & Sadler, 2008). Furthermore, 
increased awareness and enhanced flexibility in thinking has previously been 
associated with emotionally creative responses (Ivcevic et al., 2007). In addition to 
the Emotional Creativity Inventory, the Remote Associate Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) 
was again employed as a measure of convergent thinking, thought to be essential to 
creativity (Guildford, 1967).  
 
Consistent with the notion of cognitive ‘looseness’, previous research (Brugger et al., 
1993) has found that people high on the Magical Ideation Scale were able to see 
more meaningful patterns in a visual display of random dots. While Farias, Claridge 
and Lalljee (2005) found that schizotypy was associated with participants finding 
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complex types of visual patterns (static or moving people, animals, objects and 
landscapes etc.) in visual displays of random dots. Fyfe and colleagues (2008) have 
therefore suggested that apophenia (the tendency to perceive meaningful patterns 
and causal connections where none exist; Fyfe et al., 2008) may be a contributing 
factor to the formation of paranormal as well as delusional beliefs. In light of these 
findings, an experimental task known as the Snowy Pictures Task (Ekstrom, French, 
Harman, & Dermen, 1976) was also employed to measure cognitive ‘looseness’ or 
looseness of associations in those high in delusional ideation and to identify if this 
contributes to an increased risk for developing delusional beliefs. 
 
In addition to the above measures, the Eysenck Lie Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976) 
was employed to measure participants’ truthfulness when completing questionnaires. 
This is primarily to detect any differences between high and low PDI groups.  
 
To summarize, in the present experiment, the idea that those high in delusional 
ideation display liberal acceptance when reasoning about delusional and neutral 
content was again tested. It was also an aim of the experiment to investigate the 
relationship between delusional thinking, creativity and apophenia.  
It was expected that high PDI scorers would rate narratives as more likely to be true 
and more exciting than low PDI scorers. A multiple linear regression was also 
employed to test the prediction that PDI scores would be significantly predicted by 
the Novelty sub-scale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory and the Remote 
Associate Test. Consistent with previous research it was also expected that high PDI 
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scorers would display more cognitive ‘looseness’ and detect more pictures in the 
snowy images where no picture has been embedded in the Snowy Pictures Task 
(Ekstrom et al., 1976). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six participants took part (84 female) with a mean age of 20.78 (SD = 3.91). 
Participants were recruited voluntarily from a large urban UK university and received 
course credits for their participation. 
Materials 
Once informed consent was complete (Appendix 16 & 17), participants completed 
the following measures. 
 
Delusional Ideation. The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory, (Peters et al., 1996; 
Appendix 4) was again employed to place individuals into high and low scoring 
groups.  
 
Narratives. The narratives were made shorter for this study to reduce participant 
fatigue (see examples below). Additionally, bizarre delusions were not included since 
previous findings indicated that the content may have been too bizarre when utilised 
in a subclinical sample. Four delusional narratives were used based on four types of 
delusion: grandiose delusions, persecutory delusions, delusions of reference and 
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Schneiderian delusions (thought insertion/ thought broadcasting; Appendix 18). 
Delusional narratives were developed from first person accounts in special issues of 
Schizophrenia Bulletin (Chapman, 2002; Herrig, 1995; Payne, 1992; Weiner, 2003; 
Zelt, 1981). For example, the grandiose narrative read:  
 
While working, Reece began to feel that he had such enormous insight into subject 
areas he hadn't previously studied. He began to think of himself as being somewhat 
special and having a special mind to be thinking these things. He thought he was 
‘chosen’. 
 
Three neutral narratives were also constructed for this study (Appendix 19). An 
example of a neutral narrative is: 
 
Karen owned a lot of modern art. Since moving to a smaller house she had found it 
hard to find a place for everything and considered whether she should sell or use a 
storage facility for some of her art to make more space. 
 
Participants were asked to read each narrative and give ratings on a five-point scale 
of how likely they think the narrative is true, as well as how exciting they find the 
narrative and how exciting the narrative would be to most other people with 1 being 
0%, 3 being 50% and 5 being 100%. 
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The Novelty sub-scale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 1999; Appendix 
12) and the Remote Associate Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962; Appendix 13) was 
completed. Participants also completed the Eysenck Lie Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1976; Appendix 7), identical to Chapter 3. 
 
Cognitive ‘Looseness’ – Snowy Pictures Task (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976; Appendix 20). This task involves viewing 24 images. Twelve of the images 
contain objects embedded in ‘noise’ while 12 of the images contain no objects. 
Participants are asked to indicate if they can see an object and what it is they can 
see in the images. This is illustrated in Figure 4 along with standardised instructions. 
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It is helpful to be able to see objects quickly in spite of their being 
partially concealed by snow, rain, haze, darkness, or other visual 
obstructions.  
 
Look at the picture below. What object do you see? 
 
Sample Item 1:   
 
By looking carefully at this sample you will see an anchor. 
Some pictures in this test may have no object in them. If you believe a 
picture does not have an object in it then describe the picture by writing 
'none'. 
 
Your score on this test will be the number of objects that you name 
correctly. Work as quickly as you can without sacrificing accuracy. If some 
pictures are difficult, skip them and return to them later if you have 
time.  
 
Do not spend too much time on any one picture.  
Figure 4. Illustration of the Snowy Pictures Task and standardized instructions 
 
Design 
A mixed design was employed with PDI group (high/ low) being the between-groups 
factor and Narratives (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other) as within-
group factors. The dependent variables were: likelihood of being true, exciting to the 
self and exciting to others.  
Additional dependent variables were the scores on the measures of creativity; the 
Emotional Creativity Inventory and the Remote Associate Test. 
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The final dependant variables were the number of objects correctly identified in the 
Snowy Pictures Task, the number of objects incorrectly identified, the number of 
objects incorrectly detected (i.e. indicated there was an object when no object had 
been embedded; i.e. a false positive), and finally the participant stating that there 
was no object (i.e. that there was no object embedded in the image) and this was 
correct. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the study via an online platform. Participants were presented 
with information regarding the study and consent was gained by checking a number 
of statements. Questions were presented in a fixed order. Participants firstly 
assigned ratings to the delusional and neutral narratives. These were ordered by 
presenting a delusional narrative followed by a neutral narrative and this sequence 
was fixed for all seven narratives. Participants then completed the Eysenck Lie Scale 
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). The Remote Associate Test (Mednick, 1962) was 
presented next to act as an interval between rating scales. Participants then went on 
to complete the Novelty subscale of the Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 
1999) and the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1996). The Snowy 
Pictures Task (Ekstrom et al., 1976) measuring cognitive looseness was presented 
last. A debrief page was displayed to participants on completion of the study 
thanking them for participation and detailing the researcher’s contact details. 
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Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 47 
made the low PDI group, while those scoring over the median made the high PDI 
group. There were 47 participants in the low PDI group and 46 participants in the 
high PDI group. Independent t-tests revealed a significant difference between males 
and females and PDI score (t (91) = 3.55; p < 0.01) with males having higher PDI 
scores than females. There was also a significant PDI group difference in age (t (91) 
= - 2.53; p < 0.05). High PDI scorers had a higher mean age than low PDI scorers. 
There were no significant PDI group differences on the Lie Scale (t (90) = 0.659; p 
= 0.51). Summary statistics are displayed in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1  
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups  
 High PDI Group (n) Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean 
(S.D.) 
Female 36 42 50.17 (35.47) 
Male 10 2 90.75 (46.33) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 21.85 (5.3) 19.81 (1.39) - 
PDI Score 86.80 (30.57) 24.68 (14.53) - 
Lie scale 5.5 (3.64) 6 (3.63)  
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A two-way ANOVA was conducted with PDI group as the between groups variable 
and the narratives (delusional/ neutral) as the within-group variable and the 
participants’ likelihood ratings as the dependent variable. The data did not 
approximate a normal distribution (see Appendix 36) however it has been 
demonstrated that ANOVA is robust to moderate deviations from normality (Kim, 
2013). Homogeneity of variance was met for the comparison on neutral narratives (p 
= .5) however it was not met for delusional narratives (p < .05). 
 
This analysis examined average ratings of how likely the narrative was true between 
high and low PDI groups. There was no main effect of PDI group (F (1, 91) = 0.011; 
p = 0.92; p² = 0.00). There was a significant main effect of narrative (F (1, 91) = 
152.695; p <0.01; p² = 0.627). Neutral narratives had higher ratings than 
delusional narratives. The interaction was significant (F (1, 91) = 6.259; p = 0.01; 
p² = 0.06). As can be seen from Table 4.2, this appears to be from a crossover 
effect. While the high PDI group rate higher on delusional narratives and lower on 
neutral narratives, the low PDI group rate higher on neutral narratives and lower on 
delusional narratives. 
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Table 4.2  
Mean values (standard deviation in parenthesis) for how likely the delusional and 
neutral narratives were true between high and low PDI groups  
 Delusional narrative Neutral narrative Overall 
High PDI group 2.25 (0.90) 3.27 (0.90) 2.76 (0.90) 
Low PDI group 2.01 (0.54) 3.54 (0.84) 2.77 (0.69) 
Overall 2.13 (0.72) 3.40 (0.87) 2.76 (0.79) 
 
Follow up analyses (independent t-tests) to explore the significant interaction 
between high and low delusional ideation groups and average ratings of how likely 
the narrative was true were carried out. 
 
The difference between the high and low PDI groups was not significant when rating 
delusional narratives (t (91) = 1.59; p = .18). Neither was the difference significant 
between the high and low PDI groups when rating neutral narratives (t (91) = 1.51; 
p = .14). 
 
A three-way ANOVA was conducted with PDI Group (high/ low) as the between 
groups variable and Content (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other 
referent) as the within group variables and average ratings of excitement of the 
delusional and neutral narratives as dependent variables. Homogeneity of variance 
was met for all comparisons (p > .05). 
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There was no main effect of PDI group (F (1, 91) = 1.016; p = 0.32; p² = 0.01). 
There was a main effect of Content (F (1, 91) = 45.586; p < 0.01; p² = 0.334). As 
can be seen from Table 4.3, delusional narratives were rated as more exciting than 
neutral narratives. The main effect of Perspective was significant (F (1, 91) = 9.562; 
p < 0.01; p² = 0.095) with narratives being rated as more exciting to others than 
to the self. None of the interactions were significant for this analysis (p > 0.45).  
 
Table 4.3.   
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how exciting delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to the self or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ 
Self-Referent 
 
2.20 (0.70) 2.06 (0.67) 2.13 (0.68) 
Delusional/ 
Other-Referent 
 
2.36 (0.98) 2.23 (0.59) 2.29 (0.78) 
Neutral/ Self-
Referent 
 
1.69 (0.71) 1.61 (0.76) 1.65 (0.73) 
Neutral/ Other-
Referent 
 
1.82 (0.78) 1.67 (0.72) 1.74 (0.75) 
Overall 2.02 (0.79) 1.89 (0.68) 1.95 (0.73) 
 
A multiple linear regression incorporated the Remote Associates Test and the 
Emotional Creativity Inventory as predictors of PDI scores. The Durbin Watson value 
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was 1.69. The model was statistically significant (F (2, 90) = 19.533; p < 0.01; R2 = 
0.30) explaining 30% of the variation in PDI scores. Emotional creativity made a 
significant contribution towards the model (Beta = 0.55; p < 0.01) but the Remote 
Associate Test was non-significant. Mean scores, Beta values, t values, p values and 
partial correlations can be found in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4  
Mean scores (standard deviation in parenthesis), Beta values, t values, p values, 
partial correlations and VIF for the Emotional Creativity Inventory and the Remote 
Associates Test 
 Means 
(SD) 
Beta t value p value  Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Emotional 
Creativity 
42.05 
(12.69) 
0.55 6.226 < 0.001 0.55 1 
Remote 
Associates Test 
2.14 
(2.16) 
- 0.07 - 0.842 0.40 - 0.09 1 
 
The Snowy Pictures Task was split into four categories; the number of objects that 
were correctly identified, the number of objects incorrectly identified, the number of 
objects incorrectly detected (i.e. indicated there was an object that was not there; a 
false positive), and finally the participant correctly indicating that there was no 
object embedded. Exploratory data analysis indicated that the data was not normally 
distributed (p < .05; see Appendix 36 for exploratory analysis and equivalent non-
parametric tests). Homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons except for 
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the number of objects incorrectly identified (p = .04) therefore this result should be 
interpreted with caution. 
 
One way ANOVAs revealed a significant difference between high and low PDI groups 
for the number of objects incorrectly detected (false positives) (F (1, 91) = 4.69; p 
= 0.03). As can be seen in Table 4.5, the high PDI group incorrectly detected more 
objects than the low PDI group when no object had been embedded. The number of 
objects incorrectly identified was also found to be approaching significance (F (1, 91) 
= 3.32; p = 0.07) with high PDI scorers incorrectly identifying more objects than low 
PDI scorers.  However, the difference between the high and the low PDI groups was 
not significant for the number of objects that were correctly identified (F (1, 91) = 
0.229; p = 0.63) or when the participant correctly indicated that there was no object 
embedded (F (1, 91) = 0.295; p = 0.59).  
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Table 4.5  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for the Snowy Pictures Task 
between high and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Objects correctly identified 7.24 (2.09) 6.98 (3.05) 7.11 (2.57) 
Objects incorrectly 
identified 
4.80 (2.2) 3.91 (2.5) 4.35 (2.35) 
Objects incorrectly 
detected  
3.74 (2.64) 2.66 (2.14) 3.2 (2.39) 
No objects indicated - 
correct 
8.22 (2.68) 7.87 (3.40) 8.04 (3.04) 
Overall 6 (2.4) 5.35 (2.77) 5.67 (2.59) 
 
Discussion 
The prediction that high PDI scorers would rate narratives more highly than low PDI 
scorers was only partially supported. The significant two-way interaction between 
PDI group and narratives resulted in a crossover effect whereby the high PDI group 
gave significantly higher ratings on delusional narratives, while the low PDI group 
gave significantly higher ratings on neutral narratives. This is consistent with the 
findings of LaRocco and Warman (2009) as they found that those high in delusional 
ideation rated delusional narratives as more likely to be true compared to those low 
in delusional ideation. In the present study however, those low in delusional ideation 
displayed the opposite effect, rating neutral scenarios as more likely to be true. This 
finding appears to differ to that of LaRocco and Warman (2009) as both groups in 
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their study assigned equivalent probability estimates to neutral stimuli. Nonetheless, 
consistent with Chapter 3, both groups rated narratives as more likely/ true but high 
PDI scorers still rated more highly than low PDI scorers across both types of 
narrative supporting a liberal acceptance account (Moritz & Woodward, 2004; Moritz 
et al., 2006; Moritz et al., 2008; Moritz et al., 2007).  
 
Additionally, the high PDI group rated delusional narratives as more exciting 
compared to the low PDI group but this effect did not achieve significance. 
Nonetheless, this is consistent with Chapter 2 and with authors who have theorised 
that those who hold divergent beliefs may seek excitement, as a preference to a 
more rational view of the world (Kumar et al., 1993). As seen in Chapter 3, this does 
not necessarily imply that those high in delusional ideation are sensation seekers 
(Zuckerman, 1994) but that delusional stimuli affect reasoning in a unique way 
(LaRocco & Warman, 2009) and thus, excitement about implausible material may 
lead to this being accepted more easily.  
 
The prediction that creativity would be significantly associated with and predict PDI 
scores was only partially supported. The Emotional Creativity Inventory was 
positively associated and significantly predicted PDI scores. While the Remotes 
Associate Test did not significantly predict PDI scores, the relationship was seen to 
be a negative one, suggesting that low PDI scorers did better than high PDI scorers. 
This is in line with earlier suggestions that low PDI scorers perform better on 
convergent thinking tasks and high PDI scorers tend to demonstrate a ‘looser’ 
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cognitive style and therefore may not perform as well when the task is to narrow the 
options down to a single answer (cf. Young & Bentall, 1995). However, the 
association between PDI scores and emotional creativity was positive and significant, 
supporting this prediction. As suggested by Averill (1999), an emotionally creative 
response can be considered novel in comparison to an individual’s usual behaviour 
or novel in comparison to the typical behaviour in a society. Indeed, it has been 
posited that one of the key aspects of emotional creativity is the ability to think in 
novel ways, particularly in comparison to group norms (Averill, 1999; Humphreys, et 
al., 2008). Averill (1999) found that those who score highly on the General Mysticism 
Scale (Hood, 1975) measuring unusual experiences had greater emotional creativity 
- this also appears to extend to those who hold unusual beliefs in the current study. 
Furthermore, emotional creativity has previously been shown to be positively 
associated with fantasy proneness (Fuchs et al., 2007).  
 
Although it appears evident that creativity is associated with schizotypy (e.g. Nettle, 
2006), it could be argued that this is only with reference to specific types of 
creativity. For example, findings imply that those low in delusional ideation perform 
better on convergent thinking tasks (such as the Remote Associates Test) perhaps 
due to greater cognitive inhibition (Davidson-Jenkins, 2003). Conversely, this would 
imply that those high in delusional ideation would therefore display greater cognitive 
‘looseness’ or disinhibition.  
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In the present study, the prediction that those high in delusional ideation would 
report more objects on the Snowy Pictures Task when no object had been 
embedded was supported. High PDI scorers, compared to low PDI scorers, detected 
more objects that were not there in visual ‘noise’ and the number of objects 
incorrectly identified was also approaching significance, indicating a ‘loose’ or 
disinhibited cognitive style. This is not only consistent with a lowered threshold of 
acceptance (Moritz & Woodward, 2004) but also with previous research that has 
demonstrated that schizotypy is associated with people finding complex types of 
visual patterns such as, static or moving people and objects in visual displays of 
random dots (Farias et al., 2005). Consistent with this, Brugger and colleagues 
(1993) demonstrated that those high on the Magical Ideation Scale were able to see 
more meaningful patterns in a visual display of random dots. This has led authors to 
argue that this leads the individual to make close associations between random 
events, which in turn may account for the emergence of magical and paranormal, as 
well as delusional beliefs (Farias et al., 2005).  
 
In terms of the formation of delusional beliefs, the findings from the present 
experiment are consistent, suggesting that ‘likelihood of being true’ and ‘excitement’ 
continue to be important variables and may explain why scenarios are deemed 
plausible and are thus accepted. Furthermore, those higher in delusional ideation 
display greater emotional creativity (Averill, 1999) and detect more pictures 
embedded in visual ‘noise’ when no picture has been embedded compared to those 
low in delusional ideation, indicating a ‘looser’ or disinhibited cognitive style. Taken 
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together, these findings offer new insight into liberal acceptance (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2004) in a subclinical sample where those with a lower threshold of 
acceptance, such as those high in delusional ideation in the current sample, liberally 
accept, perhaps because of the tendency to perceive meaningful patterns or make 
causal connections where there are none to be found (Fyfe et al., 2008). 
 
This was explored further in Chapter 5. While Chapter 4 examined the tendency to 
perceive meaningful patterns/ causal connections where none exist or apophenia in 
a perceptual manner, Chapter 5 aimed to examine apophenia in a non-perceptual 
manner by utilizing an associative processing task and a measure of coincidental 
experiences. Liberal acceptance was again explored by examining ‘likelihood’ and 
‘excitement’ of narratives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 
 
Chapter V 
Creativity and non-perceptual apophenia as factors in 
delusional thinking and reasoning 
 
‘Every single thing ‘means’ something. This kind of symbolic thinking is 
exhaustive… I have a sense that everything is more vivid and important; the 
incoming stimuli are almost more than I can bear. There is a connection to 
everything that happens—no coincidences. I feel tremendously creative.’ 
(Brundage, 1983; p. 584) 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4, it was found that high PDI scorers detected objects in visual ‘noise’ on 
the Snowy Pictures Task when no objects were embedded, demonstrating a ‘loose’ 
cognitive style which may be indicative of less rigid associative processing 
(Rominger, Weiss, Fink, Schulter & Papousek, 2011). The aim of Chapter 5 was to 
examine creativity and apophenia using non-perceptual information in the form of an 
associative processing task and coincidental experiences. 
 
At one time or another, everyone will have experienced something coincidental. For 
example, perhaps someone thinks of a friend who they have not heard from or met 
with in a long time. The person decides to telephone the friend but at the exact 
moment they decide to call, the person receives a phone call from the very same 
friend they were just about to call. The connection between these two events (the 
intention to call the friend and the call from the same person) are perceived as 
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meaningful – too surprising to be chance alone.  Some authors have put forward 
that making these kinds of causal connections between random, coincidental events 
can account for the emergence of superstitious behaviour and paranormal beliefs 
which in turn, only serves to reinforce coincidences as meaningful (Bressan, 2002; 
Brugger et al., 1990; Fiedler, 2004). Indeed, coincidences may be responsible for 
the formation of such beliefs because these seemingly objective connections seem 
unexplained by reason and science (Bressan, 2002). Eysenck (1994) has referred to 
this type of cognitive looseness as ‘allusive thinking’; a cognitive style that is related 
to and links both psychosis and creativity. Studies have supported this theory by 
finding similarities between schizotypy and creativity: in particular unusual 
experiences and impulsive nonconformity share a positive relationship with 
creativity, however cognitive disorganisation (characterised by disorganised 
thoughts) has been shown to be negatively related to creativity (Batey & Furnham, 
2008).  
 
Furthermore, creativity as assessed by divergent thinking scores has been predicted 
by positive schizotypy (Green & Williams, 1999; O’Reilly, Dunbar & Bentall, 2001). 
Giannotti, Mohr, Pizzagalli, Lehmann and Brugger (2001) place this associative type 
of processing on a continuum from creative, to paranormal, to disordered thought. 
Giannotti et al. (2001) found that believers in the paranormal made more unique 
associations between word pairs that were unrelated demonstrating that believers in 
the paranormal may employ a looser cognitive style in comparison to sceptics who 
produced less unique associations to unrelated word pairs. 
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The ability to make new associations between events can be seen as useful and 
even crucial to the creative process (Gianotti, et al., 2001) and can be viewed as the 
most basic element required for learning (Rominger et al., 2011). One particular task 
known as the Bridge-the-Associative-Gap task (BAG; Gianotti, et al., 2001) not only 
measures creativity, but also a cognitive ability Gianotti et al. (2001) term as 
‘associative processing’. In terms of delusional thinking, the ability to ‘bridge’ 
associative gaps can mean displaying the tendency to make meaningful associations 
between random events or what is termed apophenia (Fyfe et al., 2008). 
 
Indeed, Bressan (2002) also supports this position with the finding that paranormal 
believers report experiencing a higher frequency of coincidences. While some 
authors have attributed this to individuals underestimating the probability of such 
coincidences occurring by chance (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985), the findings of 
Bressan (2002) suggest an alternative explanation - that believers in the paranormal 
make more causal connections based on less evidence. As a consequence of this, 
individuals experience a greater number of meaningful coincidences. This is 
consistent with literature demonstrating reasoning biases in delusional and delusion 
prone populations whereby fewer data are gathered (see Fine et al., 2007) before 
making a decision, thus leading to the formation of poorly supported and aberrant 
beliefs.  
 
In line with Chapter 2, 3 and 4, narratives containing delusional and neutral content 
were utilized to assess a liberal reasoning style. Participants were again asked to 
rate narratives on ‘likelihood of being true’, ‘exciting to self’ and ‘exciting to others’ 
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as these appear to be important factors for the liberal acceptance account (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2004). The Bridge the Associate Gap task (Gianotti et al., 2001) was also 
employed as a measure of creativity/ ‘associative processing’ and the Coincidences 
Questionnaire (Bressan, 2002) as a measure of non-perceptual apophenia to 
examine if those high in delusional ideation make more causal connections where 
none exist. 
 
In light of previous research/findings, it was expected that the high PDI group would 
rate delusional narratives as more likely to be true and more exciting than the low 
PDI group. It was also predicted that the high PDI group would generate more 
associative words compared to the low PDI group on the Bridge the Associate Gap 
task. Finally, it was expected that the high PDI group would report experiencing 
more coincidences compared to the low PDI group as well as endorse alternatives to 
‘pure chance’ when considering what coincidences are due to. 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred-twenty-one participants took part (105 female) with a mean age of 
21.26 (S.D. = 5.24). Participants were recruited voluntarily from a large urban UK 
university and received course credits for their participation. 
Materials 
Once informed consent was complete (Appendix 21 & 22), the Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory (Peters, et al., 1996; Appendix 4) was again employed as a 
measure of delusional ideation. Additionally, participants assessed a series of 
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delusional and neutral narratives (Appendix 18 & 19) and completed the Remote 
Associate Test (Appendix 13), identical to Chapter 4. 
 
Bridge-the-Associate-Gap Task 
The Bridge-the-Associate-Gap Task (Gianotti et al., 2001; Appendix 23) involves 
viewing a pair of either semantically indirectly related word pairs (e.g. flower – nose) 
or semantically unrelated word pairs (e.g. people - piece) and generating an 
associative word.  
 
Coincidence Questionnaire 
This questionnaire consists of 15 items divided into three sections. The first section 
measures how often participants have come across meaningful coincidences. The 
second section measures coincidences in various categories. For example, one 
question asks how often they have experienced spontaneous associations (like 
thinking of someone and running unexpectedly into that person soon afterwards), 
while another question asks how often they have experienced the perception of 
something distant in time (like having a dream that then comes true). Items are 
rated from 1 to 5 with 1 being ‘never’ and 5 being ‘very often’. The final section asks 
what participants think coincidences are due to with options such as ‘pure chance’ 
and ‘destiny’. Participants indicate either ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Don’t Know’ (Bressan, 2002; 
Appendix 24). 
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Design 
A mixed design was employed with PDI group (high/ low) being the between-groups 
factor and Narratives (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other) as within-
group factors. The dependent variables were: likelihood of being true, exciting to the 
self and exciting to others. The other dependent variables were the associative 
words generated on the Bridge the Associate Gap task and responses to the 
Coincidences questionnaire. 
 
Procedure 
All measures were completed via an online survey platform. After informed consent 
was gained participants completed the Bridge the Associate Gap task (Gianotti et al., 
2001), the Coincidences questionnaire (Bressan, 2002) and then assigned ratings to 
the delusional and neutral narratives. These were counterbalanced by presenting a 
delusional narrative followed by a neutral narrative and this sequence was fixed for 
all seven narratives. Participants then went on to complete the Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory (Peters et al., 1996). After completion, participants viewed a 
debrief page thanking them for participation and specifying the researcher’s contact 
details. 
 
Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 46 
made the low PDI group, while those scoring over the median made the high PDI 
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group. There were 63 participants in the low PDI group and 58 participants in the 
high PDI group. Independent t-tests revealed no significant difference between 
males and females and PDI score (t (119) = -1.86; p = 0.07) nor any PDI group 
differences in age (t (119) = 0.6; p = 0.55). Summary statistics are displayed in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1  
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups  
 High PDI Group 
(n) 
Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean (S.D.) 
Female 55 50 57.13 (38.95) 
Male 3 13 38.19 (30.66) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 20.97 (5.38) 21.54 (5.14) - 
PDI Score 85.96 (31.23) 25.78 (13.86) - 
 
Narratives 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted with PDI group (high/ low) as the between groups 
variable and the narratives (delusional/ neutral) as the within-group variable and the 
participants likelihood ratings as the dependent variable. The data approximated a 
normal distribution (p = .2; see Appendix 36). A Levene’s test found that 
homogeneity of variance had been met for neutral narratives (p = .71) but had not 
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been met for delusional narratives (p = .05) hence interpretation of the results 
should remain cautious. 
 
This analysis examined average ratings of how likely the narrative was true between 
high and low PDI groups. There was a main effect of PDI group (F (1, 116) = 4.80; 
p = 0.03; p² = 0.04) with the high PDI group having higher scores than the low 
PDI group. There was also a main effect of narrative (F (1, 116) = 332.227; p 
<0.001; p² = 0.741). Neutral narratives had higher ratings than delusional 
narratives. The interaction was not significant (F (1, 116) = 0.130; p = 0.719; p² = 
0.001). As can be seen from Table 5.2, the high and the low PDI groups both rate 
neutral narratives more highly than delusional narratives. 
 
Table 5.2  
Mean values (standard deviation in parenthesis) for how likely the delusional and 
neutral narratives were true between high and low PDI groups.  
 Delusional 
narrative 
Neutral narrative Overall 
High PDI group 2.21 (0.69) 3.75 (0.73) 2.98 (0.71) 
Low PDI group 1.95 (0.68) 3.55 (0.85) 2.75 (0.76) 
Overall 2.08 (0.68) 3.65 (0.79) 2.86 (0.73) 
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A three-way ANOVA was conducted with PDI Group (high/ low) as the between 
groups variable and Content (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other 
referent) as the within group variables and average ratings of excitement of the 
delusional and neutral narratives as dependent variable. Homogeneity of variance 
was met for all comparisons (p > .05) except for ratings of excitement to oneself for 
neutral narratives (p < .05). 
 
There was a main effect of PDI group (F (1, 114) = 5.026; p = 0.03; p² = 0.04) 
with the high PDI group having higher ratings than the low PDI group. Additionally, 
there was a main effect of Content (F (1, 114) = 67.484; p <0.001; p² = 0.372). 
Delusional narratives were rated as more exciting than neutral narratives. The main 
effect of Perspective was significant (F (1, 114) = 18.025; p = 0.001; p² = 0.137) 
with narratives being rated as more exciting to others than to the self. The 
interaction between PDI group and Perspective was approaching significance (F (1, 
114) = 3.3; p = 0.07; p² = 0.028). As shown in Table 5.3, the ratings differed 
more between self and other perspectives for the low PDI group than the high PDI 
group. 
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Table 5.3   
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how exciting delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to the self or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ 
Self-Referent 
 
2.23 (0.69) 1.94 (0.69) 2.08 (0.69) 
Delusional/ 
Other-Referent 
 
2.35 (0.63) 2.26 (0.58) 2.30 (0.60) 
Neutral/ Self-
Referent 
 
1.66 (0.74) 1.39 (0.54) 1.52 (0.64) 
Neutral/ Other-
Referent 
 
1.78 (0.68) 1.69 (0.62) 1.73 (0.65) 
Overall 2.01 (0.68) 1.82 (0.61) 1.91 (0.64) 
 
Bridge the Associate Gap Task 
A further three-way ANOVA was used to examine responses on the Bridge the 
Associate Gap task with PDI group (high/ low) as the between groups factor and 
stimulus type (indirectly related/ unrelated) and association category (unique/ rare/ 
common) as within group factors.  The number of associative words generated was 
the dependent variable. The number of associated words in each category did not 
approximate a normal distribution (p < .05) but this was expected given the nature 
of the task (see Appendix 36) and it has been demonstrated that ANOVA is robust to 
moderate these deviations from normality (Kim, 2013). Homogeneity of variance 
was met for all comparisons (p > .05).  
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There was no main effect of PDI group (F (1, 119) = 0.321; p = 0.57; p² = 0.003). 
There was a main effect of stimulus type (F (1, 119) = 6.302; p = 0.01; p² = 0.05) 
with indirectly related word pairs generating more associative words than the 
unrelated word pairs. The main effect of association category was also significant (F 
(1, 119) = 444.546; p < 0.001; p² = 0.789). More common words were generated 
followed by unique words and finally rare words. Simple contrasts revealed a 
significant difference between all categories (p < .01). There was a significant 
interaction between stimulus type and association category (F (1, 119) = 37.494; p 
< 0.001; p² = 0.240). More common words were generated for both indirectly 
related and unrelated word pairs however the difference is larger for unique words 
between unrelated word pairs and indirectly related word pairs (See Table 5.4). No 
other interactions were significant for this analysis (p ≥ 0.77). 
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Table 5.4  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for unique, rare and common 
words generated for indirectly related and unrelated words pairs between high and 
low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Indirectly Related/ 
Unique 
 
1.33 (1.59) 1.52 (1.43) 1.42 (1.51) 
Indirectly Related/ Rare 
 
1.17 (1.27) 1.03 (1.03) 1.1 (1.15) 
Indirectly Related/ 
Common 
 
7.38 (1.76) 7.43 (1.77) 7.4 (1.76) 
Unrelated/ Unique 2.48 (1.89) 2.63 (1.92) 2.55 (1.9) 
Unrelated/ Rare 1.15 (1.24) 1.19 (1.09) 1.17 (1.16) 
Unrelated/ Common 6.05 (1.89) 5.92 (2.02) 5.98 (1.95) 
Overall 3.26 (1.61) 3.29 (1.54) 3.27 (1.57) 
 
Follow up analyses (paired samples t-tests) explored the significant interaction 
between stimulus type and association categories. A Bonferroni correction was 
employed due to three comparisons being made. The p value needed to be less than 
.017 to achieve statistical significance. 
The first analysis examined stimulus type (indirectly related and unrelated words) 
and the number of unique words generated. The difference between the indirectly 
related and unrelated word categories was significant (t (83) = -6.56; p <.01). More 
unique words were generated in the unrelated word category (M = 3.08; SD = 2.1) 
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compared to unique words generated in the indirectly related word category (M = 
1.64; SD = 1.66). 
 
The second analysis examined stimulus type (indirectly related and unrelated words) 
and the number of rare words generated. The difference between the indirectly 
related and unrelated word categories was not significant (t (83) = 1.36; p = .18). 
More rare words were generated in the indirectly related word category (M = 1.38; 
SD = 1.21) compared to rare words generated in the unrelated word category (M = 
1.15; SD = 1). 
 
The final analysis examined stimulus type (indirectly related and unrelated words) 
and the number of common words generated. The difference between the indirectly 
related and unrelated word categories was significant (t (83) = 5.96; p <.01). More 
common words were generated in the indirectly related word category (M = 6.89; 
SD = 1.85) compared to common words generated in the unrelated word category 
(M = 5.45; SD = 2.12). 
 
Coincidences 
An Independent samples t-test was used to examine the difference between high 
and low PDI groups and the total number of coincidences reported. Exploratory data 
analysis indicated that the data was not normally distributed (p < .05; see Appendix 
36 for exploratory analysis and equivalent non-parametric tests). Homogeneity of 
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variance was met (p > .05). Results revealed a significant difference between high 
and low PDI groups (t (119) = -02.02; p = 0.05) with the high PDI groups mean 
score being 22.41 (SD = 4.85) and low PDI groups mean score being 20.36 (SD = 
6.18).  
 
Data were further analysed using Spearman’s correlation to examine if there was 
any relationship between total PDI score and categories of coincidences. Significant 
positive correlations were found between total PDI score and General Coincidences 
(r (119) = 0.223; p = 0.01), Clusters of Events (r = (119); 0.228; p = 0.01), 
Spontaneous Associations (r (119) = 0.324; p <0.001), Perceptions Distant in Space 
(r = (117); 0.255; p = 0.005), Perceptions Distant in Time (r (119) = 0.271; p = 
0.003) and Guardian Angel Experiences (r (119) = 0.375; p < 0.001). Unexpected 
solutions (r (121) = 0.105; p = 0.252) and Small World Experiences (r (120) = 
0.141; p = 0.125) did not correlate significantly with PDI score.  
 
A multiple linear regression analysis incorporating the variables: Guardian Angel 
Experiences, General Coincidences, Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant 
in Space, Small World Experiences, Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations 
and Unexpected Solutions (Durbin Watson = 1.81) significantly predicted PDI score 
(F (1, 117) = 3.405; p = 0.002; R2 = 0.20) with 20% of the variance in PDI scores 
being explained by the model. As can be seen from Table 5.5, Spontaneous 
Associations, Unexpected Solutions and Guardian Angel Experiences made a 
significant contribution to the model. 
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Table 5.5 
Mean (standard deviation in parenthesis), Beta, t values, p-values, partial 
correlations and VIF for Guardian Angel Experiences, General Coincidences, 
Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant in Space, Small World Experiences, 
Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations and Unexpected Solutions. 
Variable 
 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Beta t value p value Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Guardian Angel 
Experiences 
 
2.59 
(1.23) 
0.268 2.503 0.01 0.233 1.71 
General 
Coincidences 
 
3.09 
(0.88) 
0.039 0.402 0.69 0.038 1.4 
Perceptions 
Distant in Time 
 
2.52 
(1.23) 
0.121 1.144 0.25 0.109 1.9 
Perceptions 
Distant in 
Space 
 
2.12 
(1.07) 
0.086 0.756 0.45 0.072 2.21 
Small World 
Experiences 
 
2.84 
(0.93) 
- 0.067 -0.637 0.52 -0.061 1.48 
Clusters of 
Events 
 
2.88 
(1.03) 
0.057 0.557 0.58 0.053 1.41 
Spontaneous 
Associations 
 
3.07 
(1.01) 
0.240 2.26 0.03 0.211 1.71 
Unexpected 
Solutions 
 
2.29 
(1.08) 
- 0.253 -2.231 0.03 -0.209 1.92 
 
It was found however that whilst unexpected solutions and small world experiences 
shared a non-significant positive correlation with PDI score, these shared a negative 
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association in the regression model (significantly so for unexpected solutions). This 
was investigated further in a series of regression models to explore the possibility of 
suppressor variables.  
 
When Unexpected Solutions and Small World Experiences were removed (Durbin 
Watson = 2.07) the model remained significant (F (6, 112) = 4.18; p = 0.001; R2 = 
0.18) and accounted for 18% of the variance in PDI scores. Spontaneous 
Associations (Beta = 0.204; p = 0.05) and Guardian Angel Experiences (Beta = 
0.23; p = 0.03) made significant contributions to the model (see Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6  
Beta, t- values, p-values, partial correlations and VIF for Guardian Angel 
Experiences, General Coincidences, Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant 
in Space, Clusters of Events and Spontaneous Associations. 
Variable 
 
Beta t value p value Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Guardian Angel 
Experiences 
 
0.230 2.188 0.03 0.203 1.59 
General 
Coincidences 
 
0.062 0.636 0.53 0.06 1.44 
Perceptions 
Distant in Time 
 
0.033 0.323 0.75 0.031 1.77 
Perceptions 
Distant in Space 
 
0.012 0.109 0.91 0.01 2.12 
Clusters of Events 
 
0.033 0.321 0.75 0.03 1.35 
Spontaneous 
Associations 
 
0.204 2.004 0.05 0.186 1.58 
      
 
The strongest model emerged when all previous predictor variables were included 
except for small world experiences (Durbin Watson = 2.05). The model accounted 
for 22% of the variance in PDI scores (F (7,111) = 4.37; p < 0.001; R2 = 0.22) and 
as can be seen in Table 5.7, Guardian Angel Experiences, Spontaneous Associations 
and Unexpected Solutions made a significant contribution towards the model. 
Unexpected Solutions maintains a negative beta value (despite a positive, non-
significant bivariate correlation) and is a significant contributor to the regression 
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model suggesting that this variable is suppressing irrelevant variance in other 
predictor variables resulting in a stronger model overall when included (see Pandey 
& Elliott, 2010). 
 
Table 5.7  
Beta, t- values, p-values, partial correlations and VIF for Guardian Angel 
Experiences, General Coincidences, Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant 
in Space, Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations and Unexpected Solutions. 
Variable 
 
Beta t value p value Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Guardian Angel 
Experiences 
 
0.283 2.668 0.009 0.245 1.74 
General 
Coincidences 
 
0.058 0.601 0.55 0.057 1.44 
Perceptions 
Distant in Time 
 
0.085 0.833 0.41 0.079 1.81 
Perceptions 
Distant in Space 
 
0.067 0.597 0.55 0.057 2.21 
Clusters of Events 
 
0.066 0.649 0.59 0.062 1.48 
Spontaneous 
Associations 
 
0.228 2.266 0.02 0.210 1.59 
Unexpected 
Solutions 
 
- 0.239 -2.163 0.03 -0.201 1.96 
      
Finally, two-way Chi-Square tests were used to investigate if there were any 
associations between PDI group and what participants thought coincidences were 
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due to. There was a significant association between PDI group and Pure Chance (2 
(df = 2) = 9.967; p = 0.03), Destiny (2 (df = 2) =16.718; p < 0.001), Divine 
Intervention (2 (df = 2) = 9.832; p = 0.007) and Everything Being Connected to 
Everything Else in the Universe (2 (df = 2) = 9.034; p = 0.01). It appears that 
those in the low PDI group attribute coincidences to Pure Chance; while those in the 
high PDI group appear to attribute coincidences to Destiny, Divine Intervention and 
Everything being Connected to Everything Else in the Universe. No significant 
associations were found between PDI group and Extra-Sensory Perception, Intuition 
or Physical Principles Not Yet Discovered by Science (p > 0.06).  
 
Discussion 
High PDI scorers gave significantly higher ratings of ‘how likely to be true’ for 
narratives containing delusional and neutral content. Both groups rated neutral 
narratives as more likely/ true but high PDI scorers still gave higher ratings to both 
scenarios in comparison to low PDI scorers. While this partially supports the work of 
LaRocco and Warman, (2009), it is argued that this finding adds further evidence of 
a liberal acceptance bias in delusion prone individuals for scenarios in general; 
where those with a lower threshold of acceptance liberally accept information that 
others would reject or rate lowly  (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). In addition, when 
asked how exciting participants found the narratives, high PDI scorers gave higher 
ratings than low PDI scorers. Excitement may explain why high PDI scorers accept 
scenarios more easily, especially delusional ones, since they offer an alternative to a 
rational view of the world (Kumar et al., 1993). In addition, further analysis revealed 
that, compared to low PDI scorers, high PDI scorers rate delusional narratives as 
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significantly more exciting to the self than neutral narratives – an effect not 
demonstrated when high and low PDI scorers were compared on how exciting 
delusional and neutral narratives would be to others. This is consistent with previous 
theory and research suggesting a self-reference bias in the prodromal stages of 
schizophrenia (Sass & Parnas, 2003) and in subclinical delusional ideation (Galbraith 
et al., 2008; Warman et al., 2007; Warman & Martin, 2006). 
 
The findings from these four experiments add to the literature in three unique ways. 
Firstly, liberal acceptance has not previously been demonstrated in a non-clinical 
population. Secondly, this effect is evident on both delusional and neutral stimuli, 
not just implausible stimuli; previous research has only demonstrated this on 
delusional/ implausible materials (LaRocco & Warman, 2009; Moritz & Woodward, 
2004). Thirdly, excitement about the stimulus may be an underpinning factor for 
why scenarios are accepted more readily by those high in delusional ideation. 
 
No significant group difference was found for the Bridge the Associate Gap task 
(Gianotti et al., 2001) and thus, the prediction that high PDI scorers would generate 
more associative words was not supported. Instead, both groups generated more 
associative words for indirectly related word pairs than unrelated word pairs. Gianotti 
et al. (2001) found that strong paranormal believers compared to sceptics produced 
more original associations to unrelated word pairs however this does not appear 
consistent with those high in delusion ideation. Compared to the Remote Associate 
Test (Mednick, 1962), the Bridge the Associate Gap task has the advantage of being 
able to compare semantically related and unrelated word pairs in addition to all 
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responses (associations) being accepted as valid, so there is no single, correct 
answer being sought after.  
 
Nonetheless, it appears that in the present Chapter (Chapter 5) and in Chapter 4, 
the word associations tasks employed such as the Remotes Associates Test and the 
Bridge the Associate Gap task do not differentiate PDI groups or predict delusional 
ideation. The Remote Associate Test may act as a mediator as seen in Chapter 3 
however this is in relation to lower scores in people who demonstrate high delusional 
ideation suggesting that those low in delusional ideation perform better on word 
association tasks where convergent thinking is necessary. Consistent with this 
notion, schizotypy has been related to divergent thinking in contrast to convergent 
thinking (Folley & Park, 2005). Previous research demonstrates this pattern of 
results, in that complex, moving objects are reported in visual displays of random 
dots by believers in the paranormal and schizotypes (Brugger et al., 1993; Farias et 
al., 2005) suggesting a ‘looser’ cognitive style. Tasks that employ pattern detection 
in visual ‘noise’ do not necessarily initiate convergent thinking but cognitive 
‘looseness’ for subjective meaningful associations; much like the finding in Chapter 4 
whereby high PDI scorers reported more embedded objects in ‘snowy pictures’ 
where no object had been embedded. It could be argued that word association tasks 
do not rely on making meaningful associations even if stimuli are semantically 
related. The meaningfulness of stimuli relies on a person’s subjective evaluation 
rather than objective information (Gianotti et al., 2001). In addition, the literature on 
a JTC bias is robust in that less objective information is gathered before reaching a 
decision in those with delusions and delusion-prone participants (see Fine et al., 
 126 
 
2007) suggesting that subjective interpretations of information/ events is relied upon 
in subclinical delusions. 
 
In support of this theoretical standpoint, the high PDI group reported experiencing 
significantly more coincidences compared to the low PDI group, supporting this 
prediction. Furthermore, significant, positive correlations were found between total 
PDI score and general coincidences, clusters of events, spontaneous associations, 
perceptions distant in space, perceptions distant in time and guardian angel 
experiences. A further analysis found that spontaneous associations, unexpected 
solutions and guardian angel experiences all predicted delusional ideation. It was 
found however that whilst unexpected solutions and small world experiences shared 
a non-significant positive correlation with PDI score, these shared a negative 
association in the regression model (significantly so for unexpected solutions). 
Unexpected Solutions made a significant yet negative contribution to the model 
suggesting that it suppressed irrelevant variance in the other predictor variables 
resulting in the strongest regression model when small world experiences were 
removed. 
 
The final prediction was also supported with the low PDI scorers endorsing that 
coincidences are due to pure chance; while high PDI scorers endorsed destiny, 
divine intervention and everything being connected to everything else in the 
universe. Consistent with the present findings, Bressan (2002) reported that 
believers in the paranormal compared to non-believers detect more patterns and 
make more causal connections based on less evidence and therefore are more prone 
 127 
 
to experience a greater number of meaningful coincidences. The ability to find 
patterns and search for causes is, of course, useful for survival and will vary 
between individuals (Bressan, 2002).  
 
However, Brugger (1997) suggests that believers in the paranormal may have a 
lower ‘threshold of causal attribution’ and a consequence of this is the need to make 
more causal connections between random events. Therefore, in the event that a 
natural cause cannot be found, a paranormal or delusional explanation may seem 
fitting. Fyfe and colleagues (2008) suggest that apophenia or the tendency to 
perceive these meaningful patterns and causal connections where none exist may be 
a contributing factor to the formation of paranormal as well as delusional beliefs. 
This is consistent with findings in the schizophrenia literature; with those 
experiencing delusions having a ‘lowered threshold of acceptance’, liberally accepting 
even implausible interpretations (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). 
 
While this study has investigated the effects of associative processing and reported 
experiences of coincidences in those that are delusional-prone, research within this 
area has been mostly conducted with believers and non-believers in the paranormal 
and any inferences drawn between these two populations must remain tentative. 
Future studies should investigate similar additional factors, such as apophenia and 
its different forms (perceptual and non-perceptual), which may contribute to 
increased liberal acceptance in delusion-prone individuals. 
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Chapter 6 aimed to replicate the findings examining coincidental experiences that 
were tested in the present experiment. Additionally, narratives with delusional and 
neutral content have been utilised to examine liberal acceptance in the previous 
experiments; in Chapter 6, the task used by Moritz and Woodward, (2004) in 
previous studies was utilised to measure liberal acceptance.  
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Chapter VI 
Delusional ideation and decision thresholds: Testing the 
liberal acceptance account 
 
Introduction 
In Chapters 2-5, narratives have been used to measure liberal acceptance in a 
subclinical sample. In Chapter 6, the aim was to examine if liberal acceptance could 
be demonstrated in a subclinical sample using materials that have been utilised 
previously in a clinical sample. This followed the method employed by Moritz and 
Woodward (2004). 
 
Theories introduced at the beginning of this thesis, have dominated research into 
cognition and delusions (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). These include perceptual 
anomalies (Maher, 1974; 1999), attributional biases (see Bentall, & Kaney, 1996; 
Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996; Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1997) and reasoning biases - most notably the jump to conclusions bias (see 
Fine et al., 2007). To reiterate, there is robust evidence that those who experience 
delusions exhibit a number of reasoning biases. These reasoning biases, particularly 
the jump to conclusions bias, have been mainly investigated using probabilistic 
reasoning tasks such as the beads task (see Garety & Freeman, 1999; Fine et al. 
2007). A strict jump to conclusions account would hold that participants would 
hastily choose one option and stick with this, even if this is not supported with 
evidence (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). 
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As previously discussed, Moritz and Woodward (2004) have argued for a liberal 
acceptance account whereby implausible information is accepted more easily by 
patients with schizophrenia due to a lowered threshold for acceptance. They posit 
that when there are several competing hypotheses, a decision may be delayed 
because multiple hypotheses pass the threshold for plausibility leading to greater 
ambiguity. Therefore, schizophrenia patients may consider a hypothesis as a 
plausible option but healthy participants may dismiss the hypothesis as implausible. 
Moritz and Woodward (2004) tested this theory using pictures from the Thematic 
Apperception Test and asked participants to rate various interpretations in terms of 
plausibility. They found that patients gave relatively high plausibility ratings for those 
that were rated as poor or unlikely by controls, yet patients were comparable on 
plausibility ratings that were rated as good or excellent by controls. Evidence was 
also found that contradicts a strict jump to conclusions account since participants did 
not converge on one particular interpretation but considered several options (Moritz 
& Woodward, 2004). 
 
In the present study, six pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; 
Murray, 1943) were presented and participants were asked to rate three or six 
interpretations of varying plausibility. In addition, the Coincidences Questionnaire 
(Bressan, 2002) was again employed as a measure of non-perceptual apophenia to 
examine if those high in delusional ideation make more causal connections where 
none exist. 
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Consistent with previous research (Moritz & Woodward, 2004), it was expected that 
high PDI scorers would rate more interpretations for the Thematic Apperception Test 
pictures as good or excellent compared to low PDI scorers but that low PDI scorers 
would rate more interpretations as poor or unlikely compared to high PDI scorers. It 
was expected that this pattern would be more pronounced for pictures with six 
interpretations compared to pictures with three interpretations due to greater 
ambiguity with six interpretations. 
 
In addition, it was also predicted that if a strict jump to conclusions account was 
supported, in contrast to the liberal acceptance account, participants in the high PDI 
group would judge solely one interpretation as good or excellent for each picture 
compared to participants in the low PDI group. 
Consistent with Chapter 5, it was expected that the high PDI group would report 
experiencing more coincidences compared to the low PDI group as well as endorse 
alternatives to ‘pure chance’ when considering what coincidences are due to.  
 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred-thirteen participants took part (94 female) with a mean age of 23.04 
(S.D. = 7.43). Participants were recruited voluntarily from a large urban UK 
university and received course credits for their participation. 
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Materials 
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters, Day & Garety, 1996; Appendix 4) was 
again employed as a measure of delusional ideation. In addition, participants 
completed the Coincidences questionnaire (Bressan, 2002; Appendix 24), identical to 
Chapter 5. 
 
Thematic Apperception Test - Liberal Acceptance Measure 
Six pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943; Appendix 27) were 
presented and participants were asked to rate three or six interpretations of varying 
plausibility. The number of interpretations was manipulated (three or six 
interpretations) in order to test whether the level of ambiguity would affect task 
performance. The plausibility ratings per interpretation were recorded as follows: 1 
= does not fit/poor interpretation, 2 = possible interpretation but not likely, 3 = 
good interpretation, 4 = excellent interpretation. Cards displaying dominant 
aggression (e.g., card 15, man among gravestones), nudity (e.g., picture 17BM, 
naked man) or pictures with only few details (e.g., picture 16 which is a blank card) 
were excluded.The Thematic Apperception Test was chosen because many of its 
pictures evoke a variety of different interpretations and the use of this stimulus 
material is consistent with previous research (Moritz & Woodward, 2004). This test is 
illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
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Please look at the picture and rate each interpretation below as either: 1 = does not 
fit/poor interpretation, 2 = possible interpretation but not likely, 3 = good 
interpretation, 4 = excellent interpretation. 
 Smugglers are loading stolen goods from ships into a warehouse. The person 
on the bridge is a detective watching. 
 The sun is exploding; meteorites are crashing down the earth. The men try to 
move them away or even catch them. 
 The woman is sick, perhaps from the sun, or the smell of the goods the 
workers are carrying, and is about to vomit. 
 From a bridge, a rich woman is supervising her servants who are moving 
boxes into her new house or factory. 
 The woman is complaining about the noise the workers are making or 
perhaps the smell of the goods they are carrying. 
 A woman on the bridge is thinking whether or not she should jump from the 
high bridge. 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943) used as a 
measure of liberal acceptance 
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Design  
A mixed design was employed with PDI group (high/ low) as the between groups 
variable and response options (does not fit/ poor interpretation, possible but not 
likely interpretation, good interpretation and excellent interpretation) as the within-
group variable. The total number of interpretations assigned to each response option 
served as the dependent variable. The other dependent variable was the scores from 
the coincidence measure. 
 
Procedure 
All measures were completed via an online survey platform. Once informed consent 
was complete, participants then completed the coincidences questionnaire, followed 
by viewing each of the six pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test and 
assigning plausibility ratings to either three or six interpretations. Finally, participants 
completed the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory. A debrief page was displayed 
thanking participants for taking part and detailing the researcher’s details.  
 
Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 48 
made the low PDI group, while those scoring over the median made the high PDI 
group. There were 57 participants in the low PDI group and 56 participants in the 
high PDI group. Independent t-tests revealed a significant difference between males 
and females and PDI score (t (111) = -2.02; p = 0.05).  There was also a significant 
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PDI group difference in age (t (94.54) = 2.02; p = 0.05). Summary statistics are 
displayed in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1  
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups  
 High PDI Group 
(n) 
Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean (S.D.) 
Female 49 45 58.71 (43.40) 
Male 7 12 37.47 (32.52) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 21.64 (5.51) 24.42 (8.76) - 
PDI Score 85.75 (39.11) 25.07 (15.37) - 
 
Thematic Apperception Test 
Two-way ANOVAs were conducted with PDI group (high/ low) as the between 
groups variable and response options (does not fit/ poor interpretation, possible but 
not likely interpretation, good interpretation and excellent interpretation) as the 
within-group variable. The total number of interpretations assigned to each response 
option served as the dependent variable. The data did not approximate a normal 
distribution (p < .05; see Appendix 36) however this was expected due to the nature 
of the task and ANOVA is considered robust enough to manage deviations from 
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normality (Kim, 2013). The Levene’s tests found that homogeneity of variance had 
been met for all comparisons (p > .05).  
 
The first analysis examined the total number of interpretations assigned to each 
response option when response options were collapsed across pictures with three 
and six interpretations. There was no main effect of PDI group (F (1, 110) = 0.22; p 
= 0.64; p² = 0.002). The main effect of response option was significant (F (3, 110) 
= 76.9; p <0.01; p² = 0.41). Participants chose the ‘possible but not likely’ option 
most often and the excellent option least often. Simple contrasts revealed a 
significant difference between poor and unlikely response options (p = 0.02) and 
poor and excellent response options (p < 0.01). The interaction was not significant 
(F (1, 110) = 0.28; p = 0.64; p² = 0.003). As can be seen from Table 6.2, there is 
not much difference on the overall ratings between the high and the low PDI groups 
on the various response options.  
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Table 6.2 
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for response options between high 
and low PDI groups across three and six interpretations 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Does not fit/ poor 
interpretation 
 
7.61 (4.68) 7.93 (4.54) 7.77 (4.61) 
Possible interpretation but 
not likely 
 
9.61 (3.56) 9.18 (4.54) 9.4 (4.05) 
Good interpretation 
 
 
7.80 (3.81) 7.93 (3.44) 7.87 (3.63) 
Excellent interpretation 
 
 
 1.63 (2.2) 1.38 (1.86) 1.51 (2.03) 
Overall 6.66 (3.56) 6.61 (3.6) 6.64 (3.58) 
 
The second analysis examined the total number of interpretations assigned to each 
response option when there were three response options. The data did not 
approximate a normal distribution (p < .05; see Appendix 36). Homogeneity of 
variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05). The main effect of PDI group was 
not significant (F (1, 110) = 0.59; p = 0.44; p² = 0.005). The main effect of 
response option was significant (F (1, 110) = 39.402; p < 0.001; p² = 0.264). As 
can be seen from Table 6.3, the excellent option was chosen least often. Simple 
contrasts revealed significant differences between all response options (p < 0.001). 
The interaction between PDI group and response option was not significant (F (1, 
110) = 0.451; p = 0.72; p² = 0.004).  
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Table 6.3 
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for response options between high 
and low PDI groups across three interpretations 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Does not fit/ poor 
interpretation 
 
2.14 (1.76) 2.43 (1.62) 2.29 (1.69) 
Possible interpretation but 
not likely 
 
3.16 (1.56) 2.95 (1.84) 3.06 (1.7) 
Good interpretation 
 
 
2.84 (1.58)  2.79 (1.45) 2.82 (1.52) 
Excellent interpretation 
 
 
0.82 (1.25) 0.68 (0.96) 0.75 (1.11) 
Overall 2.24 (1.54) 2.21 (1.47) 2.23 (1.51) 
 
The final analysis examined the total number of interpretations assigned to each 
response option when there were six response options. Again, the data did not 
approximate a normal distribution (p < .05; see Appendix 36). Homogeneity of 
variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05). The main effect of PDI group was 
not significant (F (1, 110) = 0.102; p = 0.75; p² = 0.001). The main effect of 
response option was significant (F (1, 110) = 73.8; p < 0.001; p² = 0.62). The 
excellent option was chosen least often (see Table 6.4). Simple contrasts showed a 
significant difference between all response options (p < 0.001). The interaction was 
not significant (F (1, 110) = 0.09; p = 0.97; p² = 0.001). 
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Table 6.4 
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for response categories between 
high and low PDI groups across six interpretations 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Does not fit/ poor 
interpretation 
 
5.46 (3.31)     5.5 (3.34) 5.48 (3.33) 
Possible interpretation but 
not likely 
 
6.45 (2.68) 6.23 (3.25) 6.34 (2.97) 
Good interpretation 
 
 
4.96 (2.82) 5.14 (2.74) 5.05 (2.78) 
Excellent interpretation 
 
 
0.8 (1.38)     0.7 (1.04) 0.75 (1.21) 
Overall 4.15 (2.55) 4.39 (2.59) 4.27 (2.57) 
 
In line with previous research, it was tested how often participants judged solely one 
interpretation for each picture as good or excellent between high and low PDI 
groups. For pictures with three interpretations the low PDI group had a single 
preference in 86.3% of the trials compared to 84.7% in the high PDI group. The 
difference between the groups was not significant (2 (df = 2) = 0.394; p = 0.82).  
 
For all pictures with six interpretations, the low PDI group had a single preference in 
23.4% of the trials compared to 27.2% in the high PDI group. Again, the difference 
between the groups was not significant (2 (df = 2) = 0.826; p = 0.66).  
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Coincidences 
An Independent samples t-test was used to examine the difference between high 
and low PDI groups and the total number of coincidences reported. The data 
approximated a normal distribution (p > .05; see Appendix 36) and homogeneity of 
variance was met (p > .05). There was a significant difference between high and 
low PDI groups (t (111) = -02.44; p = 0.02) with the high PDI groups mean score 
being 21.43 (SD = 5.39) and low PDI groups mean score being 19.04 (SD = 5.02). 
  
Data were further analysed using Spearman’s correlation to examine if there was 
any relationship between total PDI score and categories of coincidences. Significant 
positive correlations were found between total PDI score and General Coincidences 
(r (112) = 0.253; p < 0.01), Spontaneous Associations (r (112) = 0.343; p <0.01), 
Small World Experiences (r (112) = 0.315; p = 0.01), Perceptions Distant in Space (r 
= (112); 0.256; p < 0.01), Perceptions Distant in Time (r (112) = 0.259; p < 0.01) 
and Guardian Angel Experiences (r (112) = 0.301; p < 0.01). Clusters of Events (r = 
(112); 0.06; p = 0.26) and Unexpected Solutions (r (112) = 0.132; p = 0.08) did not 
correlate significantly with PDI score.  
 
A multiple linear regression analysis incorporating the variables: Guardian Angel 
Experiences, General Coincidences, Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant 
in Space, Small World Experiences, Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations 
and Unexpected Solutions significantly predicted PDI score (F (8, 103) = 4; p < 
0.01; R2 = 0.24) with 24% of the variance in PDI scores being explained by the 
model (Durbin Watson = 1.92). As can be seen from Table 6.5, Spontaneous 
 141 
 
Associations (Beta = 0.23; p = 0.03) and Perception Distant in Space (Beta = 0.21; 
p = 0.05) were the only predictors that made a significant contribution to the model. 
However, Guardian Angel Experiences (Beta = 022; p = 0.06), Small World 
Experiences (Beta = 0.19; p = 0.07) and Clusters of Events (Beta = 0.23; p = 0.07) 
were found to be approaching significance.  
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Table 6.5 
Mean (standard deviation in parenthesis), Beta, t values, p-values, partial 
correlations and VIF for Guardian Angel Experiences, General Coincidences, 
Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant in Space, Small World Experiences, 
Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations and Unexpected Solutions. 
Variable 
 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Beta t value p value Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Guardian Angel 
Experiences 
 
2.46 
(0.99) 
0.22 1.92 0.06 0.19 1.79 
General 
Coincidences 
 
2.95 
(0.77) 
0.1 0.09 0.93 0.01 1.82 
Perceptions 
Distant in Time 
 
2.39 
(1.08) 
0.38 0.35 0.73 0.03 1.62 
Perceptions 
Distant in Space 
 
1.86 
(1.05) 
0.21 1.97 0.05 0.19 1.52 
Small World 
Experiences 
 
2.89 
(1.03) 
0.19 1.83 0.07 0.18 1.58 
Clusters of 
Events 
 
2.54 
(0.91) 
-0.19 -1.82 0.07 -0.18 1.44 
Spontaneous 
Associations 
 
3.05 
(0.93) 
0.23 2.11 0.04 0.20 1.64 
Unexpected 
Solutions 
 
2.17 
(1.03) 
-0.18 -1.61 0.11 -0.16 1.63 
 
Finally, two-way Chi-Square tests were used to investigate if there were any 
associations between PDI group and what participants thought coincidences were 
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due to. There was a significant association between PDI group and Pure Chance (2 
(df = 2) = 8.28; p = 0.02), Destiny (2 (df = 2) = 9.73; p < 0.01), Divine 
Intervention (2 (df = 2) = 6.7; p = 0.04) and Extra Sensorial Perception (2 (df = 
2) = 11.07; p < 0.01). It appears that those in the low PDI group attribute 
coincidences to pure chance, while those in the high PDI group appear to attribute 
coincidences mostly to destiny. No significant associations were found between PDI 
group and Intuition, Physical Principles Not Yet Discovered by Science and 
Everything Being Connected to Everything Else in the Universe (p > 0.15). 
 
Discussion 
In Chapters 2-5, the findings have been suggestive of a liberal reasoning style when 
assessing narratives containing delusional and neutral themes. The present study 
aimed to examine if a liberal acceptance reasoning style would be evident in a 
subclinical sample using materials that have been previously employed in a clinical 
sample in the published literature. In line with Moritz and Woodward (2004), the first 
prediction was that high PDI scorers would rate more interpretations for the 
Thematic Apperception Test pictures as good or excellent compared to low PDI 
scorers and that low PDI scorers would rate more interpretations as poor or unlikely 
compared to high PDI scorers. In the present study, it was found that when trials 
were collapsed over three and six interpretations, the high PDI group rated more 
interpretations as excellent compared to the low PDI group and the low PDI group 
rated more interpretations as poor but this interaction did not achieve significance. 
Neither was the difference between the PDI groups significant. 
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Furthermore, it was expected that this effect may be more pronounced for pictures 
with six interpretations compared to pictures with three interpretations due to 
greater ambiguity but this effect did not emerge. For three interpretations, the low 
PDI group rated more interpretations as poor compared to the high PDI group, while 
the high PDI group rated more interpretations as possible but not likely, good or 
excellent interpretations but this interaction again did not achieve significance. 
Similarly, for pictures with six interpretations the low PDI group rated more 
interpretations as poor compared to the high PDI group and high PDI scorers rated 
more interpretations as excellent compared to the low PDI group but no significant 
interaction was found. It may be that while this liberal acceptance task using 
pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test was able to differentiate between 
healthy participants and schizophrenic patients in previous research (e.g. Moritz & 
Woodward, 2004), the task is not sensitive enough to be able to differentiate 
between participants that are classified as high or low in delusional ideation in a 
subclinical sample. One explanation is that, some interpretations were simply too 
implausible to be accepted, even by participants in the high PDI group. For example, 
the meteorite explanation in Figure 5 (The sun is exploding, meteorites are crashing 
down the earth. The men try to move them away or even catch them) was not 
deemed plausible by healthy participants in Moritz and Woodward’s (2004) study, 
however, was an explanation that was thought possible by patients with 
schizophrenia. Across the pictures with three interpretations, six interpretations and 
when trials were collapsed across both three and six interpretations, mean scores 
indicate that the ‘possible but unlikely’ option was chosen most often, particularly by 
high PDI scorers, suggesting that interpretations were thought of as at least 
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possible. This may point to evidence of a liberal acceptance reasoning style in high 
PDI scorers for implausible interpretations but must, of course, remain tentative. 
 
Consistent with Moritz and Woodward’s (2004) study, a strict jump to conclusions 
account was also examined. This investigated how often participants judged solely 
one interpretation for each picture as good or excellent between high and low PDI 
groups. It was expected that if participants displayed a jump to conclusions bias, 
they would stick with one interpretation even if it was not supported by evidence. 
This was not the case – for pictures with three interpretations, the low PDI group 
displayed a single preference more often that the high PDI group but this difference 
was not significant. For pictures with six interpretations, the high PDI group 
displayed a single preference more often than the low PDI group but similarly, the 
difference was not significant suggesting that a strict jump to conclusions style was 
not supported. 
 
Despite previous research demonstrating a jump to conclusions bias in a subclinical 
sample (e.g. Colbert & Peters, 2002), the findings from the present study do not 
support this position. Participants in the high PDI group did not jump to conclusions 
significantly more often than participants in the low PDI group regardless of whether 
there were three or six interpretations for each picture. Moritz and Woodward (2004) 
propose that the jump to conclusions bias may not be evident when there are 
several competing hypotheses since this creates greater ambiguity leading to more 
than one hypothesis surpassing this lowered threshold for acceptance. For instance, 
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it has been found that when the number of jars in the beads task is increased to 
three rather than two, hasty decision making disappears in delusion-prone 
participants (Bensi et al., 2010). The increased number of alternative jars leads to 
greater ambiguity since multiple alternatives cross this lowered threshold of 
acceptance, although there have been contradictory findings to this account (White 
& Mansell, 2009). There was however some evidence to support the liberal 
acceptance notion in the present study since the percentage of single preferences 
were greater for pictures that had three interpretations than pictures with six 
interpretations meaning that for pictures with six interpretations greater ambiguity 
led to more of the interpretations being accepted as plausible.  
 
Consistent with Chapter 5, high PDI scorers reported significantly more coincidences 
in comparison to low PDI scorers. Furthermore, significant positive correlations were 
found between total PDI score and General Coincidences, Spontaneous Associations, 
Small World Experiences, Perceptions Distant in Space, Perceptions Distant in Time 
and Guardian Angel Experiences. A further multiple linear regression analysis found 
that spontaneous associations and perceptions distant in space significantly 
predicted delusional ideation. Guardian Angel Experiences, Small World Experiences 
and Clusters of Events were found to be approaching statistical significance. Finally, 
it was found that low PDI scorers tended to attribute coincidences to pure chance 
while high PDI scorers tended to attribute coincidences mainly to destiny. This is 
consistent with findings from Chapter 5 and suggests that high PDI scorers see 
patterns and make more causal connections where none exist in comparison to low 
PDI scorers and could be an underpinning factor in the formation of delusional 
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beliefs (Fyfe et al., 2008). In addition, it could be argued that the causal connections 
made from coincidental experiences by high PDI scorers and the multiple 
explanations that are accepted for the occurrence of coincidences (i.e. destiny, 
divine intervention etc.) are entertained as plausible due to a liberal reasoning style.  
 
In summary, the findings from Chapter 5 were replicated in the present Chapter 
(Chapter 6) in terms of high PDI scorers’ tendency to experience a greater number 
of coincidences in comparison to low PDI scorers and attribute coincidences to other 
factors apart from pure chance. However, using materials that have previously been 
employed in a clinical sample to measure liberal acceptance did not yield significant 
differences between those high and low in delusional ideation in the present study. 
In Chapter 7, liberal acceptance was again measured, again using a task that has 
been utilised previously in a clinical sample. 
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Chapter VII 
Delusional Ideation and Decision Thresholds: Who 
wants to be a Millionaire?  
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 6, the method employed by Moritz and Woodward (2004) using the 
Thematic Apperception Test was utilised to measure liberal acceptance in a 
subclinical sample. In Chapter 7, the aim was again to utilise materials that have 
been used previously in the published literature to measure liberal acceptance. This 
time, to measure liberal acceptance, a method employed by Moritz et al. (2006) was 
utilised. In this research (Moritz et al., 2006), a new paradigm was designed after 
the ‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’ television game show. In this task, patients with 
schizophrenia and healthy participants were asked to answer general knowledge 
questions from four possible response options (only one of the options was correct).  
After each question participants were asked to give a probability estimate between 
0% and 100% and then asked if they could decide in favour of one of the options or 
rule out one or more of the options. This allowed for two separate measures – one 
for probability estimates and one for decisions and rejections made. This enabled 
researchers to determine when a probability estimate translated into a decision. In 
other words, the subjective confidence in a decision could be observed 
experimentally in the form of the probabilities that correspond to each decision and 
rejection. Unlike tasks measuring the jump to conclusions bias (in particular, tasks 
using the draws to decision method), decisions based on low probability estimates 
could not be because of a preference to prematurely end the task since the decision 
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or rejection of an option would prolong the task rather than terminate it in this 
experimental paradigm (Moritz et al., 2006). Additionally, it is likely that if liberal 
acceptance was evident, then patients would be more likely to make this type of 
error, i.e. considering several differing options as plausible; thus leading to a task 
that is deemed as ecologically valid when testing for underpinning factors for the 
development of fixed, delusional beliefs.  
 
In Moritz et al’s (2006) study, it was found that there was no difference between 
patients and healthy participants in terms of probability estimates given to response 
options. This is consistent with previous research demonstrating no differences 
between patients and healthy participants in estimating probabilities (Dudley et al., 
1997a) and that comprehension problems are also highly unlikely in patients (Moritz 
& Woodward, 2005). Furthermore, there was no difference between patients and 
healthy participants on correct decisions made - correct decisions were made 
comparably often. However, patients with schizophrenia made significantly more 
incorrect decisions and endorsed decisions even when probability estimates were 
low while healthy participants based their decisions on higher probability estimates. 
In addition, patients rejected options despite rather high probability estimates. This 
research demonstrates that not only are patients more willing to make a decision, 
even in the face of low subjective probabilities, options tend to be rejected more 
easily too, despite higher subjective probabilities.  
 
Moritz and colleagues (2006) argued that these findings provide support for the 
liberal acceptance account. It demonstrates that liberal acceptance is evident in 
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patients when ambiguity between response options is high. Several competing 
response options to the questions may cross the threshold of acceptance leading to 
a delayed and potentially incorrect decision. Liberal acceptance provides a 
parsimonious explanation for this reasoning style. This is supported by research 
demonstrating that the jump to conclusions reasoning style tends to disappear in 
situations when ambiguity is high (Moritz et al., 2007). This has led to the assertion 
that a jump to conclusions reasoning style tends to emerge when the number of 
response options is limited and it is very obvious when one particular option is the 
correct choice relative to other options (Moritz et al., 2007). 
 
In the present study, the aim was to examine if liberal acceptance would emerge in 
a subclinical sample of participants classified as high or low in delusional ideation 
using the above ‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’ experimental paradigm proposed by 
Moritz and colleagues. In line with Moritz et al. (2006), it was expected that 
participants high in delusional ideation would display a liberal acceptance reasoning 
style compared to participants low in delusional ideation. In other words, that 
participants high in delusional ideation would make decisions based on lower 
probability estimates – probability estimates that would be deemed insufficient to 
make a decision in those low in delusional ideation. It was also expected that high 
PDI scorers would make more incorrect decisions and base rejections on higher 
probability estimates compared to low PDI scorers.  
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Method 
Participants 
Eighty-nine participants took part (71 female) with a mean age of 22.2 (S.D. = 
6.29). Participants were recruited voluntarily from a large urban UK university and 
received course credits for their participation. 
Materials 
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory, (Peters, Day & Garety, 1996; Appendix 4) was 
again employed as a measure of delusional ideation. 
‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’ task - Liberal Acceptance Measure  
Participants were asked to answer twenty general knowledge questions with four 
possible options. For each alternative answer, the participant was asked to assign a 
probability estimate between 0% and 100% (using 10% increments) and then asked 
if they could decide in favour of one of the options (decision) or could rule out one 
or more of the available options (rejection). There was also a ‘Can’t be absolutely 
sure’ option. Two practice questions were included (Appendix 31). 
 
Participants could assign all estimates first and then indicate the answers they 
thought were correct or not; they could also go back and forward through questions. 
Participants did not receive feedback about whether they had answered the 
questions correctly or not. Standard instructions were as shown below: 
Below are 20 general knowledge questions. For each of the four answers, we 
would like you to give a probability estimate between 0% and 100%. There 
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are no right or wrong probably estimates and you should give an estimate 
that you think is about right. Even if you are entirely certain that an answer is 
correct, please still give a probability estimate for each answer.  
We would also like you to decide which answer you think is right or wrong. 
Sometimes you absolutely know that something is right or wrong, at other 
times you can’t be sure. When you feel that you really can't make a decision, 
there is an additional option of 'can't be absolutely sure' for this. You can 
decide which answer is right or wrong (or if you 'can't be absolutely sure') 
after each estimate you provide or after you have given estimates to all four 
answers. You can also go back to previous questions if you change your 
mind. 
Please see the example scenarios below for guidance on completing this part 
of the survey: 
 
Example 1 
You are asked the question: How many fingers does Mickey Mouse have? 
The four alternative answers are 10, 12, 8 and 6. You think that the answer 
could be that Mickey Mouse has either 10 or 8 fingers. So you give 50% for 
the answer 10 fingers and 50% for the answer 8 fingers. You think the 
chance of Mickey Mouse having 12 fingers is small, so you give this 20% and 
the chance of Mickey Mouse having 6 fingers is even smaller, so you give this 
10%. You decide to go for the answer of Mickey Mouse having 10 fingers and 
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indicate this by choosing 'I would say this is right'. You may still be unsure 
about whether Mickey Mouse has 8 fingers so for this you might choose 'can't 
be absolutely sure'. For the other alternative answers (12 and 6 fingers) you 
choose 'I would say this is wrong'.  
 
Example 2 
You are asked the question: Which one of the following is not a character 
from the standard edition of the board game Cluedo? 
The four alternative answers are Captain Scarlett, Professor Plum, Reverend 
Green and Mrs White. You are pretty sure that the answer is not Mrs White or 
Reverend Green and you give these both 20% and choose 'I would say this is 
wrong'. You are less certain about Professor Plum so you give this 30% and 
choose 'can't be absolutely sure'. You give the remaining answer (Captain 
Scarlett) 40% and choose 'I would say this is right'.  
Below are 2 trial questions for you to practice this task. You will then begin 
the 20 general knowledge questions. 
 
Design 
A between groups design was employed with delusion-prone groups (high/ low) as 
the between groups variable. There were two dependent variables based on the 
scores from the ‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’ liberal acceptance task. These were 
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the probability estimates given to alternative answers and decisions and rejections 
for alternative answers. 
Procedure 
All measures were completed via an online survey platform. Informed consent was 
completed by checking a number of statements before beginning the study. 
Participants then completed the twenty general knowledge questions as a measure 
of liberal acceptance after which the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory was 
completed. A debrief page was displayed thanking participants for taking part and 
detailing the researcher’s details. 
 
Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 36 
made the low PDI group, while those scoring over the median made the high PDI 
group. There were 45 participants in the low PDI group and 44 participants in the 
high PDI group. Independent t-tests revealed no significant difference between 
males and females and PDI score (t (87) = 1.39; p = 0.17).  There was also a non-
significant PDI group difference in age (t (68) = 1.82; p = 0.07). Summary statistics 
are displayed in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups  
 High PDI Group 
(n) 
Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean (S.D.) 
Female 38 33 44.41 (37.99) 
Male 6 12 31     (29.26) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 21 (4.15) 23.38 (7.71) - 
PDI Score 69.07 (33.21) 14.93 (11.24) - 
 
‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’ task  
Independent sample t-tests were used to analyse differences between high and low 
PDI groups on the ‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’ task consistent with the analysis 
carried out by Moritz et al. (2006). The data was not normally distributed (p > .05; 
see Appendix 36 for exploratory analysis and equivalent non-parametric tests). 
Homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05) except for the 
number of incorrect rejections (p < .05).  
 
The first analysis examined mean probability estimates for correct decisions between 
high and low PDI groups. The difference between the groups mean probability 
estimates for correct decisions was not significant (t (77) = -1.19; p = 0.24). The 
second analysis examined mean probability estimates for incorrect decisions. The 
difference between the mean probability estimates for the high and the low PDI 
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groups was also not significant (t (76) = -0.64; p = 0.53). As can be seen from 
Figure 6, the probability estimates between the groups were very similar. 
 
Subsequent independent t-tests examined the minimum probability estimate given 
for correct and incorrect decisions and whether these differences between high and 
low PDI groups were significant. No significant difference was found between the 
minimum probability estimates for correct decisions (t (82) = -0.22; p = 0.83). The 
difference between the groups for the minimum probability estimates for incorrect 
decisions was also non-significant (t (76) = -0.96; p = 0.34) (see Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean and minimum probability estimates for correct and incorrect 
decisions between high and low PDI groups 
 
The next analysis examined mean probability estimates for correct and incorrect 
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probability estimates was not significant for correct rejections (t (80) = 0.183; p = 
0.86). Neither was the difference significant between the probability estimates for 
incorrect rejections between the groups (t (77) = -0.046; p = 0.96). 
 
In addition, the maximum probability estimate for correct and incorrect rejections 
was examined between the high and low PDI groups. The difference between the 
maximum probability estimates was not significant between the groups for correct 
rejections (t (80) = 0.459; p = 0.65) nor was it significant for incorrect rejections (t 
(77) = -0.518; p = 0.61). 
 
Figure 7. Mean and maximum probability estimates for correct and incorrect 
rejections between high and low PDI groups 
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significant for the number of correct (t (87) = -0.33; p = 0.74) or incorrect decisions 
(t (87) = 1.48; p = 0.14). 
 
Additionally, the difference was not significant between the groups for the number of 
correct rejections (t (87) = -1.08; p = 0.28). Neither was the difference significant 
for the number of incorrect rejections between the groups (t (87) = 0.21; p = 0.84). 
Descriptive statistics are displayed in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The number of correct and incorrect decisions and rejections between 
high and low PDI groups 
 
Discussion 
The present Chapter (Chapter 7) aimed to examine if a liberal acceptance reasoning 
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employed previously in a clinical sample to examine the liberal acceptance account 
(Moritz et al., 2006).  
 
In line with Moritz et al. (2006), it was expected that participants high in delusional 
ideation would make more incorrect decisions compared to participants low in 
delusional ideation but this prediction was not supported. The difference was not 
significant and incorrect decisions were made equally often between the groups. It 
was also expected that participants high in delusional ideation compared to 
participants low in delusional ideation would base decisions on lower probability 
estimates consistent with a liberal reasoning style but this difference was also non-
significant between the groups. Finally, it was expected that participants high in 
delusional ideation would reject answers even in the face of high probability 
estimates compared to those low in delusional ideation but again, the difference 
between the groups was not significant.  
 
Consistent with Moritz et al. (2006), no difference emerged between the groups for 
the number of correct decisions made, nor was there any difference between the 
estimates of likelihood for correct and incorrect answers. This supports the view that 
biases in reasoning cannot easily be attributed to difficulties in estimating likelihoods 
(e.g. Dudley et al., 1997a). In addition, differences cannot be attributed to 
deficiencies in semantic knowledge since no differences were found to be significant 
between the groups for the number of correct decisions made. However, unlike 
patients in Moritz et al’s (2006) study, participants high in delusional ideation did not 
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make more incorrect decisions than those low in delusional ideation in the present 
study. In addition, participants in the present study made decisions and rejections 
based on similar probability estimates meaning that the threshold for acceptance in 
terms of estimating likelihoods and translating these into decisions and rejections 
was similar between the groups. This would suggest that participants high in 
delusional ideation in the present study did not display an incautious type of 
reasoning to the same extent as patients with schizophrenia. As such, participants 
classified as high in delusional ideation did not endorse a response option (i.e. make 
a decision) in the face of low probability estimates nor did they reject response 
options in the face of high probability estimates. There are several reasons why this 
might be the case. 
 
While the task employed is a novel and effective way of testing the liberal 
acceptance account in a clinical sample, it may not be sensitive enough to detect 
similar trends in a subclinical sample. Consistent with this, participants in the present 
study displayed rather low levels of delusional ideation; even participants in the high 
delusional ideation group did not display exceptionally high scores. This would imply 
that a stricter acceptance threshold had potentially been employed when making 
decisions and rejections making it less likely that trends would emerge consistent 
with the liberal acceptance account when utilising a task such as the one in the 
present study. However, the original study upon which this is based did not 
distinguish between delusional and non-delusional patients with schizophrenia. 
Therefore, findings remain tentative in terms of whether this relates to current 
delusional state. 
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In the original study (Moritz et al., 2006) the aim was to examine the jump to 
conclusions bias using a novel task. Using such a novel task would ensure that the 
jump to conclusions bias displayed by patients with delusions was not simply due to 
features of a specific task, such as the beads task, where options are only limited to 
two choices. It also demonstrated that when ambiguity is high, liberal acceptance 
offers a parsimonious explanation for the reasoning style displayed by patients with 
schizophrenia, with more options crossing the acceptance threshold. 
 
In summary, using materials that have previously been employed in a clinical sample 
to measure liberal acceptance did not yield significant differences between those 
high and low in delusional ideation in the present study. In Chapter 8, the final study 
in this thesis, the aim was again to employ materials that had previously been 
utilised in the published literature to examine reasoning but also to combine these 
with the new materials constructed by the author, to make a direct comparison.  
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Chapter VIII 
Liberal acceptance and underpinning factors of 
subclinical delusional ideation 
 
Introduction 
In Chapters 6 and 7, materials utilised in the published literature to examine 
reasoning in patients with schizophrenia were employed to examine reasoning in a 
subclinical sample. By conducting research in this way, it was expected that 
reasoning styles similar to patients with delusions would be displayed by participants 
in the subclinical population who are classified as high in delusional ideation, 
consistent with the continuum model of psychosis (van Os et al., 2009). In previous 
research, it has been demonstrated that healthy participants who score highly on 
measures of delusional ideation display a similar reasoning style to patients with 
delusions (e.g. Colbert & Peters, 2002; LaRocco & Warman, 1999). In Chapters 6 
and 7, using materials that have previously been employed in clinical samples, 
differences in reasoning between participants classified as high and low in delusional 
ideation had not been demonstrated. In the present study, the aim was to draw this 
research together to examine materials utilised in Chapters 2-5 and to examine 
materials used in Chapter 6 within the same study.  
 
Previously (Chapters 2-5), narratives containing delusional and neutral themes were 
constructed and used to examine reasoning in participants classified as high or low 
in delusional ideation. These studies demonstrated that participants high in 
delusional ideation tended to rate narratives as more likely to be true and more 
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exciting than participants low in delusional ideation. Within this thesis, it has been 
argued that this evidence is consistent with a liberal acceptance reasoning style.  
 
In addition to this, the focus of this thesis has also been to investigate underpinning 
factors or mechanisms for why people may liberally accept. Factors identified appear 
to be likelihood of being true and the excitement of stimuli. Additionally, the 
tendency to make meaningful connections or causal connections where none exist 
(apophenia) has also been implicated. These were considered again in this final 
experiment. 
 
Participants in this study assessed the same series of narratives with both delusional 
and neutral themes in terms of ‘likelihood of being true’, ‘exciting to the self’ and 
‘exciting to others’, identical to Chapter 4 and 5. The Thematic Apperception Test 
(Murray, 1943) was also employed as a measure of liberal acceptance as in Chapter 
6. These measures are important since the first measure of liberal acceptance used 
in Chapters 4 and 5 (narratives) was constructed by the author but the second 
measure of liberal acceptance has been taken from the published literature and has 
been used to demonstrate liberal acceptance in a clinical sample.  
 
Apophenia was again measured as this appears to be an important variable to the 
liberal acceptance account. This was carried out by employing both a perceptual and 
non-perceptual task as in Chapter 4 and 5. The Snowy Pictures Task (Ekstrom et al., 
1976) was utilised as a perceptual apophenia task, identical to Chapter 4. In 
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addition, the Coincidences Questionnaire (Bressan, 2002) was used as a non-
perceptual apophenia task, identical to Chapter 5. 
 
It was expected that the high PDI group would rate delusional narratives as more 
likely to be true and more exciting than the low PDI group. Consistent with a liberal 
acceptance account, it was expected that high PDI scorers would rate more 
interpretations for the Thematic Apperception Test pictures as good or excellent 
compared to low PDI scorers but that low PDI scorers would rate more 
interpretations as poor or unlikely compared to high PDI scorers. 
 
In terms of apophenia, it was expected that high PDI scorers would detect more 
objects in the Snowy Pictures Task where no object has been embedded in the 
snowy images. Finally, it was predicted that the high PDI group would report 
experiencing more coincidences compared to the low PDI group as well as endorse 
more alternatives to ‘pure chance’ when considering what coincidences are due to.  
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-three participants took part (81 female) with a mean age of 22.89 (SD = 
7.7). Participants were recruited voluntarily from a large urban UK university and 
received course credits for their participation. 
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Materials 
Delusional Ideation 
The Peters et al. Delusions Inventory, (Peters, Day & Garety, 1996; Appendix 4) was 
again employed as a measure of delusional ideation. 
 
Narratives 
Participants assessed a series of narratives with delusional and neutral themes in 
terms of ‘likelihood of being true’, ‘excitement to the self’ and ‘excitement to others’, 
identical to Chapters 4 and 5 (Appendix, 18 & 19). 
 
Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943) 
Six pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943; Appendix 27) 
were presented and participants were asked to rate three or six interpretations of 
varying plausibility, identical to Chapter 6. 
 
Snowy Pictures Task (Ekstrom et al., 1976) 
This task involves viewing 24 images. Twelve of the images contain objects 
embedded in ‘noise’ while 12 of the images contain no objects. Participants are 
asked to indicate if they can see an object and what it is they can see in the images 
(see Chapter 4; Appendix 20). 
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Coincidences Questionnaire (Bressan, 2002) 
This questionnaire consists of 15 items divided into three sections. The first section 
measures how often participants have come across meaningful coincidences. The 
second section measures coincidences in various categories and the final section 
asks what participants think coincidences are due to. This followed the same 
procedure as Chapter 5 (Appendix 24).  
 
Design 
A mixed design was employed with PDI group (high/ low) being the between-groups 
factor and Narratives (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other) as within-
group factors. The dependent variables were: likelihood of being true, exciting to the 
self and exciting to others. The other dependent variables were the scores from the 
Snowy Pictures task, the Coincidences questionnaire and the plausibility ratings from 
the Thematic Apperception Test. 
Procedure 
All measures were completed via an online survey platform. Informed consent was 
completed by checking a number of statements before beginning the study. 
Participants assessed a series of delusional and neutral narratives. They then went 
on to view each of the six pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test and 
assigned plausibility ratings to either three or six interpretations. Participants then 
completed the coincidences questionnaire and the Snowy Pictures Task. Finally, 
participants completed the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory. A debrief page was 
displayed thanking participants for taking part and detailing the researcher’s details.  
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Results 
Total PDI scores were used to divide participants into high and low scoring groups. A 
median split was conducted and those scoring up to and including the median of 49 
comprised the low PDI group (n = 43) while those scoring above the median 
comprised the high PDI group (n = 40). Independent t-tests revealed no significant 
PDI group differences in age (t (81) = -0.41; p = 0.68). In addition, no significant 
difference was found between males and females and PDI score (t (81) = -0.67; p = 
0.51). 
 
Table 8.1 
Summary statistics for high and low PDI groups  
 High PDI Group 
(n) 
Low PDI Group (n) PDI Mean (S.D.) 
Female 40 41 57.73 (43.64) 
Male 0 2 37     (11.31) 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) - 
Age 23.24 (7.09) 22.55 (8.32) - 
PDI Score 88.8 (39.64) 26.52 (15.54) - 
 
Narratives 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted with PDI group (high/ low) as the between groups 
variable and the narratives (delusional/ neutral) as the within-group variable and the 
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participants likelihood ratings as the dependent variable. The data approximated a 
normal distribution (p = .18; see Appendix 36) and homogeneity of variance was 
met for all comparisons (p > .05).  
 
This analysis examined average ratings of how likely the narrative was true between 
high and low PDI groups. The main effect of PDI group was significant (F (1, 81) = 
3.97; p = 0.05; p² = 0.05). The high PDI group had higher ratings than the low 
PDI group. There was also a significant main effect of narrative (F (1, 81) = 205.28; 
p = 0.01; p² = 0.72) with neutral narratives rated as more likely to be true than 
delusional narratives. The interaction was not found to be significant (F (1, 81) = 
0.02; p = 0.89; p² = 0.001). 
Table 8.2 
Mean values (standard deviation in parenthesis) for how likely the delusional and 
neutral narratives were true between high and low PDI groups.  
 Delusional 
narrative 
Neutral narrative Overall 
High PDI group 2.06 (0.70) 3.63 (0.72) 3.88 (0.71) 
Low PDI group 1.82 (0.73) 3.43 (0.72) 2.63 (0.73) 
Overall 1.94 (0.72) 3.53 (0.72) 3.26 (0.72) 
 
A three-way ANOVA was conducted with PDI Group (high/ low) as the between 
groups variable and Content (delusional/ neutral) and Perspective (self/ other 
referent) as the within group variables and average ratings of excitement of the 
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delusional and neutral narratives as dependent variable. A Levene’s test found that 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met for all comparisons (p > .05). 
 
The main effect of PDI group was not significant (F (1, 81) = 0.15; p = 0.7; p² = 
0.002). There was a significant main effect of narrative (F (1, 81) = 24.21; p < 0.01; 
p² = 0.23) with delusional narratives being rated as more exciting than neutral 
narratives. The main effect of perspective was also significant (F (1, 81) = 4.08; p = 
0.05; p² = 0.05). Narratives were rated as more exciting to others than to the self. 
The three-way interaction between narrative, perspective and PDI group was found 
to be approaching significance (F (1, 81) = 3.03; p = 0.09; p² = 0.04). It seems 
that high PDI scorers rate delusional narratives as exciting to both themselves and 
others while low PDI scorers tended to rate delusional narratives as more exciting to 
others. No other interactions were significant for this analysis (p ≥ 0.16). 
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Table 8.3 
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for how exciting delusional and 
neutral narratives were rated to be to the self or to most other people between high 
and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Delusional/ 
Self-Referent 
 
2.27 (0.73) 2.01 (0.8) 2.14 (0.77) 
Delusional/ 
Other-Referent 
 
2.29 (0.7) 2.23 (0.84) 2.26 (0.77) 
Neutral/ Self-
Referent 
 
1.75 (0.74) 1.82 (0.75) 1.79 (0.75) 
Neutral/ Other-
Referent 
 
1.84 (0.7) 1.89 (0.65) 1.87 (0.68) 
Overall 2.04 (0.72) 1.99 (0.76) 2.02 (0.74) 
 
Thematic Apperception Test 
Two-way ANOVAs were conducted with PDI group (high/ low) as the between 
groups variable and response options (does not fit/ poor interpretation, possible but 
not likely interpretation, good interpretation and excellent interpretation) as the 
within-group variable. The total number of interpretations assigned to each response 
option served as the dependent variable. 
 
The first analysis examined the total number of interpretations assigned to each 
response option when response options were collapsed across pictures with three 
and six interpretations. The data did not approximate a normal distribution for the 
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possible and excellent options (p < .05; see Appendix 36) but did for the poor and 
good options (p > .05) however this was expected due to the nature of the task and 
ANOVA is considered robust enough to manage deviations from normality (Kim, 
2013). The comparisons for the poor and good response options also met the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance (p = .59 and p = .42 respectively) but the 
possible and excellent comparisons did not (p = .04 and p = .04 respectively) so 
caution should be exercised in interpreting the results.  
The main effect of PDI group was not significant (F (1, 81) = 0.57; p = 0.45; p² = 
0.007). The main effect of response option was significant (F (1, 81) = 54.51; p < 
0.01; p² = 0.40). As can be seen in Table 8.4, participants chose the ‘possible but 
not likely’ option most often and the excellent option least often. Simple contrasts 
showed a significant difference between the poor and unlikely response options (p < 
0.01) and poor and excellent response options (p < 0.01). The interaction between 
PDI group and response option was not significant (F (1, 81) = 0.76; p = 0.52; p² 
= 0.009). 
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Table 8.4  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for response options between high 
and low PDI groups across three and six interpretations 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Does not fit/ poor 
interpretation 
 
7.05 (4.13) 6.95 (4.26) 7 (4.2) 
Possible interpretation but 
not likely 
 
9.05 (2.7) 10.02 (4.55) 9.54 (3.63) 
Good interpretation 
 
 
8.33 (3.65) 7.79 (3.9) 8.06 (3.78) 
Excellent interpretation 
 
 
2.3 (2.8) 1.49 (2.35) 1.9 (2.58) 
Overall 6.68 (3.32) 6.56 (3.77) 6.62 (3.55) 
 
The second analysis examined the total number of interpretations assigned to each 
response option when there were three response options. The data was not 
normally distributed for any of the response options (p < .05; see Appendix 36) 
however all comparisons met the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p > .05). 
The main effect of PDI group was not significant (F (1, 81) = 0.93; p = 0.34; p² = 
0.01). A significant main effect of response option was found (F (1, 81) = 35.47; p < 
0.01; p² = 0.31). The ‘possible but not likely’ option was chosen most often and 
the ‘excellent’ option was chosen least often. Simple contrasts revealed a significant 
difference between all response options (p < 0.01). The interaction between PDI 
group and response option was found to be approaching significance (F (1, 81) = 
2.42; p = 0.07; p² = 0.03). This appears to be due to a crossover effect; the high 
PDI group rated more of the interpretations as good whereas the low PDI group 
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rated more of the interpretations as possible but not likely. This is displayed in Table 
8.5. 
Table 8.5 
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for response options between high 
and low PDI groups across three interpretations 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Does not fit/ poor 
interpretation 
 
2.05 (1.63) 2 (1.56) 2.03 (1.6) 
Possible interpretation but 
not likely 
 
2.73 (1.4) 3.47 (1.88) 3.1 (1.64) 
Good interpretation 
 
 
3.25 (1.3) 2.74 (1.47) 3 (1.39) 
Excellent interpretation 
 
 
0.98 (1.19) 0.58 (0.96) 0.78 (1.08) 
Overall 2.25 (1.38) 2.2 (1.47) 2.23 (1.43) 
 
The final analysis examined the total number of interpretations assigned to each 
response option when there were six response options. The data was not normally 
distributed for any of the response options (p < .05; see Appendix 36) however all 
comparisons met the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p > .05).  
The main effect of PDI group was not significant (F (1, 81) = 0.40; p = 0.53; p² = 
0.005). The main effect of response option was significant (F (1, 81) = 48.80; p < 
0.01; p² = 0.38) with the ‘possible but not likely’ option being chosen most often 
followed by the ‘good’, ‘poor’ and then ‘excellent’ response options (see Table 8.6). 
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Simple contrasts showed a significant difference between the poor and possible 
response options (p < 0.01) and the poor and excellent response options (p < 0.01). 
The interaction between the factors was not significant (F (1, 81) = 0.27; p = 0.85; 
p² = 0.003). 
Table 8.6  
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for response options between high 
and low PDI groups across six interpretations 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Does not fit/ poor 
interpretation 
 
4.88 (3.05) 5.07 (3.02) 4.98 (3.04) 
Possible interpretation but 
not likely 
 
6.32 (2.1) 6.57 (3.13) 6.45 (2.62) 
Good interpretation 
 
 
5.24 (2.98) 4.88 (2.81) 5.06 (2.9) 
Excellent interpretation 
 
 
1.29 (1.81) 0.93 (1.69) 1.11 (1.75) 
Overall 4.43 (2.49) 4.36 (2.66) 4.4 (2.58) 
 
Snowy Pictures Task 
The Snowy Pictures Task was split into four categories; the number of objects that 
were correctly identified, the number of objects incorrectly identified, the number of 
objects incorrectly detected (i.e. indicated there was an object that was not there; a 
false positive), and finally the participant correctly indicating that there was no 
object embedded. The data was not normally distributed for each category (p < .05; 
see Appendix 36 for tests of normality and non-parametric equivalent tests) however 
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this was expected due to the type of task. The Levene’s tests revealed homogeneity 
of variance for all comparisons (p > .05).  
 
One way ANOVAs revealed no significant difference between high and low PDI 
groups for the number of objects incorrectly detected (false positives) (F (1, 81) = 
1.02; p = 0.32). As can be seen in Table 8.7, the high PDI group incorrectly 
detected more objects than the low PDI group when no object had been embedded 
but this did not achieve significance. The number of objects incorrectly identified 
was also found to be non-significant (F (1, 81) = 0.54; p = 0.47). The difference 
between the high and the low PDI groups was not significant for the number of 
objects that were correctly identified (F (1, 81) = 0.23; p = 0.63) or when the 
participant correctly indicated that there was no object embedded (F (1, 81) = 0.22; 
p = 0.64).  
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Table 8.7 
Mean values (standard deviations in parenthesis) for the Snowy Pictures Task 
between high and low PDI groups 
 High PDI Low PDI Overall 
Objects correctly identified 5.46 (2.16) 5.71 (2.59) 5.59 (2.38) 
Objects incorrectly 
identified 
6.41 (2.29) 6.02 (2.55) 6.22 (2.42) 
Objects incorrectly 
detected  
3.59 (2.31) 2.98 (3.11) 3.29 (2.71) 
No objects indicated - 
correct 
8.39 (2.33) 8.69 (3.4) 8.54 (2.87) 
Overall 5.96 (2.27) 5.85 (2.91) 5.91 (2.59) 
 
Coincidences 
An Independent samples t-test was used to examine the difference between high 
and low PDI groups and the total number of coincidences reported. Exploratory data 
analysis indicated that the data was normally distributed (p > .05; see Appendix 36). 
Homogeneity of variance was met (p > .05). Results revealed a significant difference 
between high and low PDI groups (t (81) = - 2.56; p = 0.01) with the high PDI 
groups mean score being 21.59 (SD = 4.92) and low PDI groups mean score being 
18.6 (SD = 5.67).  
 
Spearman’s correlation was also employed to examine if there was any relationship 
between total PDI score and categories of coincidences. Significant positive 
 177 
 
correlations were found between total PDI score and General Coincidences (r (82) = 
0.25; p = 0.01) and Guardian Angel Experiences (r (82) = 0.31; p < 0.01). Clusters 
of Events (r = (82); 0.11; p = 0.16), Spontaneous Associations (r (82) = 0.14; p = 
0.11), Perceptions Distant in Space (r = (82); 0.07; p = 0.26), Perceptions Distant in 
Time (r (82) = 0.05; p = 0.32) Unexpected solutions (r (82) = 0.02; p = 0.44) and 
small world experiences (r (82) = 0.05; p = 0.34) did not correlate significantly with 
PDI score.  
 
A multiple linear regression analysis incorporating the variables; Guardian Angel 
Experiences, General Coincidences, Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant 
in Space, Small World Experiences, Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations 
and Unexpected Solutions did not significantly predict PDI scores (F (8, 73) = 1.52; 
p = 0.17; R2 = 0.05) with only 5% of the variance in PDI scores being explained by 
the model (Durbin Watson = 1.79). As can be seen from Table 8.8, only Guardian 
Angel Experiences made a significant contribution to the model. 
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Table 8.8 
Mean (standard deviation in parenthesis), Beta, t values, p-values, partial 
correlations and VIF for Guardian Angel Experiences, General Coincidences, 
Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions Distant in Space, Small World Experiences, 
Clusters of Events, Spontaneous Associations and Unexpected Solutions. 
Variable 
 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Beta t value p value Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Guardian Angel 
Experiences 
 
2.43 
(1.12) 
0.33 2.47 0.02 0.29 1.51 
General 
Coincidences 
 
3.02 
(0.99) 
0.23 1.7 0.09 0.2 1.53 
Perceptions 
Distant in Time 
 
2.45 
(1.21) 
-0.07 -0.51 0.61 -0.06 1.7 
Perceptions 
Distant in 
Space 
 
1.91 
(0.96) 
0.02 0.17 0.86 0.02 1.45 
Small World 
Experiences 
 
2.82 
(0.96) 
 0.002 0.02 0.99 0.002 1.27 
Clusters of 
Events 
 
2.46 
(0.95) 
0.07 0.47 0.64 0.06 1.66 
Spontaneous 
Associations 
 
3.01 
(0.95) 
-0.13 -0.85 0.4 -0.1 2.1 
Unexpected 
Solutions 
 
2.12 
(0.93) 
- 0.11   -0.8 0.43 -0.09 1.67 
 
In light of the significant bivariate correlations between General Coincidences, 
Guardian Angel Experiences and PDI scores a second multiple regression analysis 
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was carried out with General Coincidences and Guardian Angel Experiences as 
predictors of PDI scores (Durbin Watson = 1.77). This resulted in a significant model 
(F (2, 79) = 5.23; p <0.01; R2 = 0.09) with 9% of the variance in PDI scores being 
explained by the model. As can be seen from Table 8.9, only Guardian Angel 
Experiences made a significant contribution to the model. 
 
Table 8.9  
Mean (standard deviation in parenthesis), Beta, t values, p-values, partial 
correlations and VIF for Guardian Angel Experiences and General Coincidences 
Variable 
 
Mean 
(S.D.) 
Beta t value p value Partial 
correlations 
VIF 
Guardian Angel 
Experiences 
 
2.43 
(1.12) 
0.25 2.21 0.03 0.24 1.15 
General 
Coincidences 
 
3.02 
(0.99) 
0.16 1.42 0.16 0.16 1.15 
 
Finally, two-way Chi-Square tests were used to investigate if there were any 
associations between PDI group and what participants thought coincidences were 
due to. There was a significant association between PDI group and extra sensorial 
perception (2 (df = 2) = 8.71; p = 0.01). This seems to be because high PDI 
scorers attributed coincidences to extra sensorial perception compared to low PDI 
scorers. In contrast, low PDI scorers chose the ‘don’t know’ or ‘no’ option more often 
than high PDI scorers when asked if they thought coincidences were due to extra 
sensorial perception. None of the other associations were found to be significant for 
this analysis (p ≥ 0.15). 
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Discussion 
Consistent with Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the high PDI group gave higher ratings than 
the low PDI group for how likely/ true they rated narratives to be. Higher ratings 
were given to the neutral narratives as opposed to delusional narratives meaning 
that the prediction that high PDI scorers would rate delusional narratives as more 
likely to be true was only partially supported (see also LaRocco & Warman, 2009). 
Nonetheless, these findings demonstrate a liberal acceptance reasoning style insofar 
as a lowered threshold for plausibility and a general ‘willingness to accept’ is 
displayed for both delusional and neutral narratives in those high in delusional 
ideation.  
 
When participants were asked how exciting they found the narratives, delusional 
narratives were rated as more exciting by both groups. These may offer greater 
excitement, particularly to those who engage in delusional thinking. This can 
potentially be seen as a mechanism by which stimuli are accepted by high PDI 
scorers – if there is greater excitement in the stimulus, the more likely it is to 
surpass this lowered threshold for plausibility.   
Consistent with Moritz and Woodward (2004), plausibility ratings of various 
interpretations for pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test were used to look 
for differences between participants high and low in delusional ideation. This has 
previously been employed to examine liberal acceptance in a clinical sample and it is 
therefore important to see if the same trends can be detected in a subclinical 
sample, consistent with the continuum theory of psychosis (van Os et al., 2009). 
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When participants viewed pictures with both three and six interpretations, the 
ratings between the high and low PDI groups were similar and no significant 
differences emerged. When participants viewed pictures with six interpretations (as 
opposed to both three and six interpretations collapsed together), again, the 
plausibility ratings were similar between the groups. However, when participants 
rated the plausibility of three interpretations, the interaction between PDI group and 
plausibility ratings of the interpretations was found to be approaching significance. 
This seems to be because of a crossover effect; participants in the low PDI group 
rated more of the interpretations as ‘possible but not likely’, whereas participants in 
the high PDI group rated more of the interpretations as ‘good’. This is consistent 
with a liberal acceptance reasoning style however this effect was only evident when 
there were three interpretations.  Moritz and Woodward (2004) have put forward 
that when interpreting events, some explanations are accepted as plausible by 
patients with schizophrenia whereas healthy participants may not accept the same 
explanations and these are subsequently ruled out more quickly. In the present 
experiment, it seems that pictures with three interpretations were able to detect 
these differences in that, participants high in delusion ideation considered more of 
these explanations as good whereas participants low in delusional ideation rated 
these as unlikely. This could be because there were less options to choose from, 
with a greater number of options, participants in both groups tended to rate the 
interpretations similarly. This is curious given that more options should lead to 
greater ambivalence (Moritz & Woodward, 2004) however, it could be the case, as 
with the beads task, that when options are severely limited, certain interpretations 
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‘stand out’ as the most likely option and could explain these differences found in the 
present study. 
 
In Chapter 4, high PDI scorers, compared to low PDI scorers, detected more objects 
that were not present in visual ‘noise’ indicating a ‘loose’ or disinhibited cognitive 
style. This is a potential mechanism that may explain why liberal acceptance 
emerges, detecting patterns that do not exist or making causal connections between 
random events (apophenia) may lead to events appearing more plausible to those 
high in delusional ideation. In the current Chapter, high PDI scorers did report 
detecting more objects that were not present and incorrectly identified more objects 
in visual noise however these differences did not achieve significance. Engaging in 
apophenia has led some authors to argue that this enables the individual to make 
close associations between random events, which in turn may account for the 
emergence of magical and paranormal, as well as delusional beliefs (Farias et al., 
2005). 
 
In support of this notion, high PDI scorers reported experiencing significantly more 
general coincidences than low PDI scorers. Additionally, a positive correlation 
between PDI score and general coincidences and guardian angel experiences was 
found. Some specific types of coincidences (Perceptions Distant in Time, Perceptions 
Distant in Space, Small World Experiences, Clusters of Events, Spontaneous 
Associations and Unexpected Solutions) however did not significantly predict 
delusional ideation, only general coincidences and guardian angel experiences alone 
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were found to be significant predictors. This may contribute to the formation of 
delusional beliefs because seemingly objective connections (like not arriving in time 
at a job interview and then discovering that it has been for the best, because a 
much better chance, which we would otherwise have missed, turns up) seem 
unexplained by reason and science (Bressan, 2002) and may act as a way to 
reinforce such beliefs. Indeed, this mechanism could explain why high PDI scorers 
may accept an explanation as plausible while low PDI scorers would reject the same 
explanation. 
 
It is also of interest that the coincidences that were experienced most often by 
people who engage in delusional thinking were general ones and guardian angel 
experiences. In relation to guardian angel experiences, previous research has found 
that spirituality and religiosity can have a positive impact on patients with psychosis 
and provides a mechanism which helps patients to deal with positive symptoms of 
psychosis, such as delusions and hallucinations (Mohr Brandt, Borras, Gillieron & 
Huguelet, 2006). This seems to be because, for some patients, religious or spiritual 
concepts offer an explanation for their illness regardless of whether this is a positive 
or a negative explanation and it gives some meaning, which in turn, helps patients 
to cope with the symptoms of their illness (Mohr et al., 2006). In a subclinical 
population, coincidental experiences, such as the feeling of being watched over by a 
guardian angel, may provide a good explanation for a random event that may 
appear to have no rational explanation. Additionally, when participants in the 
present study were asked what they thought coincidences were due to, little 
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difference emerged between the groups except for extra sensorial perception which 
resulted in a significant difference between high and low PDI scorers. Extra sensory 
perception generally refers to perception occurring independently of sight, hearing, 
or other sensory processes - sometimes known as the sixth sense. While high PDI 
scorers indicated that they thought coincidences were due to extra sensory 
perception, low PDI scorers chose the ‘don’t know’ or ‘no’ option more often for this. 
As Rogers (2015) points out, when extra sensorial perception is endorsed by 
paranormal believers, it is often based on some remarkable and subjectively 
meaningful coincidental experience (Thalbourne, 2006) and has led to claims that 
proneness to errors in probabilistic reasoning may be responsible for this. Errors in 
probabilistic reasoning have also been consistently demonstrated in people high in 
delusional ideation (e.g. Garety & Freeman, 1999) and could potentially explain the 
misattribution of these meaningful coincidental events to a cause beyond the realms 
of science, such as having a guardian angel. 
In summary, participants high in delusional ideation rated narratives as more likely 
to be true than participants low in delusional ideation. This suggests a potential 
mechanism for why participants high in delusional ideation may liberally accept. 
When rating various interpretations for ambiguous pictures, high PDI scorers rated 
more of the interpretations as ‘good’ whereas low PDI scorers rated more of the 
interpretations as ‘possible but not likely’ when there were three interpretations. 
Finally, coincidental experiences play a part in why people high in delusional ideation 
liberally accept. Random events are often interpreted as having a causal explanation. 
 
 185 
 
Chapter IX 
General Discussion 
 
Aims of the thesis and summary of key findings 
This thesis has found that participants high in delusional ideation demonstrate a 
more liberal reasoning style by seeing plausibility and salience where others do not 
in delusional and neutral content. This thesis has also found that factors that are 
important for the liberal acceptance account appear to be excitement about the 
stimuli, emotional creativity and perceptual and non-perceptual apophenia. The aim 
of this thesis was to make two new contributions to the literature. The first was to 
test whether liberal acceptance could be demonstrated in non-clinical, delusion-
prone participants as opposed to patients. Secondly, this thesis aimed to explore 
previously untested questions as to why people with delusional ideas exhibit a liberal 
reasoning style. This has been achieved by exploring factors such as, bizarreness, 
excitement, personality, creativity and apophenia in relation to delusional beliefs.  
 
It is evident in this thesis that excitement about delusional stimuli is an important 
factor that has not previously been considered in the published literature and 
provides a mechanism by which stimuli may be accepted as plausible or salient. In 
addition, apophenia has not previously been investigated in delusional beliefs. This is 
important since the evidence from this thesis suggests that apophenia has an effect 
on those that hold delusional beliefs in the subclinical population in that patterns are 
detected where none exist and more causal connections are made where cause and 
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effect cannot necessarily be established. This may lead to unfounded, delusional 
beliefs potentially through misattributing meaning to random events/ occurrences. 
Furthermore, this may maintain aberrant beliefs over time if a liberal reasoning style 
is adopted. This thesis has shown that liberal acceptance is evident in a non-clinical 
population and has explored a number of variables that contribute to a liberal 
acceptance reasoning style. A summary of the findings from the experiments that 
have been conducted will be given before moving on to a discussion of these 
findings in relation to liberal acceptance. 
Discussion of findings  
Throughout this thesis, most notably it has been found that, there was a tendency 
for those high in delusional ideation to rate stimuli with both delusional and neutral 
themes as more likely to be true compared to those low in delusional ideation 
(Chapters 3-5 & Chapter 8). In addition, there was evidence that high PDI scorers 
rated stimuli as more likely to happen although this was rated as more likely to 
happen to others than to themselves (Chapter 3). It was consistently found that 
stimuli with delusional themes were rated as more exciting than stimuli with neutral 
themes by high PDI scorers, highlighting a potential mechanism for why narratives 
with delusional and neutral themes are more likely to be accepted by those high in 
delusional ideation in comparison to those low in delusional ideation (Chapter 2, 5 & 
8). Sensation seeking did not provide an explanation for finding excitement in 
delusional stimuli however, cognitive looseness did explain the relationship between 
PDI score and finding scenarios more exciting (Chapter 3).  
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Furthermore, apophenia (both perceptual and non-perceptual) appears to play a 
central role in why participants high in delusional ideation liberally accept. Embedded 
objects were reported in visual ‘noise’ where no object had been embedded (Chapter 
4). Consistent with this, high PDI scorers also tended to report experiencing more 
coincidences than low PDI scorers (Chapter 5 & 8). This thesis has been successful 
in highlighting whether (and with what types of stimuli) participants high in 
delusional ideation liberally accept and in identifying potential factors that underpin 
this acceptance. This was also investigated in light of studies with clinical patients 
(Chapter 6 & 7). In addition, this thesis has extended the definition of liberal 
acceptance to include parameters where stimuli are rated more highly on plausibility 
but also on other parameters such as the salience of stimuli. These findings will now 
be discussed in light of relevant literature. 
 
Do people high in delusional ideation liberally accept? 
LaRocco and Warman (2009) first compared participants high and low in delusional 
ideation and asked them to rate whether narratives with delusional and neutral 
themes were more likely to be true. They found that those high in delusional 
ideation rated delusional narratives as more likely to be true compared to those low 
in delusional ideation and suggested that there was something about delusional 
material that affects reasoning in a unique way in those high in delusional ideation. 
This has been interpreted in this thesis as being synonymous with liberal 
acceptance. It makes intuitive sense to interpret LaRocco and Warman’s (2009) 
findings in this way – if participants rate narratives with delusional content as more 
likely to be true, they therefore appear to be biased to accept delusional narratives 
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as plausible. This is consistent with the way Moritz and Woodward (2004) theorised 
that patients with schizophrenia displayed a lowered threshold for acceptance and 
thus, accepted information as plausible - information that would either be rejected or 
rated lowly by others. Liberal acceptance has been demonstrated consistently in 
patients with schizophrenia (Moritz & Woodward, 2004; Moritz, et al., 2006; Moritz, 
et al., 2008; Moritz, et al., 2007). Although Moritz and colleagues did not 
discriminate between currently delusional/ non-delusional schizophrenic patients, it 
was assumed that liberal acceptance provides a mechanism by which information is 
initially accepted as plausible and over time becomes a sustained and potentially 
delusional belief.  
 
A recent meta-analysis suggests that reasoning biases thought to contribute to belief 
formation, including liberal acceptance, are not simply features of schizophrenia but 
fluctuate with current delusional state; being elevated when delusions are worse and 
lower when delusions subside (McLean, et al., 2017). This is of utmost importance 
since it implies that reasoning biases contribute causally to delusions. Furthermore, 
people with psychiatric illnesses without delusions displayed the same level of liberal 
acceptance (and other reasoning biases, such as a bias against disconfirmatory 
evidence, bias against confirmatory evidence and a jump to conclusions bias) as 
healthy control groups, meaning that having a psychiatric illness without delusions 
does not account for the reasoning biases seen in patients with delusions (McLean et 
al., 2017).  
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In the present thesis, I have demonstrated that high PDI scorers have a lowered 
threshold for plausibility or salience (particularly in relation to how exciting or likely 
the narratives are) supporting a continuum model of psychosis – particularly in 
relation to positive symptoms such as delusions. Participants rated narratives with 
delusional and neutral content as more likely to be true than participants low in 
delusional ideation; significantly so in Chapters 3, 5, and 8. This was mostly relevant 
to neutral narratives rather than delusional ones and suggests that liberal 
acceptance is more pervasive and generalised, in that, it is not only delusional 
materials where we see this effect, it is also in relation to neutral material. Having 
said that, in Chapter 4, there was found to be a significant interaction between high 
and low PDI scorers and delusional and neutral narratives, with high PDI scorers 
rating delusional narratives as more likely to be true and low PDI scorers rating 
neutral narratives as more likely to be true, resulting in a significant crossover effect. 
Although it may be seen as beneficial to exclude the use of materials containing 
delusional themes to avoid tautological effects (Dudley & Over, 2003), in the real 
world, implausible, even delusional themes may be encountered and either accepted 
or rejected based on subjective ratings of plausibility.  
 
Moritz and Woodward’s (2004) findings, using the Thematic Apperception Test, 
indicated that liberal acceptance was more pronounced when scenarios were absurd 
or less likely and that these were usually discounted either through ‘common sense’ 
or prior knowledge. Furthermore, when a situation is ambiguous in nature and has 
more than one clear alternative, greater ambivalence means that several alternatives 
may be entertained as plausible and cross the decision threshold (Moritz et al., 
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2007). In the present thesis when participants rated narratives in terms of likelihood 
of being true (Chapters 3-5 & 8), it seems that more of the narratives (both 
delusional and neutral) surpassed a lowered threshold of acceptance in participants 
in the high PDI group but not the low PDI group and thus, higher ratings of 
plausibility were evidenced.  
 
In Chapter 6 and Chapter 8, the aim was to investigate liberal acceptance using 
materials similar to that of Moritz and Woodward (2004). A similar trend was found 
in a subclinical sample to that of Moritz and Woodward (2004) but these differences 
were simply too subtle to achieve significance. Low PDI scorers rated more of the 
interpretations for pictures from the Thematic Apperception Test as poor while high 
PDI scorers more often rated these as either possible, good or excellent. This would 
imply that when interpreting events in the real world, information may be taken as 
plausible by people high in delusional ideation that may not be accepted as plausible 
by people lower on the continuum in terms of delusional ideation. The effect, 
however is much more subtle in the current experiments, although still in the 
expected direction, demonstrating a strong likelihood of a liberal acceptance bias in 
a non-clinical sample. 
 
In Chapter 7, using materials from Moritz et al. (2006) to examine liberal acceptance 
did not distinguish between participants high and low in delusional ideation. Using a 
task similar to ‘Who wants to be a Millionaire’, participants answered general 
knowledge questions with four possible answers and additionally provided a 
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probability estimate for each answer. This novel task allows for the point to be 
determined of when a probability estimate translates into either a decision or a 
rejection. It has been shown previously (Moritz et al., 2006) that patients with 
schizophrenia tended to make more incorrect decisions and rejections as well as 
base these on lower or higher probability estimates respectively. In the current 
thesis, high PDI scorers did not make more incorrect decisions, endorse decisions in 
light of low probability estimates or reject answers in the face of high probability 
estimates in comparison to low PDI scorers, as patients with schizophrenia and 
healthy participants did in the original study. While this provides further evidence to 
support the notion that deluded participants performed similar to controls on 
probability estimates (Dudley et al., 1997a) and distinguishes between patients with 
schizophrenia and healthy controls (Moritz et al., 2006), it does not appear to be 
subtle enough to detect differences in a subclinical sample. Participants performed 
similarly across both probability estimates and selecting correct and incorrect 
answers regardless of being in a high or low delusional ideation group. This would 
imply that a stricter acceptance threshold had potentially been employed when 
making decisions and rejections, making it less likely that trends would emerge 
consistent with the liberal acceptance account. None of the participants 
demonstrated high scores in delusional ideation and the median that was utilised to 
form the groups was exceptionally low; hence, this may explain why differences 
failed to emerge in Chapter 7 – performance between the groups remained similar 
throughout. The original study upon which this was based did not distinguish 
between delusional and non-delusional patients with schizophrenia (Moritz et al., 
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2006). Therefore, findings remain tentative in terms of whether this relates to 
current delusional state, as McLean et al. (2017) points out.  
 
The first aim of the above experiments was to test whether liberal acceptance could 
be demonstrated in a subclinical sample. It seems that while the effects are subtle, 
differences between the groups have been established when reasoning was 
examined. The second aim was to explore and test a number of different variables 
for why participants high in delusional ideation may exhibit a liberal acceptance bias. 
 
Why do people high in delusional ideation liberally accept? 
Since participants high in delusional ideation rated delusional narratives as more 
likely to be true (LaRocco & Warman, 2009), it was theorised that this may be 
because delusional material may be seen as less bizarre and disturbing. There is 
evidence to suggest that many individuals find their delusional ideas disturbing (e.g. 
Stanton & David, 2000) and bizarreness has not been examined previously in the 
literature. Despite this, ratings of how bizarre and disturbing narratives were did not 
differentiate between participants high and low in delusional ideation in Chapter 2 or 
3. Nonetheless, when participants were asked how exciting they found narratives, 
high PDI scorers gave significantly higher ratings in Chapters 2, 5 and 8 (Chapter 3 
was approaching significance) than low PDI scorers. Furthermore, delusional 
narratives were rated as more exciting than neutral narratives. Unusual, divergent 
beliefs appear to offer a greater excitement than the mundane (Kumar, et al., 1993; 
Zuckerman, 1979). This finding is also consistent with research highlighting arousal 
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abnormalities in delusional patients (Mujica-Parodi, et al., 2002) and delusion-prone 
participants (Kéri et al., 2011).  
 
Kapur (2003) posited that the root of schizophrenia lies in aberrant salience whereby 
excessive salience is given to external stimuli and internal representations. Recent 
research has provided support for this position. So et al. (2017) examined the effect 
of emotional disturbances and aberrant salience on persecutory delusions and found 
that persecutory delusions were exacerbated by both negative emotions and 
aberrant salience but that aberrant salience provided both direct and indirect 
pathways to persecutory delusions. Additionally, Larivière et al. (2017) found that 
delusional patients endorsed generic statements as self referent; in other words, 
these generic statements were given greater salience or personal significance. The 
above findings of participants high in delusional ideation finding excitement in 
delusional stimuli is in line with the evidence suggesting that aberrant salience is 
implicated. It suggests that delusional narratives hold particular salience for those 
high in delusional ideation and are thus rated as more exciting. 
  
These findings provide new evidence not only that a liberal acceptance bias is 
evident in delusion-prone individuals, but also that inflated estimates of likelihood 
and feelings of excitement may be reasons why such individuals have a more liberal 
threshold of acceptance. These findings provided a rationale to explore the concept 
of sensation seeking and whether this excitement was due to participants high in 
delusional ideation being sensation seekers. This however was not demonstrated 
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and it implies that there is something specific about the delusional stimuli that 
affects high PDI scorers’ excitement and that it was not a general tendency to seek 
excitement in all other areas of life but more suggestive of a general bias to perceive 
abnormal salience in stimuli and experiences where others do not. 
 
Although previous studies have found a relationship between personality variables 
and delusional ideation (Ross, et al., 2002; Larøi, et al. 2005), no such relationship 
was found when this was investigated in Chapter 3. Moreover, there is evidence to 
suggest that schizotypal personality traits are associated with creativity (see Nettle, 
2006). Schuldberg (1988; 1990; 2000) has shown that self-report measures of 
creativity and scales to measure liability to psychiatric symptoms are correlated, 
particularly measures relating to the positive symptoms of psychotic illness (i.e. 
delusions and hallucinations). Both creativity and the psychosis continuum are 
related to cognition and thus it was theorised that creativity may be a factor in why 
delusion-prone individuals see plausibility where others do not. In Chapter 3, it was 
found that attempts to examine creativity in relation to delusional ideation resulted 
in emotional creativity playing an important part but not ratings of self-reported 
creative personality. One of the key aspects of emotional creativity is the ability to 
think in novel ways, particularly in comparison to group norms (Averill, 1999; 
Humphreys, et al., 2008). Averill (1999) found that those who score highly on the 
General Mysticism Scale (Hood, 1975) measuring unusual experiences had greater 
emotional creativity - this also appears to extend to those who hold unusual beliefs, 
as seen in Chapters 3 and 4. Furthermore, emotional creativity has previously been 
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shown to be positively associated with fantasy proneness (Fuchs et al., 2007). In 
addition, those who score highly on scales measuring positive psychotic symptoms 
have been found to make more semantic associations (Mohr, et al., 2001). In 
Chapter 3, it was found that the Remote Associate Test mediated the association 
between PDI score and ratings of excitement of narratives. In other words, lower 
scores on the Remote Associate Test explain why high PDI scorers rated the 
scenarios as more exciting. Hence, low scores on the Remote Associate Test would 
suggest ‘cognitive looseness’ in high PDI scorers and cognitive inhibition in low PDI 
scorers. This is potentially because high PDI scorers perform less well when 
attempting to narrow the options down to a single answer (cf. Young & Bentall, 
1995). 
 
The idea of cognitive ‘looseness’ or a ‘looseness of associations’ (Gianotti et al., 
2001) as an underpinning factor of delusional ideation was investigated further in 
Chapter 4 and 5. Farias et al. (2005) found that schizotypy was associated with 
participants finding complex types of visual patterns (static or moving people, 
animals, objects and landscapes etc.) in visual displays of random dots. Fyfe and 
colleagues (2008) made the suggestion that apophenia (the tendency to perceive 
meaningful patterns and causal connections where none exist; Fyfe et al., 2008) 
may be a contributing factor to the formation of paranormal as well as delusional 
beliefs. Indeed, this effect was also replicated in Chapter 4 and participants high in 
delusional ideation reported seeing significantly more objects in visual ‘noise’ than 
participants low in delusional ideation. This was reinforced further in Chapter 5, 
when high PDI scorers reported experiencing significantly more coincidences in 
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Chapters 5 and 8. Thus cognitive looseness is a potential mechanism that may 
explain why liberal acceptance emerges: detecting patterns that do not exist in 
perceptual experiences or making causal connections between random events such 
as coincidences (apophenia) may lead to events appearing more plausible or salient 
to those high in delusional ideation and thus accepted more easily. Brugger (1997) 
has put forward that believers in the paranormal have a lower ‘threshold of causal 
attribution’ and a consequence of this is the need to make more causal connections 
between random events. Therefore, in the event that a natural cause cannot be 
found, a paranormal or delusional explanation may seem fitting since it will need to 
be given causal meaning (Bressan, 2002). Blanco, Barberia and Matute (2015) 
provided additional support for this by demonstrating that paranormal believers were 
biased to expose themselves to cause-present (as opposed to cause-absent) cases 
and that this in turn strengthens the illusion of causality. Paranormal beliefs however 
did not affect the participant’s ability to detect causal relationships that did exist 
(Blanco et al., 2015). Furthermore, participants high in delusional ideation appear to 
attribute coincidences to destiny, divine intervention and everything being connected 
to everything else in the universe in Chapter 5, whereas participants in the low PDI 
group attributed coincidences to pure chance. In addition, it could be argued that 
the causal connections made from coincidental experiences by high PDI scorers and 
the multiple explanations that are accepted for the occurrence of coincidences (i.e. 
destiny, divine intervention etc.) are entertained as plausible due to a liberal 
reasoning style.  
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In summary, excitement about the stimulus combined with emotional creativity and 
the ability to make causal connections between random events and see patterns 
where none exist in both perceptual and non-perceptual forms provide a persuasive 
explanation for why participants high in delusional ideation display a liberal 
reasoning style. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
There are several limitations of this thesis that will be highlighted below while 
examining potential areas for future research. 
 
While this thesis has examined a number of different variables in relation to liberal 
acceptance and underpinning factors of this, it should be acknowledged that in the 
above empirical chapters, as well as the sample being drawn from a student 
population, the majority of participants in each study were predominantly female. 
Although previous research examining the properties of the Peters et al. Delusions 
Inventory has shown no sex differences on the measure (Peters et al., 2004) other 
research examining the incidence of schizophrenia (Falkenburg & Tracy, 2012) and 
first-episode psychosis (Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, Labad & Kulkarni, 2012) has found that 
males have a higher incidence rate. It has also been found that the age of onset 
differs between the sexes (Falkenburg & Tracy, 2012) with the onset in males being 
between the ages of 18-25 and for females, between the ages of 25-35. This means 
that results may have differed if the distribution of males and females had been 
more balanced. This should certainly be considered in future studies examining 
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subclinical delusional ideation. Furthermore, none of the participants displayed 
exceptionally high levels of delusional ideation and the median scores used to form 
the high and low groups were relatively low in comparison to other studies of this 
nature (e.g. LaRocco & Warman, 2009). Despite this, it is compelling that so many 
noteworthy differences were found between participants classified as high or low in 
delusional ideation. 
 
With regards to the methods employed in this thesis, there have been precautions 
given about the use of a median split; these have also been highlighted in the 
literature by MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, and Rucker (2002). These primarily 
concentrate on people being assigned to the same group on the basis of falling 
above or below the median. It is argued that essentially, people placed in a high or a 
low group will not necessarily be the same, even though they are treated as such in 
any analysis. It is also noted in the same article that effect sizes may be reduced 
and there may be an increase in the likelihood of spurious effects. Along the same 
lines as this limitation, previous studies have aimed to measure delusional ideation 
along a continuum yet it is not uncommon in the literature on delusional ideation 
and reasoning to employ the same categorical approach as that employed in the 
experiments in this thesis (e.g. LaRocco & Warman, 2001; Galbraith et al., 2008; 
2010). To address this, further analyses were carried out and can be found in 
Appendix 35. These analyses go some way to support the results in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. In almost all cases where a median split has been employed 
and significant differences have been found between high and low PDI groups, the 
 199 
 
dependent variable could be predicted by total PDI scores, demonstrating that 
categorical and continuous independent variables ultimately led to similar outcomes.  
 
In previous research on reasoning in delusional patients (McGuire et al., 2001) and 
delusion-prone non-patients (LaRocco & Warman, 2009) authors have suggested 
that participants would be more familiar with delusional material and thus have 
given higher ratings of likelihood for such material. Although familiarity was found to 
influence probability estimates in patients with delusions (McGuire et al., 2001), this 
was not the case with people high in delusional ideation in LaRocco and Warman’s 
(2009) study. Nonetheless, this has not been measured in the experiments in this 
thesis and future studies should consider including a measure of familiarity with 
materials to see the effect this may have on reasoning about stimuli with delusional 
content. In addition, although the narratives in Chapters 2-5 and Chapter 8 
contained delusional content that was consistent with various delusional themes 
(grandiose, persecutory, reference, bizarre and Schneiderian delusions e.g. control, 
thought broadcasting, insertion and withdrawal) no attempt was made to explore 
the effect of any one particular theme further. For example, persecutory delusions 
are thought to be more common than grandiose delusions (Freeman, 2007); there 
were also differences found between grandiose and persecutory narratives in 
LaRocco and Warman’s (2009) study, therefore, different themes may influence 
likelihood ratings. This is in addition to the notion of familiarity influencing estimates 
of likelihood in clinical patients with delusions (McGuire et al., 2001). Future studies 
should examine the effect that different delusional themes have on reasoning and 
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whether one particular type of delusion would result in inflated estimates of 
likelihood or greater excitement, for example. 
 
Although self reference and the effect of emotionally salient material have been 
considered in this thesis, the effect of emotions on reasoning could have been 
examined in more depth as this may have had an effect on reasoning. For example, 
emotionally salient material appeared to exaggerate the JTC bias and lead to more 
errors in reasoning in one study (Dudley, et al., 1997b) and thus should be given 
closer attention in future research. 
 
Implications 
Considering the implications of the above research, the data suggest that people 
who engage in delusional thinking may be more prone to develop delusional beliefs 
due to a liberal reasoning style and underpinning factors of this. Research suggests 
that 1-3% of the non-clinical population have delusions with the same severity as 
patients with clinical delusions. Around 5-6% of the non-clinical population have a 
delusion with less severity but still experience social and emotional difficulties as a 
consequence of this. A further 10-15% of the non-clinical population have regular 
delusional ideation (Freeman, 2006). This provides convincing evidence of the link 
between these experiences of clinical delusions, delusions and delusional ideation 
and reinforces the rationale for studying people who engage in delusional ideation as 
a means of making inferences regarding the clinical population (Freeman, 2006).  
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A recent meta-analysis has demonstrated that liberal acceptance may combine with 
other biases (such as biases against disconfirmatory evidence, biases against 
confirmatory evidence and jumping to conclusions) to form a single ‘evidence 
integration’ cognitive process (McLean et al., 2017). It is therefore of utmost 
importance that cognitive therapies are developed to address reasoning biases 
associated with delusions. Ultimately, findings from the above research in this thesis 
contribute to this process by highlighting underpinning factors of the liberal 
acceptance bias in a subclinical population. 
 
Metacognitive training for psychosis (Moritz et al., 2007) is a fairly new therapy 
aimed at reducing reasoning biases in clinical delusions and has shown promising 
results in reducing delusional severity in schizophrenia patients (Eichner & Berna, 
2016). The aim of this therapy is to raise patients’ awareness of cognitive errors and 
how to think critically about these while learning how to spot and avoid them. The 
research that has been carried out in this thesis is important to interventions such as 
metacognitive training since it provides new evidence of the different kinds of 
cognitive biases that such interventions could potentially target. 
Thesis conclusions 
To conclude, the current thesis contributes to the literature by demonstrating that 
participants high in delusional ideation display reasoning biases similar to patients 
with clinical delusions and by examining variables that explain why participants 
demonstrate these reasoning biases.  
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This thesis has found that participants high in delusional ideation demonstrated a 
more liberal reasoning style by seeing plausibility and salience where others did not 
in delusional and neutral content. This thesis has also found that factors that are 
important for the liberal acceptance account appear to be excitement about the 
stimuli, emotional creativity and perceptual and non-perceptual apophenia. These 
factors offer explanations for why participants high in delusional ideation liberally 
accept. Current research that examines reasoning in delusions, including this thesis, 
represents a step forward in supporting patients with delusions.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 – Information Sheet  
Subclinical delusional ideation and likelihood ratings of delusional and 
neutral narratives 
Information Sheet 
 
Delusional Ideation and Reasoning 
 
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and reasoning. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if strong beliefs are related to certain thinking styles.  
 
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (c.l.jones@wlv.ac.uk) and Dr Niall Galbraith 
(n.galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Department of Psychology at the University of 
Wolverhampton.  
 
If you decide to participate you will be required to complete a demographics form, a 
questionnaire and to complete a series of narratives. The first questionnaire measures beliefs 
and vivid mental experiences. There are no right or wrong answers and you should answer 
the questions as honestly as you can. The reasoning task requires you to read nine short 
narratives and assess them on various parameters.  
 
Any information gathered in this study will remain anonymous. No individual will be 
identified in any publication of results. All data will be locked in a cabinet in the supervisor’s 
office for a period of five years upon which it will be destroyed. Only the investigator and the 
supervisor will have access to this information. You are also reminded that you are free to 
withdraw at any point during the study without giving a reason and without consequence.  
 
A summary of the results of this data will be made available to you in the following week. 
 
If you consent to participate in this study please sign the Consent Form provided and return to 
the investigator. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Claire Jones, Dr Niall Galbraith. 
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Appendix 2 – Consent form 
 
Consent Form 
 
In signing this form I agree that I have read and understood the information sheet provided.  
 
I have had time to ask questions of the researcher. 
 
I understand that my responses are anonymous 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw during this study at any time without giving a reason 
and without consequence. 
 
I consent to take part in this study. 
 
Name…………………. 
 
 
Signature……………… 
 
 
Date…………………… 
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Appendix 3 – Demographics form 
 
Participant information 
 
Please indicate the following: 
 
 
Your sex:   
 
 
Your age:            
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Appendix 4 – Peters et al., Delusions Inventory (1996) 
 
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI: Peters et al., 1996) 
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Appendix 5 – Delusional Narratives 
 
 
Please read the following narratives and circle the appropriate answer accordingly.  
 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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3.  
 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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5.  
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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7.  
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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9.  
 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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Appendix 6 – Neutral Narratives 
2. My friends had invited me to a party at their house. At the party, I began to play a game with 
my friends. We had a bag of a hundred marshmallows. A quarter of the marshmallows were 
pink and the rest of the marshmallows were white. The game was that we all took turns to see if 
we could pick out a certain colour marshmallow. I started the game and my friends asked me if 
I could pick out a white marshmallow. I said I was sure I could pick out a white marshmallow 
without looking. 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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4. My friend asked me if we could go to the Christmas fete. When we got there, there were a 
number of stalls. The stalls had been beautifully decorated and gave a warm, exciting feeling 
about Christmas. On one of the stalls the owner had a jar that was half full of sweets. The stall 
owner told us that there were a hundred sweets left in the jar. Half of them were yellow and the 
rest of them were red. If a person could choose a red sweet from the jar without looking they 
would win a prize. I said I could choose a red sweet from the jar without looking. 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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6. A colleague of mine had been looking for a used car. I suggested that she should go to have a 
look at a car auction because cars are usually quite inexpensive there. She said she would really 
like a black car. The site where the auction was held was only able hold 200 cars. On arrival, we 
noticed the majority of the cars were black.  In fact, the auctioneer informed us that 150 of the 
cars were black and the rest were silver. I said I knew the first car to be shown would be black. 
 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. I signed up to take part in an experiment. When I arrived the experimenter told me he had a 
jar that was filled with a hundred beads. He informed me that three quarters of the jar was 
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filled with red beads and the rest of the beads were black. The experimenter showed me the jar 
of beads. He asked me if I could choose a red bead from the jar without looking. I said I was 
sure the first bead I would choose from the jar would be red.   
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How bizarre do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
you? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How likely is it that this could happen to 
someone you know? 
Extremely 
unlikely 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
likely 
5 
How disturbing do you find this 
narrative?  
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How bizarre would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
bizarre 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
bizarre 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How disturbing would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
disturbing 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
disturbing 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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Appendix 7 – Eysenck Lie Scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976) 
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Appendix 8 – Information Sheet 
Personality, creativity, sensation seeking, acquiescence and reasoning as 
underpinning factors of delusional ideation 
Information Sheet 
 
Sub-Clinical Delusional Ideation and Reasoning 
 
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and reasoning. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if strong beliefs are related to certain thinking styles.  
 
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) as part of a PhD 
under the supervision of Dr Niall Galbraith (N.Galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Wolverhampton.  
 
If you decide to participate you will be required to complete a number of questionnaires 
related to beliefs, interests and preferences, personality and creativity. Some questions also 
relate to experiences of drug use. You are reminded that all responses are anonymous. There 
are no right or wrong answers and you should answer the questions as honestly as you can. 
You will also be required to assess a series of narratives. This involves reading nine short 
narratives and indicating probabilities for each on a five-point scale. This study will take no 
longer than 1 hour to complete and you will receive 1 credit of participant pool time. 
 
Any information gathered in this study will remain anonymous. No individual will be 
identified in any publication of results. All data will be locked in a cabinet in the 
investigator’s office for a period of five years upon which it will be destroyed. Only the 
investigators will have access to this information. You are also reminded that you are free to 
withdraw at any point during the study without giving a reason and without consequence. 
However, once responses are submitted to the researcher you will not be able to withdraw 
your data due to all responses being unidentifiable to the researcher.  
 
If you are interested in receiving a summary of this study, this can be obtained by emailing 
(Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) in May 2012. 
 
If you consent to participate in this study please sign the Consent Form provided and return to 
the investigator. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Claire Jones 
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Appendix 9 – Consent Form 
 
Consent Form 
Study Title: Sub-Clinical Delusional Ideation and Reasoning 
Researcher: Claire Jones - PhD Student 
 
In signing this form I agree that I have read and understood the information sheet provided.  
 
I understand that I will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires measuring beliefs, 
interests and preferences, personality and creativity. 
 
I have had time to ask questions of the researcher and any questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that my responses are anonymous. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from this study at any time without giving a reason 
and without consequence up to the submission of my responses when my data will be 
anonymous to the researcher. 
 
I consent to take part in this study. 
 
Name…………………. 
 
 
Signature……………… 
 
 
Date…………………… 
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Appendix 10 – Sensation Seeking Scale Form V (Zuckerman, 1994) 
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Appendix 11 – Gough’s (1979) Creative Personality Scale 
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Appendix 12 – Emotional Creativity Inventory (Averill, 1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248 
 
Appendix 13 – Remote Associate Test (Mednick, 1962) 
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Appendix 14 – Response Acquiescence (Winkler, Kanouse & Ware, 1982) 
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Appendix 15 - 20-Item Mini-IPIP (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, and Lucas, 
2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 251 
 
Appendix 16 – Information Sheet 
Delusional thinking and reasoning: The effect of creativity and apophenia 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Beliefs, Creativity and Reasoning 
 
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and reasoning. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if strong beliefs are related to certain thinking styles.  
 
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) as part of a PhD 
under the supervision of Dr Niall Galbraith (N.Galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Wolverhampton.  
 
If you decide to participate you will be required to complete a number of questionnaires 
related to beliefs and creativity and partake in a computerised experimental task. There are no 
right or wrong answers and you should answer the questions as honestly as you can. You will 
also be required to assess a series of narratives. This involves reading seven short narratives 
and assigning ratings for each on a five-point scale. This study will take no longer than 45 
minutes to complete and you will receive 0.75 credits of participant pool time. 
 
Any information gathered in this study will remain anonymous. No individual will be 
identified in any publication of results. All data will be locked in a cabinet in the 
investigator’s office for a period of five years upon which it will be destroyed. Only the 
investigators will have access to this information. You are also reminded that you are free to 
withdraw at any point during the study without giving a reason and without consequence. 
However, once responses are submitted to the researcher you will not be able to withdraw 
your data due to all responses being unidentifiable to the researcher.  
 
If you are interested in receiving a summary of this study, this can be obtained by emailing 
(Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) in May 2013. 
 
If you consent to participate in this study please sign the Consent Form provided and return to 
the investigator. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Claire Jones 
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Appendix 17 - Consent form 
 
Consent Form 
Study Title: Beliefs, Creativity and Reasoning 
Researcher: Claire Jones - PhD Student 
 
In signing this form I agree that I have read and understood the information sheet provided.  
 
I understand that I will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires measuring beliefs, 
creativity and reasoning and take part in an experimental task. 
 
I have had time to ask questions of the researcher and any questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that my responses are anonymous. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from this study at any time without giving a reason 
and without consequence up to the submission of my responses when my data will be 
anonymous to the researcher. 
 
I consent to take part in this study. 
 
Name…………………. 
 
 
Signature……………… 
 
 
Date…………………… 
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Appendix 18 – Delusional Narratives 
 
Please read the following narratives and circle the appropriate answer accordingly.  
 
1. While working, Reece began to feel that he had such enormous insight into subject areas 
he hadn't previously studied. He began to think of himself as being somewhat special and 
having a special mind to be thinking these things. He thought he was ‘chosen’. 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
 
 
3. One of Josh’s duties was to read information intended for military personnel. He 
became convinced that he was reading top secret information and that someone would 
try to have him followed so that he couldn't talk. He began to suspect that he was being 
observed. 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
 
5. One day, Jessica saw a movie poster for "The Net," starring Sandra Bullock. Because 
she had brown eyes and brown hair as she did, she realized that Sandra Bullock was 
meant to represent her. 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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7. On the job as a machinist, Natalie began to think that others could somehow know 
what she was thinking. She couldn't help but suspect that some people in her presence 
knew her thoughts. 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
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Appendix 19 – Neutral Narratives 
 
2. Someone unfamiliar rang Jodie’s doorbell one day. She looked from behind the curtain 
and thought the man looked like a salesman and that he would probably try to sell her 
something she didn’t really want. She decided that she should answer the door since it would 
be rude not to. 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
 
 
4. Brad’s colleague Nick had been looking for a used car. Brad suggested that he should 
go to have a look at a car auction. Nick said he would really like a black car. When they 
arrived at the auction they noticed the majority of the cars were black.   
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
 
 
6. Karen owned a lot of modern art. Since moving to a smaller house she had found it 
hard to find a place for everything and considered whether she should sell or use a 
storage facility for some of her art to make more space. 
 
How likely is it that this narrative is true? 
0% 
1 
 
2 
50% 
3 
 
4 
100% 
5 
How exciting do you find this narrative? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
How exciting would the narrative be to 
most other people? 
Not at all 
exciting 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
Extremely 
exciting 
5 
 
 
 256 
 
Appendix 20 - Snowy Pictures Task (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 257 
 
Appendix 21 – Information Sheet 
Creativity and non-perceptual apophenia as factors in delusional thinking 
and reasoning 
Information Sheet 
 
Beliefs, Reasoning and Creativity 
 
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and reasoning. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if strong beliefs are related to certain thinking styles.  
 
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) as part of a PhD 
under the supervision of Dr Niall Galbraith (N.Galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Department of 
Psychology at the University of Wolverhampton.  
 
If you decide to participate you will be required to complete questionnaires related to your 
beliefs and reasoning and take part in an experimental task. There are no right or wrong 
answers and you should answer the questions as honestly as you can. You will also be 
required to assess a series of narratives. This involves reading seven short narratives and 
assigning ratings for each on a five-point scale. This study will take no longer than 45 
minutes to complete and you will receive 0.75 credits of participant pool time. 
 
Any information gathered in this study will remain anonymous. No individual will be 
identified in any publication of results. All data will be locked in a cabinet in the 
investigator’s office for a period of five years upon which it will be destroyed. Only the 
investigators will have access to this information. You are also reminded that you are free to 
withdraw at any point during the study without giving a reason and without consequence. 
However, once responses are submitted to the researcher you will not be able to withdraw 
your data due to all responses being unidentifiable to the researcher.  
 
If you are interested in receiving a summary of this study, this can be obtained by emailing 
(Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) in August 2013. 
 
If you consent to participate in this study please sign the Consent Form provided and return to 
the investigator. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Claire Jones 
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Appendix 22 – Consent form 
Consent Form 
Study Title: Beliefs, Reasoning and Creativity 
Researcher: Claire Jones - PhD Student 
 
In signing this form I agree that I have read and understood the information sheet provided.  
 
I understand that I will be asked to complete questionnaires measuring belief and reasoning 
and take part in an experimental task. 
 
I have had time to ask questions of the researcher and any questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
I understand that my responses are anonymous. 
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from this study at any time without giving a reason 
and without consequence up to the submission of my responses when my data will be 
anonymous to the researcher. 
 
I consent to take part in this study. 
 
Name…………………. 
 
 
Signature……………… 
 
 
Date…………………… 
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Appendix 23 - Bridge-the-Associate-Gap Task (Gianotti et al., 2001) 
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Appendix 24 – Coincidences Questionnaire (Bressan 2002) 
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Appendix 25 – Information sheet 
Delusional ideation and decision thresholds: Testing the liberal acceptance 
account 
 
Beliefs and Reasoning 
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and reasoning. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if strong beliefs are related to certain thinking styles.  
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) under the 
supervision of Dr Niall Galbraith (N.Galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Department of Psychology 
at the University of Wolverhampton. 
If you decide to participate you will be asked to answer a number of questions related to your 
beliefs and your experience of coincidences. You will also be asked to assess a series of 
pictures by assigning plausibility ratings to various interpretations. There are no right or 
wrong answers and you should answer the questions as honestly as you can. Participation will 
take no longer than 45 minutes. 
This survey is completely anonymous and you will not be asked to provide your name at any 
point. Your responses will be kept confidential and only the researcher and research 
supervisors will have access to these. The answers you give will never be traced back to you.   
Participation is voluntary and you can always withdraw from the study at any point during 
the survey if you want to, up to the point that you submit your responses. If, however, you are 
happy to take part, then please try to answer all of the questions. 
 
Claire Jones 
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Health, Education and Wellbeing 
University of Wolverhampton 
Wolverhampton 
WV1 1LY 
 
Email: Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk  
Tel: 01902 321374 
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Appendix 26 – Consent 
 
Consent 
 
BEFORE beginning the survey, please make sure that you understand the statements below: 
 I understand that it is up to me if I take part in this survey. 
 If I decide to do this survey, I understand that I am allowed to change my mind after I 
have started it. 
 I know that my answers are anonymous and that they cannot be traced back to me. 
 I understand that once I have finished the survey, I cannot withdraw my answers. 
 
If you agree with all of the above statements, please click the button below to begin the 
survey. 
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Appendix 27 – Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943) 
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Appendix 28 – Debrief 
 
Thank you for your participation. It is hoped that this study will tell us more about the way 
people reason about stimuli with interpretations of differing plausibility and how this relates 
to strong beliefs. 
If you would like to receive a summary of this study, this can be obtained by emailing the 
researcher at Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk in August 2014. 
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Claire Jones 
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Health, Education and Wellbeing 
University of Wolverhampton 
Wolverhampton 
WV1 1LY 
 
Email: Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk  
Tel: 01902 321374 
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Appendix 29 – Information sheet 
Delusional Ideation and Decision Thresholds: Who wants to be a 
Millionaire? 
 
Beliefs and Decision Making  
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and decision making. The purpose of this 
study is to investigate if strong beliefs are related to the way we make decisions.  
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) under the 
supervision of Dr Niall Galbraith (N.Galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Institute of Psychology at 
the University of Wolverhampton. 
If you decide to participate you will be asked to consider 20 general knowledge questions and 
provide an estimate for four alternative answers. You will then be asked whether you would 
accept or reject the answer based on your estimates. You will also be asked a number of 
questions related to your beliefs. There are no right or wrong answers and you should answer 
the questions as honestly as you can. Participation will take no longer than 45 minutes. 
This survey is completely anonymous and you will not be asked to provide your name at any 
point. Your responses will be kept confidential and only the researcher and research 
supervisors will have access to these. The answers you give will never be traced back to you.   
Participation is voluntary and you can always withdraw from the study at any point during 
the survey if you want to, up to the point that you submit your responses. If, however, you are 
happy to take part, then please try to answer all of the questions. 
 
Claire Jones 
Institute of Psychology 
Faculty of Health, Education and Wellbeing 
University of Wolverhampton 
Wolverhampton 
WV1 1LY 
 
Email: Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk  
Tel: 01902 321374 
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Appendix 30 – Consent 
 
Consent 
 
BEFORE beginning the survey, please make sure that you understand the statements below: 
 I understand that it is up to me if I take part in this survey. 
 If I decide to do this survey, I understand that I am allowed to change my mind after I 
have started it. 
 I know that my answers are anonymous and that they cannot be traced back to me. 
 I understand that once I have finished the survey, I cannot withdraw my answers. 
 
If you agree with all of the above statements, please click the button below to begin the 
survey. 
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Appendix 31 – General Knowledge Questions for the ‘Who Wants to be a 
Millionaire’ task 
 
Below are 20 general knowledge questions. For each of the four answers, we 
would like you to give a probability estimate between 0% and 100%. There 
are no right or wrong probably estimates and you should give an estimate 
that you think is about right. Even if you are entirely certain that an answer is 
correct, please still give a probability estimate for each answer.  
We would also like you to decide which answer you think is right or wrong. 
Sometimes you absolutely know that something is right or wrong, at other 
times you can’t be sure. When you feel that you really can't make a decision, 
there is an additional option of 'can't be absolutely sure' for this. You can 
decide which answer is right or wrong (or if you 'can't be absolutely sure') 
after each estimate you provide or after you have given estimates to all four 
answers. You can also go back to previous questions if you change your 
mind. 
Please see the example scenarios below for guidance on completing this part 
of the survey: 
Example 1 
You are asked the question: How many fingers does Mickey Mouse have? 
The four alternative answers are 10, 12, 8 and 6. You think that the answer 
could be that Mickey Mouse has either 10 or 8 fingers. So you give 50% for 
the answer 10 fingers and 50% for the answer 8 fingers. You think the 
 268 
 
chance of Mickey Mouse having 12 fingers is small, so you give this 20% and 
the chance of Mickey Mouse having 6 fingers is even smaller, so you give this 
10%. You decide to go for the answer of Mickey Mouse having 10 fingers and 
indicate this by choosing 'I would say this is right'. You may still be unsure 
about whether Mickey Mouse has 8 fingers so for this you might choose 'can't 
be absolutely sure'. For the other alternative answers (12 and 6 fingers) you 
choose 'I would say this is wrong'.  
 
Example 2 
You are asked the question: Which one of the following is not a character 
from the standard edition of the board game Cluedo? 
The four alternative answers are Captain Scarlett, Professor Plum, Reverend 
Green and Mrs White. You are pretty sure that the answer is not Mrs White or 
Reverend Green and you give these both 20% and choose 'I would say this is 
wrong'. You are less certain about Professor Plum so you give this 30% and 
choose 'can't be absolutely sure'. You give the remaining answer (Captain 
Scarlett) 40% and choose 'I would say this is right'.  
Below are 2 trial questions for you to practice this task. You will then begin 
the 20 general knowledge questions. 
 
 
 
 269 
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Appendix 32 – Information sheet 
Liberal acceptance and underpinning factors of subclinical 
delusional ideation 
Beliefs and Reasoning 
You are invited to participate in a study of beliefs and reasoning. The purpose of this study is 
to investigate if strong beliefs are related to certain thinking styles.  
The study is being conducted by Claire Jones (Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk) under the 
supervision of Dr Niall Galbraith (N.Galbraith@wlv.ac.uk) in the Institute of Psychology at 
the University of Wolverhampton. 
If you decide to participate you will be asked to assess a series of narratives and answer a 
number of questions related to your beliefs and your experience of coincidences. You will 
also be asked to assess a series of pictures by assigning plausibility ratings to various 
interpretations and completing an experimental picture task. There are no right or wrong 
answers and you should answer the questions as honestly as you can. Participation will take 
no longer than 1 hour. 
This survey is completely anonymous and you will not be asked to provide your name at any 
point. Your responses will be kept confidential and only the researcher and research 
supervisors will have access to these. The answers you give will never be traced back to you.   
Participation is voluntary and you can always withdraw from the study at any point during 
the survey if you want to, up to the point that you submit your responses. If, however, you are 
happy to take part, then please try to answer all of the questions. 
 
Claire Jones 
Institute of Psychology 
Faculty of Health, Education and Wellbeing 
University of Wolverhampton 
Wolverhampton 
WV1 1LY 
 
Email: Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk  
Tel: 01902 321374 
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Appendix 33 – Consent 
 
Consent 
 
BEFORE beginning the survey, please make sure that you understand the statements below: 
 I understand that it is up to me if I take part in this survey. 
 If I decide to do this survey, I understand that I am allowed to change my mind after I 
have started it. 
 I know that my answers are anonymous and that they cannot be traced back to me. 
 I understand that once I have finished the survey, I cannot withdraw my answers. 
 
If you agree with all of the above statements, please click the button below to begin the 
survey. 
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Appendix 34 – Debrief 
 
Thank you for your participation. It is hoped that this study will tell us more about the way 
people reason and how this relates to strong beliefs. 
If you would like to receive a summary of this study, this can be obtained by emailing the 
researcher at Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk in October 2016. 
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Claire Jones 
Institute of Psychology 
Faculty of Health, Education and Wellbeing 
University of Wolverhampton 
Wolverhampton 
WV1 1LY 
 
Email: Claire.Jones@wlv.ac.uk  
Tel: 01902 321374 
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Appendix 35 – SPSS outputs for regression analyses showing PDI score as 
a continuous IV  
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Exciting_overall 5.3714 1.28809 101 
Total_PDI_score 59.8020 34.73903 101 
 
 
Correlations 
 Exciting_overall Total_PDI_score 
Pearson Correlation Exciting_overall 1.000 .211 
Total_PDI_score .211 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Exciting_overall . .017 
Total_PDI_score .017 . 
N Exciting_overall 101 101 
Total_PDI_score 101 101 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .211a .045 .035 1.26543 1.907 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_score 
b. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7.390 1 7.390 4.615 .034b 
Residual 158.529 99 1.601   
Total 165.919 100    
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_score 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 4.903 .252  19.488 .000    
Total_PDI_
score 
.008 .004 .211 2.148 .034 .211 .211 .211 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.9035 6.3433 5.3714 .27184 101 
Residual -2.98211 2.39523 .00000 1.25908 101 
Std. Predicted Value -1.721 3.575 .000 1.000 101 
Std. Residual -2.357 1.893 .000 .995 101 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
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Chapter 3 
 
Regression 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
True_overall_2 3.1879 .60650 65 
Total_PDI_Score 55.9692 41.17758 65 
 
 
Correlations 
 True_overall_2 Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation True_overall_2 1.000 .232 
Total_PDI_Score .232 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) True_overall_2 . .032 
Total_PDI_Score .032 . 
N True_overall_2 65 65 
Total_PDI_Score 65 65 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall_2 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .232a .054 .039 .59464 2.295 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: True_overall_2 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.265 1 1.265 3.579 .063b 
Residual 22.277 63 .354   
Total 23.542 64    
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall_2 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 2.997 .125  23.958 .000    
Total_PDI_Sc
ore 
.003 .002 .232 1.892 .063 .232 .232 .232 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall_2 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.9968 3.6627 3.1879 .14061 65 
Residual -1.43327 1.44966 .00000 .58997 65 
Std. Predicted Value -1.359 3.376 .000 1.000 65 
Std. Residual -2.410 2.438 .000 .992 65 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall_2 
 
 
 
 ************************************* 
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Regression 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Exciting_overall 4.8698 1.30958 65 
Total_PDI_Score 55.9692 41.17758 65 
 
 
Correlations 
 Exciting_overall Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation Exciting_overall 1.000 .316 
Total_PDI_Score .316 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Exciting_overall . .005 
Total_PDI_Score .005 . 
N Exciting_overall 65 65 
Total_PDI_Score 65 65 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .316a .100 .086 1.25222 1.982 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 10.971 1 10.971 6.997 .010b 
Residual 98.788 63 1.568   
Total 109.759 64    
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 4.307 .263  16.351 .000    
Total_PDI_Sco
re 
.010 .004 .316 2.645 .010 .316 .316 .316 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.3070 6.2678 4.8698 .41404 65 
Residual -2.29350 3.89104 .00000 1.24240 65 
Std. Predicted Value -1.359 3.376 .000 1.000 65 
Std. Residual -1.832 3.107 .000 .992 65 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
 
 
 ******************************************** 
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Chapter 4 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Snowy Pictures False Positives 3.1935 2.45063 93 
Total_PDI_Score 55.4086 39.21713 93 
 
 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Snowy Pictures 
False Positives Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation Snowy Pictures False Positives 1.000 .206 
Total_PDI_Score .206 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Snowy Pictures False Positives . .024 
Total_PDI_Score .024 . 
N Snowy Pictures False Positives 93 93 
Total_PDI_Score 93 93 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures False Positives 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .206a .042 .032 2.41143 .042 4.015 1 91 .048 2.340 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures False Positives 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.350 1 23.350 4.015 .048b 
Residual 529.167 91 5.815   
Total 552.516 92    
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures False Positives 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 2.482 .434  5.713 .000    
Total_PDI_Scor
e 
.013 .006 .206 2.004 .048 .206 .206 .206 
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures False Positives 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 2.4818 4.5628 3.1935 .50379 93 
Residual -3.68930 6.77316 .00000 2.39829 93 
Std. Predicted Value -1.413 2.718 .000 1.000 93 
Std. Residual -1.530 2.809 .000 .995 93 
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures False Positives 
 
 ****************************************** 
 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
4.3548 2.38494 93 
Total_PDI_Score 55.4086 39.21713 93 
 
 
Correlations 
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Snowy Pictures 
Attempt Made but 
Incorrect Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
1.000 .227 
Total_PDI_Score .227 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
. .014 
Total_PDI_Score .014 . 
N Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
93 93 
Total_PDI_Score 93 93 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures Attempt Made but 
Incorrect 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .227a .052 .041 2.33533 .052 4.950 1 91 .029 1.646 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures Attempt Made but Incorrect 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 26.998 1 26.998 4.950 .029b 
Residual 496.292 91 5.454   
Total 523.290 92    
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures Attempt Made but Incorrect 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 3.589 .421  8.532 .000    
Total_PDI_Scor
e 
.014 .006 .227 2.225 .029 .227 .227 .227 
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures Attempt Made but Incorrect 
 
 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.5895 5.8272 4.3548 .54172 93 
Residual -3.89335 8.83038 .00000 2.32260 93 
Std. Predicted Value -1.413 2.718 .000 1.000 93 
Std. Residual -1.667 3.781 .000 .995 93 
a. Dependent Variable: Snowy Pictures Attempt Made but Incorrect 
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Chapter 5 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
True_overall 3.8813 .93641 83 
Total_PDI_Score 48.0241 35.28489 83 
 
 
Correlations 
 True_overall Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation True_overall 1.000 .310 
Total_PDI_Score .310 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) True_overall . .002 
Total_PDI_Score .002 . 
N True_overall 83 83 
Total_PDI_Score 83 83 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .310a .096 .085 .89582 2.013 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.901 1 6.901 8.600 .004b 
Residual 65.002 81 .802   
Total 71.904 82    
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 3.486 .167  20.911 .000    
Total_PDI_Sc
ore 
.008 .003 .310 2.933 .004 .310 .310 .310 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.4865 4.8266 3.8813 .29011 83 
Residual -2.14710 2.20109 .00000 .89034 83 
Std. Predicted Value -1.361 3.259 .000 1.000 83 
Std. Residual -2.397 2.457 .000 .994 83 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
 
 
 
 ************************************** 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Exciting_overall 4.3781 1.15699 80 
Total_PDI_Score 48.0750 35.10591 80 
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Correlations 
 Exciting_overall Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation Exciting_overall 1.000 .329 
Total_PDI_Score .329 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Exciting_overall . .001 
Total_PDI_Score .001 . 
N Exciting_overall 80 80 
Total_PDI_Score 80 80 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .329a .108 .097 1.09953 1.786 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11.453 1 11.453 9.474 .003b 
Residual 94.299 78 1.209   
Total 105.752 79    
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 3.857 .209  18.426 .000    
Total_PDI_Sc
ore 
.011 .004 .329 3.078 .003 .329 .329 .329 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.8567 5.6246 4.3781 .38076 80 
Residual -1.82254 3.01038 .00000 1.09254 80 
Std. Predicted Value -1.369 3.274 .000 1.000 80 
Std. Residual -1.658 2.738 .000 .994 80 
a. Dependent Variable: Exciting_overall 
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Chapter 6 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Total_coincidences 20.2212 5.31966 113 
Total_PDI_Score 55.1416 42.40196 113 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Total_coincidence
s Total_PDI_Score 
Pearson Correlation Total_coincidences 1.000 .373 
Total_PDI_Score .373 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Total_coincidences . .000 
Total_PDI_Score .000 . 
N Total_coincidences 113 113 
Total_PDI_Score 113 113 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Total_PDI_Scoreb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .373a .139 .132 4.95697 .139 17.989 1 111 .000 2.063 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
b. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 442.022 1 442.022 17.989 .000b 
Residual 2727.447 111 24.572   
Total 3169.469 112    
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI_Score 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 17.638 .767  22.992 .000    
Total_PDI_Scor
e 
.047 .011 .373 4.241 .000 .373 .373 .373 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 17.6378 29.3976 20.2212 1.98661 113 
Residual -10.00961 12.36373 .00000 4.93480 113 
Std. Predicted Value -1.300 4.619 .000 1.000 113 
Std. Residual -2.019 2.494 .000 .996 113 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
 
Chapter 7 
No significant group differences were found in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 8 
Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
True_overall 3.7058 .81175 83 
Total_PDI 57.2892 43.22841 83 
 
 
Correlations 
 True_overall Total_PDI 
Pearson Correlation True_overall 1.000 .140 
Total_PDI .140 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) True_overall . .104 
Total_PDI .104 . 
N True_overall 83 83 
Total_PDI 83 83 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Total_PDIb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .140a .020 .007 .80873 1.848 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI 
b. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.055 1 1.055 1.614 .208b 
Residual 52.977 81 .654   
Total 54.032 82    
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI 
 290 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta 
Zero-
order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 3.555 .148  24.032 .000    
Total_PDI .003 .002 .140 1.270 .208 .140 .140 .140 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 3.5555 4.2536 3.7058 .11345 83 
Residual -1.42947 2.29494 .00000 .80378 83 
Std. Predicted Value -1.325 4.828 .000 1.000 83 
Std. Residual -1.768 2.838 .000 .994 83 
a. Dependent Variable: True_overall 
 
 
 
 
 
 ******************************************************* 
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Regression 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Total_coincidences 20.0723 5.49009 83 
Total_PDI 57.2892 43.22841 83 
 
 
Correlations 
 Total_coincidences Total_PDI 
Pearson Correlation Total_coincidences 1.000 .221 
Total_PDI .221 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Total_coincidences . .023 
Total_PDI .023 . 
N Total_coincidences 83 83 
Total_PDI 83 83 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Total_PDIb . Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Mode
l R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .221a .049 .037 5.38790 .049 4.140 1 81 .045 1.594 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI 
b. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 120.176 1 120.176 4.140 .045b 
Residual 2351.390 81 29.030   
Total 2471.566 82    
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Total_PDI 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part 
1 (Constant) 18.468 .986  18.737 .000    
Total_PDI .028 .014 .221 2.035 .045 .221 .221 .221 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
 
 
Residuals Statisticsa 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 18.4679 25.9172 20.0723 1.21060 83 
Residual -10.46792 18.18785 .00000 5.35495 83 
Std. Predicted Value -1.325 4.828 .000 1.000 83 
Std. Residual -1.943 3.376 .000 .994 83 
a. Dependent Variable: Total_coincidences 
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Appendix 36 – SPSS outputs screening for normality  
Chapter 2 
 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Narratives_overall 101 100.0% 0 0.0% 101 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Narratives_overall Mean 4.8903 .05128 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 4.7885  
Upper Bound 4.9920  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.8907  
Median 4.8667  
Variance .266  
Std. Deviation .51539  
Minimum 3.61  
Maximum 6.38  
Range 2.77  
Interquartile Range .68  
Skewness .065 .240 
Kurtosis .332 .476 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Narratives_overall .074 101 .200* .993 101 .881 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Narratives_overall 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Narratives_overall 65 100.0% 0 0.0% 65 100.0% 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Narratives_overall Mean 4.8215 .09577 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 4.6302  
Upper Bound 5.0128  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.8297  
Median 4.8000  
Variance .596  
Std. Deviation .77214  
Minimum 2.18  
Maximum 6.77  
Range 4.59  
Interquartile Range .81  
Skewness -.444 .297 
Kurtosis 1.780 .586 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Narratives_overall .098 65 .200* .965 65 .060 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Narratives_overall 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Narratives_overall 93 100.0% 0 0.0% 93 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Narratives_overall Mean 4.4520 .10524 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound 4.2429  
Upper Bound 4.6610  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.3873  
Median 4.2167  
Variance 1.030  
Std. Deviation 1.01493  
Minimum 2.85  
Maximum 8.23  
Range 5.38  
Interquartile Range 1.22  
Skewness 1.027 .250 
Kurtosis 1.518 .495 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Narratives_overall .121 93 .002 .942 93 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Narratives_overall 
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Snowy Pictures 
 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Snowy Pictures correct answers 93 100.0% 0 0.0% 93 100.0% 
Snowy Pictures False Positives 93 100.0% 0 0.0% 93 100.0% 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
93 100.0% 0 0.0% 93 100.0% 
Snowy Pictures None Correct 93 100.0% 0 0.0% 93 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Snowy Pictures correct answers Mean 7.1075 .27069 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 6.5699  
Upper Bound 7.6451  
5% Trimmed Mean 7.2939  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 6.814  
Std. Deviation 2.61044  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 11.00  
Range 11.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness -1.162 .250 
Kurtosis 1.359 .495 
Snowy Pictures False Positives Mean 3.1935 .25412 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.6888  
Upper Bound 3.6983  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.0681  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 6.006  
Std. Deviation 2.45063  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 10.00  
Range 10.00  
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Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .536 .250 
Kurtosis -.471 .495 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
Mean 4.3548 .24731 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.8637  
Upper Bound 4.8460  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.2628  
Median 5.0000  
Variance 5.688  
Std. Deviation 2.38494  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 13.00  
Range 13.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness .639 .250 
Kurtosis 1.372 .495 
Snowy Pictures None Correct Mean 8.0430 .31664 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 7.4141  
Upper Bound 8.6719  
5% Trimmed Mean 8.2700  
Median 8.0000  
Variance 9.324  
Std. Deviation 3.05356  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 12.00  
Range 12.00  
Interquartile Range 4.50  
Skewness -.912 .250 
Kurtosis .602 .495 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Snowy Pictures correct answers .182 93 .000 .881 93 .000 
Snowy Pictures False Positives .138 93 .000 .936 93 .000 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
.134 93 .000 .949 93 .001 
Snowy Pictures None Correct .137 93 .000 .911 93 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 304 
 
Snowy Pictures correct answers 
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Snowy Pictures False Positives 
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 308 
 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made but Incorrect 
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Snowy Pictures None Correct 
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NPar Tests 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
93 4.3548 2.38494 .00 13.00 
Snowy Pictures None Correct 93 8.0430 3.05356 .00 12.00 
Snowy Pictures correct answers 93 7.1075 2.61044 .00 11.00 
Snowy Pictures False Positives 93 3.1935 2.45063 .00 10.00 
PDI_Group 93 1.4946 .50268 1.00 2.00 
 
Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
 PDI_Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Snowy Pictures Attempt Made 
but Incorrect 
Low 47 42.19 1983.00 
High 46 51.91 2388.00 
Total 93   
Snowy Pictures None Correct Low 47 46.90 2204.50 
High 46 47.10 2166.50 
Total 93   
Snowy Pictures correct answers Low 47 47.46 2230.50 
High 46 46.53 2140.50 
Total 93   
Snowy Pictures False Positives Low 47 41.56 1953.50 
High 46 52.55 2417.50 
Total 93   
 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 
Snowy Pictures 
Attempt Made but 
Incorrect 
Snowy Pictures 
None Correct 
Snowy Pictures 
correct answers 
Snowy Pictures 
False Positives 
Mann-Whitney U 855.000 1076.500 1059.500 825.500 
Wilcoxon W 1983.000 2204.500 2140.500 1953.500 
Z -1.760 -.035 -.168 -1.980 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .078 .972 .867 .048 
a. Grouping Variable: PDI_Group 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Narratives_overall 80 66.1% 41 33.9% 121 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Narratives_overall Mean 4.3988 .09452 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.2106  
Upper Bound 4.5869  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.3866  
Median 4.3333  
Variance .715  
Std. Deviation .84545  
Minimum 2.55  
Maximum 6.50  
Range 3.95  
Interquartile Range 1.17  
Skewness .250 .269 
Kurtosis -.168 .532 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Narratives_overall .087 80 .200* .987 80 .581 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Narratives_overall 
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Bridge the Associate Gap task 
 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Word_occurrence_related_uniq
ue 
84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
Word_occurence_related_rare 84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
Word_occurance_related_comm
on 
84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
Word_occurrence_unrelated_un
ique 
84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
Word_occurance_unrelated_rar
e 
84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
Word_occurrence_unrelated_co
mmon 
84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Word_occurrence_related_uniq
ue 
Mean 1.6429 .18135 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 1.2822  
Upper Bound 2.0035  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.4947  
Median 1.0000  
Variance 2.762  
Std. Deviation 1.66207  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 7.00  
Range 7.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness 1.106 .263 
Kurtosis .804 .520 
Word_occurence_related_rare Mean 1.3810 .13218 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 1.1181  
Upper Bound 1.6439  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.2751  
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Median 1.0000  
Variance 1.468  
Std. Deviation 1.21144  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 5.00  
Range 5.00  
Interquartile Range 1.75  
Skewness 1.015 .263 
Kurtosis 1.119 .520 
Word_occurance_related_comm
on 
Mean 6.8929 .20184 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 6.4914  
Upper Bound 7.2943  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.9762  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 3.422  
Std. Deviation 1.84990  
Minimum 2.00  
Maximum 10.00  
Range 8.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness -.553 .263 
Kurtosis -.179 .520 
Word_occurrence_unrelated_un
ique 
Mean 3.0833 .22862 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.6286  
Upper Bound 3.5381  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.9974  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 4.391  
Std. Deviation 2.09537  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 9.00  
Range 9.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .732 .263 
Kurtosis .105 .520 
Word_occurance_unrelated_rar
e 
Mean 1.1548 .10910 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .9378  
Upper Bound 1.3718  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.0899  
Median 1.0000  
Variance 1.000  
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Std. Deviation .99993  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 4.00  
Range 4.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .570 .263 
Kurtosis -.048 .520 
Word_occurrence_unrelated_co
mmon 
Mean 5.4524 .23124 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.9925  
Upper Bound 5.9123  
5% Trimmed Mean 5.4868  
Median 6.0000  
Variance 4.492  
Std. Deviation 2.11936  
Minimum 1.00  
Maximum 10.00  
Range 9.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness -.236 .263 
Kurtosis -.381 .520 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Word_occurrence_related_uniq
ue 
.234 84 .000 .857 84 .000 
Word_occurence_related_rare .231 84 .000 .863 84 .000 
Word_occurance_related_comm
on 
.166 84 .000 .942 84 .001 
Word_occurrence_unrelated_un
ique 
.159 84 .000 .925 84 .000 
Word_occurance_unrelated_rar
e 
.192 84 .000 .862 84 .000 
Word_occurrence_unrelated_co
mmon 
.130 84 .001 .964 84 .020 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Word_occurance_related_common 
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Word_occurrence_unrelated_unique 
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Word_occurance_unrelated_rare 
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Word_occurrence_unrelated_common 
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Coincidences 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Total_coincidences 84 69.4% 37 30.6% 121 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Total_coincidences Mean 21.7381 .71399 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 20.3180  
Upper Bound 23.1582  
5% Trimmed Mean 21.2778  
Median 21.0000  
Variance 42.822  
Std. Deviation 6.54386  
Minimum 10.00  
Maximum 51.00  
Range 41.00  
Interquartile Range 7.75  
Skewness 1.491 .263 
Kurtosis 3.965 .520 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Total_coincidences .164 84 .000 .902 84 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Total_coincidences 
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NPar Tests 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total_coincidences 84 21.7381 6.54386 10.00 51.00 
PDI_Group 83 1.4819 .50271 1.00 2.00 
 
Mann-Whitney Test 
 
Ranks 
 PDI_Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Total_coincidences Low 43 33.94 1459.50 
High 40 50.66 2026.50 
Total 83   
 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 Total_coincidences 
Mann-Whitney U 513.500 
Wilcoxon W 1459.500 
Z -3.166 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
a. Grouping Variable: PDI_Group 
 
Chapter 6 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Poor total 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Possible total 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Good total 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Excellent total 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
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Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Poor total Mean 7.6991 .43563 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 6.8360  
Upper Bound 8.5623  
5% Trimmed Mean 7.4626  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 21.444  
Std. Deviation 4.63081  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 22.00  
Range 22.00  
Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness .744 .227 
Kurtosis .692 .451 
Possible total Mean 9.3097 .38992 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 8.5372  
Upper Bound 10.0823  
5% Trimmed Mean 9.1903  
Median 9.0000  
Variance 17.180  
Std. Deviation 4.14488  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 27.00  
Range 27.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .702 .227 
Kurtosis 2.338 .451 
Good total Mean 7.7965 .34568 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 7.1115  
Upper Bound 8.4814  
5% Trimmed Mean 7.7178  
Median 8.0000  
Variance 13.503  
Std. Deviation 3.67462  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 20.00  
Range 20.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
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Skewness .420 .227 
Kurtosis 1.514 .451 
Excellent total Mean 1.4867 .19069 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 1.1089  
Upper Bound 1.8646  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.2561  
Median 1.0000  
Variance 4.109  
Std. Deviation 2.02712  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 11.00  
Range 11.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness 1.905 .227 
Kurtosis 4.324 .451 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Poor total .121 113 .000 .955 113 .001 
Possible total .129 113 .000 .960 113 .002 
Good total .127 113 .000 .952 113 .000 
Excellent total .259 113 .000 .742 113 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Poor total 
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Possible total 
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Good total 
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Excellent total 
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 345 
 
Thematic Apperception test with 3 interpretations 
 
 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Poor 3 interpretation 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Possible 3 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Good 3 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Excellent 3 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Poor 3 interpretation Mean 2.2655 .15952 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 1.9494  
Upper Bound 2.5815  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.1903  
Median 2.0000  
Variance 2.875  
Std. Deviation 1.69568  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 7.00  
Range 7.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .457 .227 
Kurtosis -.301 .451 
Possible 3 interpretations Mean 3.0265 .16170 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.7062  
Upper Bound 3.3469  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.9607  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 2.955  
Std. Deviation 1.71891  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 9.00  
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Range 9.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .656 .227 
Kurtosis .922 .451 
Good 3 interpretations Mean 2.7876 .14358 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.5031  
Upper Bound 3.0721  
5% Trimmed Mean 2.7606  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 2.329  
Std. Deviation 1.52627  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 7.00  
Range 7.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .136 .227 
Kurtosis -.019 .451 
Excellent 3 interpretations Mean .7434 .10425 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .5368  
Upper Bound .9499  
5% Trimmed Mean .6101  
Median .0000  
Variance 1.228  
Std. Deviation 1.10824  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 6.00  
Range 6.00  
Interquartile Range 1.00  
Skewness 1.889 .227 
Kurtosis 4.390 .451 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Poor 3 interpretation .135 113 .000 .931 113 .000 
Possible 3 interpretations .161 113 .000 .944 113 .000 
Good 3 interpretations .139 113 .000 .949 113 .000 
Excellent 3 interpretations .324 113 .000 .705 113 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Poor 3 interpretation 
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Possible 3 interpretations 
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Good 3 interpretations 
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Excellent 3 interpretations 
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Thematic Apperception Test with 6 interpretations 
 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Poor 6 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Possible 6 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Good 6 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
Excellent 6 interpretations 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Poor 6 interpretations Mean 5.4336 .31374 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.8120  
Upper Bound 6.0553  
5% Trimmed Mean 5.2625  
Median 5.0000  
Variance 11.123  
Std. Deviation 3.33508  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 15.00  
Range 15.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .758 .227 
Kurtosis .562 .451 
Possible 6 interpretations Mean 6.2832 .28346 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 5.7215  
Upper Bound 6.8448  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.1804  
Median 6.0000  
Variance 9.080  
Std. Deviation 3.01327  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 18.00  
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Range 18.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .715 .227 
Kurtosis 1.859 .451 
Good 6 interpretations Mean 5.0088 .26294 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.4879  
Upper Bound 5.5298  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.8953  
Median 5.0000  
Variance 7.812  
Std. Deviation 2.79507  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 13.00  
Range 13.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness .553 .227 
Kurtosis .663 .451 
Excellent 6 interpretations Mean .7434 .11437 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .5167  
Upper Bound .9700  
5% Trimmed Mean .5905  
Median .0000  
Variance 1.478  
Std. Deviation 1.21581  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 8.00  
Range 8.00  
Interquartile Range 1.00  
Skewness 2.662 .227 
Kurtosis 10.832 .451 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Poor 6 interpretations .145 113 .000 .948 113 .000 
Possible 6 interpretations .096 113 .012 .959 113 .002 
Good 6 interpretations .140 113 .000 .955 113 .001 
Excellent 6 interpretations .322 113 .000 .650 113 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Poor 6 interpretations 
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Possible 6 interpretations 
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Good 6 interpretations 
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Excellent 6 interpretations 
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Coincidences 
 
 
Explore 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Total_coincidences 113 100.0% 0 0.0% 113 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Total_coincidences Mean 20.2212 .50043 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 19.2297  
Upper Bound 21.2128  
5% Trimmed Mean 20.1509  
Median 20.0000  
Variance 28.299  
Std. Deviation 5.31966  
Minimum 8.00  
Maximum 34.00  
Range 26.00  
Interquartile Range 7.00  
Skewness .184 .227 
Kurtosis -.038 .451 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Total_coincidences .069 113 .200* .989 113 .459 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Total_coincidences 
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Chapter 7 
 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Number_of_correct_decisions 89 100.0% 0 0.0% 89 100.0% 
Number_of_incorrect_decisions 89 100.0% 0 0.0% 89 100.0% 
Number_of_correct_rejections 89 100.0% 0 0.0% 89 100.0% 
Number_of_incorrect_rejections 89 100.0% 0 0.0% 89 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Number_of_correct_decisions Mean 7.6292 .45463 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 6.7257  
Upper Bound 8.5327  
5% Trimmed Mean 7.4395  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 18.395  
Std. Deviation 4.28894  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 19.00  
Range 19.00  
Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness .665 .255 
Kurtosis .652 .506 
Number_of_incorrect_decisions Mean 7.5393 .85041 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 5.8493  
Upper Bound 9.2293  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.3964  
Median 6.0000  
Variance 64.365  
Std. Deviation 8.02277  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 49.00  
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Range 49.00  
Interquartile Range 7.00  
Skewness 3.172 .255 
Kurtosis 12.990 .506 
Number_of_correct_rejections Mean 24.8989 1.55081 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 21.8170  
Upper Bound 27.9808  
5% Trimmed Mean 24.9476  
Median 28.0000  
Variance 214.046  
Std. Deviation 14.63033  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 55.00  
Range 55.00  
Interquartile Range 21.00  
Skewness -.393 .255 
Kurtosis -.861 .506 
Number_of_incorrect_rejections Mean 3.8315 .33030 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 3.1751  
Upper Bound 4.4879  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.6573  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 9.710  
Std. Deviation 3.11607  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 14.00  
Range 14.00  
Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness .709 .255 
Kurtosis .003 .506 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Number_of_correct_decisions .109 89 .011 .953 89 .003 
Number_of_incorrect_decisions .188 89 .000 .686 89 .000 
Number_of_correct_rejections .105 89 .017 .933 89 .000 
Number_of_incorrect_rejections .156 89 .000 .923 89 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Number_of_incorrect_decisions 
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Number_of_correct_rejections 
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Number_of_incorrect_rejections 
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 378 
 
 
NPar Tests 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number_of_correct_decisions 89 7.6292 4.28894 .00 19.00 
Number_of_incorrect_decisions 89 7.5393 8.02277 .00 49.00 
Number_of_correct_rejections 89 24.8989 14.63033 .00 55.00 
Number_of_incorrect_rejections 89 3.8315 3.11607 .00 14.00 
Correct_decisions_mean_probab
ility 
84 83.8892 15.38848 34.60 100.00 
Incorrect_decisions_mean_proba
bility 
78 71.1091 18.74255 16.60 100.00 
Correct_decisions_minimum 84 65.3571 25.33850 10.00 100.00 
Incorrect_decisions_minimum 78 53.2051 26.30953 10.00 100.00 
Correct_rejection_mean_probabil
ity 
82 20.1118 16.04389 .00 90.63 
Incorrect_rejection_mean_proba
bility 
79 23.8914 17.31624 .00 87.70 
Correct_rejection_maximum 82 39.5122 24.43952 .00 100.00 
Incorrect_rejection_maximum 79 32.2785 23.09120 .00 100.00 
PDI_Group 89 1.4944 .50280 1.00 2.00 
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Mann-Whitney Test 
Ranks 
 PDI_Group N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Number_of_correct_decisions Low 45 43.58 1961.00 
High 44 46.45 2044.00 
Total 89   
Number_of_incorrect_decisions Low 45 50.30 2263.50 
High 44 39.58 1741.50 
Total 89   
Number_of_correct_rejections Low 45 42.40 1908.00 
High 44 47.66 2097.00 
Total 89   
Number_of_incorrect_rejections Low 45 44.38 1997.00 
High 44 45.64 2008.00 
Total 89   
Correct_decisions_mean_probab
ility 
Low 44 41.42 1822.50 
High 40 43.69 1747.50 
Total 84   
Incorrect_decisions_mean_proba
bility 
Low 41 38.94 1596.50 
High 37 40.12 1484.50 
Total 78   
Correct_decisions_minimum Low 44 42.42 1866.50 
High 40 42.59 1703.50 
Total 84   
Incorrect_decisions_minimum Low 41 37.34 1531.00 
High 37 41.89 1550.00 
Total 78   
Correct_rejection_mean_probabil
ity 
Low 43 42.81 1841.00 
High 39 40.05 1562.00 
Total 82   
Incorrect_rejection_mean_proba
bility 
Low 41 39.94 1637.50 
High 38 40.07 1522.50 
Total 79   
Correct_rejection_maximum Low 43 42.30 1819.00 
High 39 40.62 1584.00 
Total 82   
Incorrect_rejection_maximum Low 41 38.84 1592.50 
High 38 41.25 1567.50 
Total 79   
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Test Statisticsa 
 
Number_of_corr
ect_decisions 
Number_of_inco
rrect_decisions 
Number_of_corr
ect_rejections 
Number_of_inco
rrect_rejections 
Mann-Whitney U 926.000 751.500 873.000 962.000 
Wilcoxon W 1961.000 1741.500 1908.000 1997.000 
Z -.527 -1.963 -.961 -.232 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .598 .050 .337 .817 
a. Grouping Variable: PDI_Group 
 
 
Test Statisticsa 
 
Correct_deci
sions_mean
_probability 
Incorrect_de
cisions_mea
n_probability 
Correct_deci
sions_minim
um 
Incorrect_de
cisions_mini
mum 
Correct_reje
ction_mean
_probability 
Incorrect_rej
ection_mea
n_probability 
Correct_reje
ction_maxim
um 
Incorrect_rej
ection_maxi
mum 
Mann-
Whitney U 
832.500 735.500 876.500 670.000 782.000 776.500 804.000 731.500 
Wilcoxon 
W 
1822.500 1596.500 1866.500 1531.000 1562.000 1637.500 1584.000 1592.500 
Z -.426 -.230 -.032 -.898 -.525 -.025 -.324 -.476 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.670 .818 .975 .369 .600 .980 .746 .634 
a. Grouping Variable: PDI_Group 
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Chapter 8 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Narratives_Overall 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Narratives_Overall Mean 4.5060 .10425 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.2986  
Upper Bound 4.7134  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.4724  
Median 4.3611  
Variance .902  
Std. Deviation .94978  
Minimum 2.58  
Maximum 7.14  
Range 4.56  
Interquartile Range 1.11  
Skewness .442 .264 
Kurtosis .350 .523 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Narratives_Overall .067 83 .200* .979 83 .183 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Narratives_Overall 
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Thematic Apperception Test – total number of interpretations 
 
 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Poor_interpretation_total 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Possible_interpretation_total 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Good_interpretation_total 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Excellent_interpretation_total 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Poor_interpretation_total Mean 7.0000 .45838 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 6.0881  
Upper Bound 7.9119  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.8487  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 17.439  
Std. Deviation 4.17601  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 19.00  
Range 19.00  
Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness .550 .264 
Kurtosis .011 .523 
Possible_interpretation_total Mean 9.5542 .41541 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 8.7278  
Upper Bound 10.3806  
5% Trimmed Mean 9.4933  
Median 9.0000  
Variance 14.323  
Std. Deviation 3.78461  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 21.00  
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Range 21.00  
Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness .261 .264 
Kurtosis 1.281 .523 
Good_interpretation_total Mean 8.0482 .41352 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 7.2256  
Upper Bound 8.8708  
5% Trimmed Mean 7.9980  
Median 8.0000  
Variance 14.193  
Std. Deviation 3.76733  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 18.00  
Range 18.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .126 .264 
Kurtosis .376 .523 
Excellent_interpretation_total Mean 1.8795 .28499 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 1.3126  
Upper Bound 2.4465  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.5656  
Median 1.0000  
Variance 6.741  
Std. Deviation 2.59642  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 13.00  
Range 13.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness 1.802 .264 
Kurtosis 3.693 .523 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Poor_interpretation_total .092 83 .079 .966 83 .026 
Possible_interpretation_total .117 83 .007 .963 83 .018 
Good_interpretation_total .089 83 .159 .974 83 .097 
Excellent_interpretation_total .235 83 .000 .752 83 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Poor_interpretation_total 
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Possible_interpretation_total 
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Good_interpretation_total 
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Excellent_interpretation_total 
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Thematic Apperception Test - 3 and 6 interpretations 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Poor_interpretation_3 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Possible_interpretation_3 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Good_interpretation_3 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Excellent_interpretation_3 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Poor_interpretation_6 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Possible_interpretation_6 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Good_interpretation_6 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Excellent_interpretation_6 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Poor_interpretation_3 Mean 2.0241 .17395 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 1.6780  
Upper Bound 2.3701  
5% Trimmed Mean 1.9311  
Median 2.0000  
Variance 2.512  
Std. Deviation 1.58481  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 7.00  
Range 7.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .656 .264 
Kurtosis .143 .523 
Possible_interpretation_3 Mean 3.1084 .18622 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.7380  
Upper Bound 3.4789  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.0669  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 2.878  
Std. Deviation 1.69657  
Minimum .00  
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Maximum 8.00  
Range 8.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness .364 .264 
Kurtosis .236 .523 
Good_interpretation_3 Mean 2.9880 .15380 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.6820  
Upper Bound 3.2939  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.0020  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 1.963  
Std. Deviation 1.40117  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 6.00  
Range 6.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
Skewness -.169 .264 
Kurtosis -.080 .523 
Excellent_interpretation_3 Mean .7711 .11917 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .5340  
Upper Bound 1.0081  
5% Trimmed Mean .6633  
Median .0000  
Variance 1.179  
Std. Deviation 1.08566  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 4.00  
Range 4.00  
Interquartile Range 1.00  
Skewness 1.351 .264 
Kurtosis .902 .523 
Poor_interpretation_6 Mean 4.9759 .33151 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.3164  
Upper Bound 5.6354  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.8621  
Median 5.0000  
Variance 9.121  
Std. Deviation 3.02016  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 13.00  
Range 13.00  
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Interquartile Range 5.00  
Skewness .516 .264 
Kurtosis -.111 .523 
Possible_interpretation_6 Mean 6.4458 .29205 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 5.8648  
Upper Bound 7.0268  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.4284  
Median 7.0000  
Variance 7.079  
Std. Deviation 2.66070  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 14.00  
Range 14.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness .086 .264 
Kurtosis .527 .523 
Good_interpretation_6 Mean 5.0602 .31671 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 4.4302  
Upper Bound 5.6903  
5% Trimmed Mean 4.9598  
Median 5.0000  
Variance 8.326  
Std. Deviation 2.88541  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 13.00  
Range 13.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .382 .264 
Kurtosis .151 .523 
Excellent_interpretation_6 Mean 1.1084 .19167 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound .7271  
Upper Bound 1.4897  
5% Trimmed Mean .9003  
Median .0000  
Variance 3.049  
Std. Deviation 1.74616  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 9.00  
Range 9.00  
Interquartile Range 2.00  
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Skewness 1.971 .264 
Kurtosis 4.493 .523 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Poor_interpretation_3 .169 83 .000 .920 83 .000 
Possible_interpretation_3 .140 83 .000 .954 83 .005 
Good_interpretation_3 .166 83 .000 .946 83 .002 
Excellent_interpretation_3 .327 83 .000 .728 83 .000 
Poor_interpretation_6 .115 83 .009 .959 83 .009 
Possible_interpretation_6 .104 83 .026 .980 83 .237 
Good_interpretation_6 .113 83 .010 .967 83 .033 
Excellent_interpretation_6 .316 83 .000 .690 83 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Snowy Pictures Task 
Explore 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Snowy_Pictures_correct_answe
r 
83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Snowy_Pictures_false_positives 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Snowy_Pictures_incorrect_atte
mpt 
83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
Snowy_Pictures_none_correct 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Snowy_Pictures_correct_answe
r 
Mean 5.5904 .26056 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 5.0720  
Upper Bound 6.1087  
5% Trimmed Mean 5.6693  
Median 6.0000  
Variance 5.635  
Std. Deviation 2.37382  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 10.00  
Range 10.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness -.505 .264 
Kurtosis -.272 .523 
Snowy_Pictures_false_positives Mean 3.2771 .30149 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 2.6774  
Upper Bound 3.8769  
5% Trimmed Mean 3.0897  
Median 3.0000  
Variance 7.544  
Std. Deviation 2.74668  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 12.00  
Range 12.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness .861 .264 
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Kurtosis .391 .523 
Snowy_Pictures_incorrect_atte
mpt 
Mean 6.2169 .26559 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 5.6885  
Upper Bound 6.7452  
5% Trimmed Mean 6.1854  
Median 6.0000  
Variance 5.855  
Std. Deviation 2.41968  
Minimum 1.00  
Maximum 12.00  
Range 11.00  
Interquartile Range 3.00  
Skewness .279 .264 
Kurtosis -.164 .523 
Snowy_Pictures_none_correct Mean 8.5422 .31900 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 7.9076  
Upper Bound 9.1768  
5% Trimmed Mean 8.7631  
Median 9.0000  
Variance 8.446  
Std. Deviation 2.90626  
Minimum .00  
Maximum 12.00  
Range 12.00  
Interquartile Range 4.00  
Skewness -.915 .264 
Kurtosis .496 .523 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Snowy_Pictures_correct_answe
r 
.182 83 .000 .949 83 .002 
Snowy_Pictures_false_positives .149 83 .000 .915 83 .000 
Snowy_Pictures_incorrect_atte
mpt 
.162 83 .000 .967 83 .033 
Snowy_Pictures_none_correct .150 83 .000 .909 83 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Coincidences 
Explore 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Total_coincidences 83 100.0% 0 0.0% 83 100.0% 
 
Descriptives 
 Statistic Std. Error 
Total_coincidences Mean 20.0723 .60262 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Lower Bound 18.8735  
Upper Bound 21.2711  
5% Trimmed Mean 19.9331  
Median 20.0000  
Variance 30.141  
Std. Deviation 5.49009  
Minimum 8.00  
Maximum 38.00  
Range 30.00  
Interquartile Range 8.00  
Skewness .414 .264 
Kurtosis .244 .523 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Total_coincidences .086 83 .200 .981 83 .265 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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